Karen Papadopoulos

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal following a criminal conviction, arguing that the new witness evidence was reasonably capable of belief on key points relating to self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for lack of cogency.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, found no reviewable error in the Court of Appeal's cogency analysis and dismissed the appeal.

In dissent, Karakatsanis and Côté JJ. would have allowed the appeal, finding that the majority erred in law by making its own determination of the witness's ultimate credibility in the cogency analysis and by erring in the due diligence analysis, and would have admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial.

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

The Crown sought to cross-examine the appellant's former trial and appellate counsel, now a Superior Court judge, on his affidavit evidence submitted in support of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The appellant and the intervening judge opposed cross-examination, arguing that it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and proposing written interrogatories as an alternative.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion for cross-examination, holding that judicial immunity does not apply to conduct undertaken prior to judicial appointment and that cross-examination is the norm for affidavit evidence in appellate proceedings.

The Court addressed the test for fitness to stand trial under s. 2 of the Criminal Code and held that fitness requires capacity to make and communicate reality-based defence decisions, not capacity to make decisions in one’s best interests.

Applying that standard, the majority found no basis to disturb findings that the accused was fit despite fluctuating psychotic symptoms, because the record showed sustained reality-based participation and intelligible communication.

The majority also dismissed fresh and new evidence motions concerning post-trial psychiatric evidence and later judicial findings about the Crown expert’s practices, concluding the proposed evidence could not reasonably have affected the verdict.

A dissent would have admitted the fresh evidence, found a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Robert Ashley Williams from his conviction for second degree murder.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by not leaving the partial defence of provocation with the jury and by misdirecting the jury on the defence of self-defence.

The court found that the evidence did not support leaving provocation with the jury, as the appellant's actions made the victim's response foreseeable and there was no air of reality to the loss of self-control or suddenness elements.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's self-defence instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerns a partial stay of proceedings granted by a trial judge due to Charter violations arising from an unauthorized "no-knock" police entry into the accused's residence to effect an arrest.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in granting a partial stay based on a factual misapprehension and in rejecting alternative remedies.

The Court concluded that while the police misconduct was serious, a stay was not warranted given the lack of evidence of a systemic problem and the availability of alternative remedies like a strong judicial reprimand and potential sentence reduction.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, vacating the stay, and the accused's cross-appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Elias Gibb, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising three grounds: the constitutionality of the Criminal Code's provocation provision (s. 232(2)), the trial judge's failure to provide a free-standing instruction on intoxication's impact on mens rea for murder, and an error in the W.D. instruction for co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge based on a companion case.

Regarding intoxication, the court found no error, noting the defence strategically chose to integrate intoxication into the provocation defence rather than seeking a separate instruction.

The court also found that while the W.D. instruction was imperfect in its wording, it did not lead to an unfair verdict when read in context, as the jury was otherwise properly instructed on separate verdicts for each accused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Sukhchain Brar, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, Gurpreet Brar.

He admitted the killing but sought a manslaughter conviction based on lack of mens rea or provocation.

The appeal raised constitutional challenges to s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code, which defines the partial defence of provocation, arguing it infringes s. 7 of the Charter by being arbitrary and overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the purpose of the amendment was to limit provocation to serious unlawful conduct, not just to address "honour killings." The court also dismissed other non-constitutional grounds of appeal related to jury instructions on provocation, cultural/religious motive, ante-mortem statements, and after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and appealed on the grounds that the Criminal Code's provocation provisions were unconstitutional and that the trial judge erred in jury instructions on provocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, affirming its reasoning in a companion case.

The court also dismissed the appeal regarding jury instructions, holding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the elements of assault and self-defence as they relate to the definition of provocation under section 232(2) of the Criminal Code, which requires the provocative act to constitute an indictable offence.

Elijah Gilmore-Bent sought a stay of charges for possession of a loaded firearm, alleging violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Charter due to excessive force by correctional officers and a subsequent cover-up through false reports and testimony.

The court found that Officer Warburton's use of pepper spray was excessive and unnecessary, aggravated by Gilmore-Bent's 15-day segregation.

Furthermore, several officers colluded to write false use-of-force reports and provided dishonest testimony, indicating a systemic lack of oversight and accountability.

