Dena Nancy Bonnet

The Crown appealed a verdict finding the respondent not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for first-degree murder and other offences.

The respondent had killed his brother-in-law and assaulted his mother and sister while experiencing command delusions.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test for expert evidence and failed to properly assess the respondent's capacity to know his actions were morally wrong.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and correctly concluded the respondent's major mental illness rendered him incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a shooting.

He argued that the verdict was unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence was incapable of establishing that he aided the unknown shooter, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample circumstantial evidence to support the inference that the appellant aided the shooter by identifying the victims and letting the shooter into the unit.

The court also held that the wilful blindness instruction was appropriate and did not risk lowering the standard of proof.

The appellant appealed a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) verdict entered on February 24, 2017, following a psychiatric assessment that concluded the appellant did not know his actions were wrong due to untreated schizophrenia.

The appeal was based on serious procedural defects at the hearing, including failure to arraign the appellant, failure to take a plea, failure to make elections on four of five charges, failure to read facts into the record, absence of viva voce evidence, and failure to address the appellant or allow him to speak.

The Crown conceded the procedural flaws warranted setting aside the verdict.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the NCRMD verdict, and ordered a new trial.

The Court addressed the test for fitness to stand trial under s. 2 of the Criminal Code and held that fitness requires capacity to make and communicate reality-based defence decisions, not capacity to make decisions in one’s best interests.

Applying that standard, the majority found no basis to disturb findings that the accused was fit despite fluctuating psychotic symptoms, because the record showed sustained reality-based participation and intelligible communication.

The majority also dismissed fresh and new evidence motions concerning post-trial psychiatric evidence and later judicial findings about the Crown expert’s practices, concluding the proposed evidence could not reasonably have affected the verdict.

A dissent would have admitted the fresh evidence, found a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, Richard Pereira, was convicted of second degree murder in the death of Kathryn Horne.

At trial, the defence conceded that Pereira killed Horne, but argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal reviewed whether the trial judge erred in applying the NCR test, in analyzing post-offence conduct, and in considering expert evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no error in the trial judge’s approach to the NCR defence, the use of post-offence conduct, or the treatment of expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Padraig Teggart from a decision designating him as a "high risk accused" (HRA) under the Criminal Code following a finding of not criminally responsible for attempted murder.

The court found that the application judge applied the correct legal standard and properly considered the evidence, including expert opinions and statutory factors, in concluding that there was a substantial likelihood that Mr. Teggart would use violence endangering the life or safety of others.

The decision affirms the exceptional and sparing use of the HRA designation and the heightened risk threshold required.

The appellant, Gregory Whalen, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his stepdaughter, V.K., and appealed his conviction.

The central issue on appeal was the admissibility of surreptitious audio recordings made by V.K.’s mother during phone calls with the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit the recordings, finding that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury were appropriate.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant, Jerome Williams, appealed the Ontario Review Board’s decision ordering his continued detention in the High Secure Provincial Forensic Programs Division at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

Williams argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge, or alternatively, a transfer to a medium secure facility.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board’s assessment of risk and the necessity of continued detention at Waypoint were reasonable and supported by the evidence, particularly in light of ongoing concerns about medication compliance and substance use.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible for a prior offence, pleaded guilty to serious assaults committed while in a psychiatric facility.

He was subsequently designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to strike his guilty pleas, arguing he did not understand the potential for an indeterminate sentence and that the judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the pleas were informed and that the delayed release of the motion judge's reasons did not render them an after-the-fact justification.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: erroneous admission of character evidence, inadequate jury instruction regarding R. v. Villaroman principles on mens rea, and failure to provide a corrective instruction for improper bolstering of eyewitness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision to admit character evidence, which was deemed relevant after the appellant put his character in issue.

The court also found the jury instruction on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence adequate, negating the need for a specific Villaroman instruction.

Finally, the omission of a corrective instruction was deemed immaterial given trial counsel's lack of insistence.

The Crown appealed a two-year global sentence for aggravated assault and breach of probation, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The respondent had a history of escalating violent offences, and the current incident involved life-threatening injuries to the victim and the use of weapons while on probation.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence demonstrably unfit due to the sentencing judge's failure to properly weigh aggravating factors, including the respondent's repeat violent offending and the concurrent nature of the sentences.

The Court varied the global sentence to three years and six months imprisonment.

However, considering the respondent's significant rehabilitative progress since his release, the remaining custodial portion of the sentence was stayed, and an 18-month probation order with specific conditions was imposed instead.

The appellant, who pleaded guilty to second degree murder, indignity to human remains, and arson, sought to set aside his guilty plea.

He claimed he was unaware of the consequences of his plea, specifically his right to appeal a conviction if he had gone to trial, including challenging the voluntariness ruling of his police statement.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's fresh evidence on this point to be untrue and accepted the trial counsel's credible recollection that the appellant was indeed informed of his appeal rights.

The court concluded that the guilty plea was a strategic, voluntary, unequivocal, and informed decision, given the formidable Crown case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Trevor Basso, appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a minor and his sentence.

He also sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his intellectual disability and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it would not have affected the trial outcome.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge's findings on the appellant's recklessness regarding the complainant's age were consistent with the mens rea requirements clarified in R. v. Carbone.

While the 12-month sentence was affirmed as fit, the court exercised its discretion to consider the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual assault under s. 271(a) of the Criminal Code.

Drawing parallels with R. v. B.J.T., the court declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter due to gross disproportionality in hypothetical scenarios.

The remnant of the appellant's custodial sentence was permanently stayed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for manslaughter and robbery, appealed his designation as a high-risk accused (HRA) under s. 672.64(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's discretionary decision, considering the appellant's extensive history of severe mental disorder, repetitive violent behaviour against strangers, and treatment resistance.

The court found the trial judge's conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood of the appellant using violence that could endanger the life or safety of another person was reasonable and supported by the evidence, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed T.L.'s acquittal for sexual assault.

The trial judge had a reasonable doubt regarding the first alleged incident.

For the second incident, the trial judge found the complainant was too intoxicated to consent.

The Court of Appeal found reversible legal error in the trial judge's analysis of the second incident, specifically the failure to address whether T.L.'s admitted actions (kissing, stroking, masturbating) constituted sexual assault and the lack of reasons for not finding party liability for the sexual assault carried out by another individual.

The acquittal was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Trevor Caruso, appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board (ORB) which found him not criminally responsible (NCR) and ordered his detention due to schizophrenia and various substance use disorders.

The ORB concluded he posed a significant threat to public safety, citing aggressive behaviour when unwell, a compulsive link between substance use and criminal behaviour, and a history of absconding.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the ORB's finding that the appellant remained a significant threat, largely upholding the ORB's reliance on uncharged violent incidents (carjacking, syringe incident) as evidence of risk, while noting that reliance on mere facts of restraint or reported fear without further inquiry was insufficient.

The Court also upheld the ORB's determination that the detention order was the least onerous and restrictive disposition, given the appellant's flight risk, the critical need for daily oral medication, and the high risk of violence if untreated and at large.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence of imprisonment.

He argued that the sentencing judge provided insufficient reasons, failed to properly consider treatability at the designation stage, and improperly placed an evidentiary burden on him to prove a reasonable expectation of eventual control in the community.

He also argued that the trial amicus curiae failed to ensure a fair hearing by conceding that he met the dangerous offender criteria.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant patently met the statutory thresholds for the designation based on a pattern of violent sexual assaults.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not impose an improper burden of proof and that the trial amicus curiae's performance did not cause actual prejudice or create an appearance of unfairness amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, a dual status dangerous offender under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board, appealed the Board's decision declining a placement hearing and affirming his detention in a penitentiary over a maximum-secure forensic hospital.

The Board found the penitentiary placement appropriate given the appellant's extreme risk of re-offence, supported by uncontradicted expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, emphasizing that a court-imposed penitentiary sentence takes precedence for dual status offenders and that the Board's paramount responsibility is public safety.

The appeal was dismissed as the Board's findings were reasonable and amply supported by the record.

This decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario serves as a notice regarding a non-publication order imposed under s. 517 of the Criminal Code.

The order prohibits the publication of evidence, information, representations, and reasons from the underlying bail hearing.

Consequently, the full decision on the application to set aside a detention order will not be publicly available on the court's website until the non-publication order expires.

A physical copy is available at the Court Registry in the interim.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after striking the complainant, causing severe brain injuries.

He appealed his conviction on five grounds, primarily challenging the trial judge's self-defence analysis, including misapprehension of evidence, defensive purpose, reasonableness of actions, and application of R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the appellant's actions were not reasonable in the circumstances, particularly considering his role in initiating the confrontation and available alternatives.