Court of Appeal

The appellant sought to consolidate several pending applications for leave to appeal in the Divisional Court with an appeal properly before the Court of Appeal.

The motion for directions was dismissed as the appellant had not obtained leave from the Divisional Court.

On the main appeal, the appellant challenged the application judge's finding of a purchase money resulting trust that awarded the respondent a 50 percent beneficial interest in a townhouse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidentiary support for the application judge's conclusions regarding the respondent's contributions to the down payment and mortgage.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breach of probation, which arose from a voicemail message left for his estranged spouse in violation of a no-communication order.

At trial, the appellant denied leaving the message, but the trial judge accepted the testimony of the complainant and the appellant's son identifying his voice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D). principles to the credibility assessment.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence alleging a police conspiracy, which the court rejected for failing to meet the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault arising from a shootout outside a nightclub that injured the initial shooter and five bystanders.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing a mistrial over the Crown's opening address, declining to direct acquittals on the assault charges, and refusing to leave self-defence with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's corrective instruction was sufficient, there was circumstantial evidence to support secondary party liability, and self-defence lacked an air of reality given the indiscriminate nature of the return fire.

The moving parties sought orders in aid of execution, including leave to issue writs of seizure and sale after six years had elapsed since the Court of Appeal's costs order, and an order compelling an examination in aid of execution.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the Court of Appeal was not the appropriate forum for such relief.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to the moving parties' right to seek the same relief in the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, possessing hydromorphone, and possessing property obtained by crime, as well as his sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but found no incompetence and no reasonable probability that different tactical choices would have altered the verdict.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued he received insufficient credit for time spent under strict bail conditions.

The Court upheld the sentencing judge's approach of treating the strict bail conditions as a mitigating factor rather than a direct credit against the sentence.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 because the arresting officer's subjective belief for the arrest was not objectively reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's Grant analysis that would displace the deference owed to such determinations.

The appellant, who previously pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and had his sentence appeal and motion to extend time to appeal conviction dismissed, filed a habeas corpus application seeking immediate release.

He alleged irregularities in his guilty plea and complained about his conditions of confinement.

The application judge summarily dismissed the application as manifestly frivolous, noting it was an attempt to bypass the statutory review process and appeal his conviction out of time.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a driving instructor, appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a student during a lesson.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny, misapprehended evidence, and improperly relied on social norms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and noting that the trial judge properly applied common sense and human experience.

The moving party sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision denying a stay of a Divisional Court order that removed a stay of an eviction order.

The moving party had already been evicted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result by the motion judge, and noting that the motion for a stay was moot.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a family court order made solely under provincial legislation.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court under section 110(1) of the Act, finding it was not in the interests of justice due to the appeal's lack of merit and the prejudice caused by delay.

The motion to quash was allowed.

The Attorney General applied to review a Superior Court judge's order granting judicial interim release to the respondent pending his committal hearing for extradition to the United States.

The respondent, a former criminal defence lawyer, was charged with conspiracy to commit murder in connection with a transnational drug trafficking organization.

The reviewing judge admitted fresh evidence but dismissed the application, finding no error in principle in the application judge's assessment of the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

The application judge appropriately scrutinized the flight risk, properly considered the strength of the prosecution's case from the respondent's perspective, and reasonably balanced the tertiary ground factors, including the respondent's health, safety, and the strength of the release plan.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment following the late service of loss of income documentation by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while late service of documents is not to be condoned, the trial judge's highly discretionary decision did not result in unfairness or prejudice to the defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and criminal harassment against a former co-worker.

He argued the trial judge erred by improperly relying on his evidence of prior consensual sexual activity with the complainant, which was not subject to a section 276 application, to undermine his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the sexual nature of the activity but solely on the fact that it revealed an inconsistency in the appellant's timeline of when he met the complainant.

This use did not impermissibly engage twin myths or stereotypes.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his conviction for criminal harassment.

He argued the appeal judge erred in upholding findings that he lacked lawful authority for his repeated communications and that the communications caused the complainant objectively reasonable fear.

The Court of Appeal found no clear error of law, noting the volume and content of the communications, and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of child sexual abuse and exploitation material and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, he sought a conditional sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing his mental health issues, treating the involvement of children as an aggravating factor, and evaluating his risk of reoffending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's application of sentencing principles or her conclusion that the appellant's mental health issues were not operative at the time of the offence.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and imposed a conditional sentence, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly account for the appellant's serious mental illness.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the civil courts had jurisdiction over the respondent's claims of sexual assault by a priest and negligence by the appellant.

The appellant argued the motion judge breached natural justice by relying on an academic article and case law not raised by the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reference to an academic article criticizing prior case law did not breach natural justice, as it did not involve relying on facts outside the record.

The Court upheld the finding that the dispute was not purely ecclesiastical in nature and subject to canon law.

Furthermore, the Court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion under the Van Breda framework.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision striking down provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020 and its Regulation.

The application judge had found that provisions invalidating consent to enter a farm obtained under false pretences violated the freedom of expression of animal rights activists seeking to conduct undercover exposés.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the activists' claim was a positive rights claim seeking access to private property on their own terms.

The Court found that the legislation did not substantially interfere with freedom of expression and that any limits were justified under section 1 of the Charter.

Following the allowance of the appeal, the Court of Appeal requested submissions on costs for the motion, which had not been addressed at the hearing.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the appellant $4,000 all-inclusive, in accordance with the parties' agreement.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it liable under an insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge did not err in proceeding on an agreed factual basis, finding no substantial breach of the insured's duty to cooperate, and interpreting the curative provision to permit notice in the next policy period absent prejudice to the insurer.

The Crown appealed a verdict finding the respondent not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for first-degree murder and other offences.

The respondent had killed his brother-in-law and assaulted his mother and sister while experiencing command delusions.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test for expert evidence and failed to properly assess the respondent's capacity to know his actions were morally wrong.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and correctly concluded the respondent's major mental illness rendered him incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions.