Paul J.I. Alexander

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon after the complainant was stabbed in the torso.

The sole trial issue was identity of the assailant.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in treating a post-offence apology as consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasons, though brief, were adequate when read in light of the whole record and counsel's submissions.

The court further held that the trial judge did not err in using the apology as confirmatory evidence, as no alternative explanation for it appeared on the record.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Heeralall Ramdeo from convictions for kidnapping, use of an imitation firearm to commit an assault, and possession of an imitation firearm for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s reliance on the evidence of the complainant, a Vetrovec witness, nor in the application of the W.(D.) standard or the assessment of credibility.

The court held that the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence, found sufficient confirmatory evidence, and gave detailed reasons for his findings.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a historical sexual assault case.

The application judge had calculated a net delay of 33 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the application judge made palpable and overriding errors by failing to attribute three distinct periods of delay to the defence: delay in setting a preliminary inquiry, delay due to defence unavailability for a judicial pre-trial, and delay caused by the defence being unprepared for the first judicial pre-trial.

Deducting these periods reduced the net delay to 29.4 months, below the ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and the matter remitted for trial.

The decision concerns the admissibility of fresh evidence on appeal in a criminal case involving convictions for offences arising from an unlawful entry into a dwelling.

The appellant, Gediminas Kevalas, sought to admit medical and related records to support his intoxication defence, arguing that he lacked the requisite mens rea for the offences.

The court found that the fresh evidence was compelling, relevant, and credible, and that its admission was in the interests of justice.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, R.S., appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation and his sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's decision to allow the Crown to amend the indictment to include "position of trust" and the reliance on circumstantial evidence to establish a trust relationship.

The sentence appeal contested the lifetime Sexual Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order and the mandatory victim fine surcharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no irreparable prejudice from the indictment amendment and no error in the trial judge's assessment of the trust relationship.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, varying the SOIRA order to 20 years and setting aside the victim fine surcharge, as conceded by the Crown.

The appellant, convicted of sexual offences, appealed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing he was deprived of his right to re-elect a judge-alone trial.

Counsel missed a statutory deadline for re-election, and the Crown subsequently withdrew consent.

The Court of Appeal found counsel's performance fell below the professional standard by missing the deadline and providing erroneous advice regarding options to rectify the situation.

This resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as the appellant genuinely desired a judge-alone trial and felt he had no choice but to proceed with a jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered before a judge alone.

The appellant, Reshane Hayles-Wilson, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper Crown submissions regarding tailoring evidence, an erroneous two-step deliberation instruction to the jury, and improper Crown submissions on motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred on all three grounds but concluded that these errors, individually or collectively, did not undermine the safety of the verdict given the overall fault-free trial and clear instructions on burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The court also found no error in principle or manifest unfitness in the sentence.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, Patrick Schlaepfer, appealed his 14-month sentence for production of marijuana, arguing the sentencing judge erred in denying "Downes credit" for onerous interim judicial release conditions.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge made legal and palpable errors by attributing delay to the appellant, misapprehending evidence of his medical issues, and faulting him for not seeking bail variations.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding the appellant's untreated complex medical condition during two years of release was punitive, warranting mitigation.

The sentence was reduced by an additional 5 months, resulting in a net sentence of 4.8 months.

The appellant, self-represented at trial, was convicted of armed bank robbery.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct himself on a key witness's motive to lie and by relying on the appellant's uncompleted testimony after indicating it would not be used.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding witness credibility but agreed the trial judge erred in using the appellant's testimony for conviction after leading him to believe it would not be used, thereby jeopardizing trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and forcible confinement, appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, credibility, and application of the burden of proof.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's implausible account and acceptance of the complainant's evidence, despite minor inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to quash the unconstitutional victim surcharge order, with the balance of the sentence remaining in effect.

The appellant, Lerrell Stennett, appealed his convictions for dangerous operation and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and an ancillary victim surcharge order.

The accident involved the appellant losing control of his vehicle on a wet highway, resulting in multiple collisions and serious injuries to himself and passengers.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on circumstantial evidence of excessive speed for the conditions and a projected blood alcohol concentration indicating impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no improper inference from consequences, and no circular reasoning.

The court allowed the appeal from sentence only to set aside the victim surcharges, as the regime was later ruled unconstitutional.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his common-law wife from a single stab wound.

He appealed his conviction on four grounds: failure to answer a jury question regarding mental state for murder; admission of bad character evidence; admission of a 911 call; and misdirection on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly admitted the evidence and gave appropriate jury instructions.

The first ground was abandoned after fresh evidence established the jury question was answered timely.

The remaining grounds were rejected as the trial judge properly balanced probative value against prejudicial effect and provided adequate cautionary instructions to the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and breach of recognizance arising from a relationship with a 14-year-old.

The defence position was that the alleged events never occurred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge appropriately addressed inconsistencies in the evidence and that the record contained ample corroboration of the complainant's core testimony.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellants were convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue on appeal concerned the validity of a search warrant obtained using information from a confidential informant.

The warrant was executed at night and resulted in the seizure of approximately 300 grams of cocaine and $46,000 in cash.

The appellants challenged the warrant on multiple grounds, including the use of the Garofoli step six procedure, the adequacy of the judicial summary of redacted information, whether the confidential informant's tip met the Debot criteria for reliability, and whether the night search was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the warrant was valid and the search lawful.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (x4) and possession of property obtained by crime, receiving a global sentence of five years and eight months.

He appealed on grounds relating to the validity of the search warrant executed at his residence, which yielded 800 grams of cocaine, 505 oxycodone pills, drug paraphernalia, and $32,880 in cash.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter s. 8 application, finding the warrant was properly issued based on a credible confidential informant's tip that was corroborated by police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, rejecting all four grounds of appeal.

Application for appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for an appeal of conviction and sentence.

The applicant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement following a two-day trial and sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment.

Legal Aid Ontario refused to fund the appeal based on lack of merit.

The applicant established lack of financial means but failed to meet the necessity threshold for appointment of counsel.

The court found that while some grounds of appeal were arguable, the applicant could effectively advance them without counsel, the record was manageable, and the court could properly decide the appeal without defence counsel assistance.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.