The court determined that no alternative remedy was sufficient and that continuing the prosecution would undermine the integrity of the justice system, granting a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on two grounds: the constitutionality of the amended s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code regarding provocation, and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge on the Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence.

The Court of Appeal declined to rule on the constitutional question, finding it was raised tactically for the first time on appeal and lacked an air of reality.

The court also found no reversible error in the NCR instructions, clarifying that the jury was properly guided on the disjunctive nature of the s. 16 test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jasper Atienza, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He raised three grounds of appeal concerning the trial judge's jury instructions: (1) whether the evidence showed only one vehicle at the shooting scene; (2) the probative value of post-offence association with co-accused Laurie Phan regarding planning and deliberation; and (3) inferring guilt from his failure to disclose his destination when leaving an apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The court affirmed the trial judge's discretion in reviewing evidence, noting the weakness of the two-car theory and that Ms. Phan's acquittal rendered any potential error regarding post-offence association harmless as it negated a joint planning theory.

The court also found no prejudice from the brief reference to the appellant's undisclosed destination.

The appellants, Demitry Papasotiriou and Mladen Ivezic, appealed their convictions for the first-degree murder of Mr. Papasotiriou's husband.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants, who were lovers, conspired to kill the victim for financial gain, with Mr. Ivezic committing the physical act while Mr. Papasotiriou was in Greece.

Mr. Papasotiriou argued the verdict was unreasonable and that his co-accused's self-represented conduct rendered the trial unfair.

Mr. Ivezic raised issues regarding alternate suspect evidence, lifestyle evidence, DNA disclosure, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the verdict reasonable, the trial fair, and no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents for first-degree murder and kidnapping.

At trial, a key alleged co-conspirator refused to testify, prompting the Crown to seek the admission of his prior police statements under the principled hearsay exception.

The trial judge excluded the statements, finding they lacked threshold procedural and substantive reliability, particularly given the witness's status as a Vetrovec witness, inconsistencies in the statements, and the lack of cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no reversible error in applying the Bradshaw framework and concluding that the corroborative evidence did not overcome the specific hearsay dangers.

The appellant, Shakeil Wheatle, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the Vetrovec caution for an unsavoury witness (A.B.) and the eyewitness identification evidence were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions were adequate, properly conveying the necessary caution and addressing the frailties of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code for a review of a decision denying him bail pending trial.

He argued that a new release plan and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstances.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding no material error in the second bail judge's conclusion that the new release plan did not address the primary and secondary grounds for detention, and that the evidence regarding the pandemic's impact on the applicant was insufficient to constitute a material change.

This is an appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board concerning a restriction of liberty hearing for an appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) for aggravated assault.

The appellant, who has schizophrenia, had his liberty restricted and was transferred to a more secure forensic unit after his mental health deteriorated due to discontinuing medication.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to consider his liberty interests and other needs, including a request for a lateral transfer to another unit, and that the Board's findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board considered all required factors and that there was sufficient evidence to support the transfer to a more secure unit, including testimony from the treating psychiatrist regarding the appellant's unmanageability and risk of harm.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the restriction of liberty was necessary to be reasonable.

The appellant, Anthony Alas, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by not leaving the defence of provocation with the jury, admitting his police statement, and inadequately charging the jury.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the first ground, finding that the defence of provocation had an air of reality and should have been considered by the jury, despite trial counsel's concession.

A new trial was ordered.

The court found no merit in the other two grounds of appeal.

The appellant, P.D.C., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, criminal harassment, and breach of recognizance.

He raised five grounds of appeal, primarily concerning the trial judge's refusal to grant a mistrial or appoint amicus curiae after he discharged his counsel mid-trial, and the adequacy of the trial judge's guidance as a self-represented accused.

He also challenged the similar fact evidence ruling and the jury instructions on consent for the sexual assault charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding the mistrial and amicus appointment, noting the appellant's voluntary decision to discharge counsel at an advanced stage of the trial.

The court also found that the trial judge provided sufficient guidance to the self-represented accused and that the jury instructions on consent were adequate given the evidence and theory of the case.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by excluding a co-accused's out-of-court hearsay statements, admitting the co-accused's guilty plea and agreed statement of facts, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, correctly admitted the edited guilty plea to preserve trial fairness, and provided a clear and error-free jury instruction regarding post-offence conduct.