Court of Appeal for Ontario
BEFORE: Huscroft, Roberts and Pomerance JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
I.A.
Appellant
COUNSEL:
Diane Magas, for the appellant
Dena Bonnet, for the respondent
HEARD: May 7, 2026
On appeal from the findings of guilt entered by Justice Robert L. Maranger of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury, on June 8, 2022.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The appellant appeals from his conviction on one count of first degree murder and three counts of attempted murder arising out of a shooting in Ottawa. He argues that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury regarding wilful blindness on the charges.
2We dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.
3The appellant argues that the totality of the evidence was incapable of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided the shooter, whose identity remains unknown. We do not agree.
4This was a circumstantial case. There was ample evidence to support the inference that the user of the “Magic Johnson” phone was the shooter and that he was the man in the blue jacket seen running from the scene of the shooting. And there was ample evidence to support the inference that the appellant, seen running behind the alleged shooter, aided by informing him of the victims and their vulnerability while sleeping and letting the shooter into the unit. As the Crown argued at trial, the evidence demonstrated a nexus in time, a nexus in location, and a nexus in purpose.
5The jury was properly instructed that it could draw inferences only if reasonable and grounded in the evidence, rather than based on speculation or conjecture. It was open to the jury to be satisfied that guilt was the only reasonable conclusion on all of the evidence and the areas in which evidence was lacking. The jury’s verdict cannot be said to be unreasonable: R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128 at para. 39.
6The appellant argues that the trial judge should not have instructed the jury concerning wilful blindness and that the wilful blindness instruction given was wrong in law. Again, we do not agree. The evidence that left it open to the jury to infer that the appellant knew of the shooter’s intention also left it open to infer that the appellant deliberately did not inquire as to the shooter’s intention in order to avoid knowing the truth: R. v. Briscoe, [2010] S.C.C.13 at para. 21. We see no risk that the jury would have convicted the appellant on a lower standard of proof.
7The appeal is dismissed.
“Grant Huscroft J.A.”
“L.B. Roberts J.A.”
“R. Pomerance J.A.”
Footnotes
- This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to ss. 110 and 111 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1.