Bryan Guertin

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after shooting a victim during a drug transaction.

He appealed his 13-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not treating his failed self-defence claim as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err, as the appellant's moral blameworthiness was not significantly reduced given he brought a loaded gun to the transaction and escalated the dispute.

The sentence was found fit and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged drug, proceeds, and firearm-related convictions arising from a search of a residence and a vehicle, arguing unreasonable verdict and misapprehension of evidence.

The court held that, on the circumstantial record, the trial judge could not reasonably infer constructive possession of the cash hidden behind a cabinet or the oxycodone found in plain view in a room occupied by four men, because knowledge and control specific to the appellant were not the only reasonable inferences.

In contrast, the appellant's observed operation of the vehicle, possession of its keys, the location of the hidden firearm and cocaine near the driver's seat, and the surrounding evidence of trafficking reasonably supported the vehicle-related convictions.

Acquittals were substituted on the residence-related counts, the balance of the appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a seven-year consecutive penitentiary sentence imposed after a guilty plea to possessing a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm without authorization or licence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle by exceeding the Crown's five-year position without notice, contrary to the framework in Nahanee, and by providing erroneous reasons for doing so.

The sentencing judge misread the applicable sentencing range in Tabnor, failed to give effect to the guilty plea and youthful first-offender status, and improperly disregarded rehabilitation as a sentencing objective.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to five years' imprisonment consecutive to any sentences being served.

The applicant was convicted of importing restricted firearms and prohibited magazines into Canada.

He brought an application challenging the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 103(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates s. 12 of the Charter.

The court applied the gross disproportionality test, considering reasonably foreseeable hypothetical scenarios, including a licensed gun owner importing parts and a 'smuggler for sport'.

The court found that the mandatory minimum sentence was not grossly disproportionate in these scenarios, given the gravity of the offence and the paramount sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to luring a child under 16 and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to give adequate weight to his youth and first-offender status.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, given the serious aggravating factors and the requirement to prioritize denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

A 17-year-old youth was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting a taxi driver multiple times without apparent motive, and of firearm offences related to a shooting incident three weeks prior.

The Crown sought an adult sentence.

The sentencing judge applied the two-stage test under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act as clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. I.M. and R. v. S.B. At stage one, the judge found the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the offender's intellectual disability in the mild range, complex trauma, disadvantaged background, impulsivity, and demonstrated capacity for rehabilitation while in custody.

At stage two, the judge imposed the maximum youth sentence of seven years custody followed by conditional supervision under an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision order, with concurrent one-year sentences for the firearm offences.

The offender was convicted by a jury of discharging a firearm with intent to wound, aggravated assault, and several firearms offences, including breaching a weapons prohibition order.

Following a verbal altercation outside a nightclub, the offender retrieved a loaded prohibited handgun from his vehicle and shot the victim twice in the abdomen at close range.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, and the harsh conditions of his pre-trial custody.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9 years imprisonment, consisting of 8 years concurrent for the shooting and possession offences, and 1 year consecutive for breaching the weapons prohibition order, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court considered whether Devret Clarke, who shot and killed Gars-Ara Kourjakian, was not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder.

The evidence established that Clarke suffered from schizophrenia and was actively psychotic at the time of the offence.

The main issue was whether his mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing that his conduct was morally wrong.

After reviewing the evidence, including psychiatric opinions and Clarke’s own testimony, the court found that Clarke’s delusions led him to believe his actions were justified both by his own moral code and by societal norms, if society understood his experiences.

The court concluded that Clarke was NCR.

The accused, I.T., a young Black youth charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude or sanitize parts of his youth record for the purpose of assessing his credibility if he were to testify.

The court considered the traditional Corbett factors (nature, remoteness, similarity of convictions, and attack on Crown witness credibility) and, significantly, extended the consideration of systemic anti-Black racism, drawing on principles from R. v. King and R. v. Morris.

The application was allowed in part: a conviction for assault peace officer was excluded, firearm possession convictions were sanitized to "possession of a restricted weapon" and "possession of a restricted weapon contrary to a prohibition order", and a robbery conviction was substituted with "assault and theft".

The court found that these modifications balanced the probative value of the record against the heightened prejudicial effect due to racial stereotypes and the risk of improper propensity reasoning.

This is a pre-trial ruling in a murder trial concerning the admissibility of two types of evidence: lay recognition opinion testimony (video and voice) and prior discreditable conduct of the accused.

The court admitted the recognition evidence from two youth detention center staff members, finding they had sufficient familiarity with the accused to offer valuable identifying information, including unique mannerisms and gait.

The court also admitted evidence of the accused's prior possession and discharge of the alleged murder weapon three weeks before the killing, and possession of another handgun three days before, balancing its high probative value for identity and means/opportunity against its moral prejudice.

The court imposed limitations on how the relationship evidence between the accused and the staff witnesses could be presented to mitigate prejudice related to the accused's detention history.

Andrew Burke pleaded guilty to four robberies (three banks, one restaurant).

The court considered aggravating factors, including his extensive criminal record (58 convictions, 17 robberies), repeated re-offending shortly after release, and the psychological harm to victims.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, expressed remorse (though noted as repetitive), participation in programs, and family support.

The court found rehabilitation prospects limited, emphasizing specific deterrence, denunciation, and public protection.

A sentence of 10 years imprisonment was imposed, less pre-sentence custody.

The accused, Edwin Subia, was found guilty of possession and accessing child pornography, and attempting to obstruct justice.

This decision focuses on the sentencing, where the court considered the nature and quantity of the child pornography, the accused's prior record, and mitigating factors.

The judge declined to view the actual images, relying on detailed descriptions and balancing probative value against prejudicial effects and the open court principle.

The court imposed a sentence of three years in prison for possession, with a concurrent four-month sentence for obstruction of justice, and stayed the accessing charge.

Ancillary orders included a 15-year prohibition on contact with minors and internet use restrictions.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused during a police interview following his arrest for child pornography offences.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and that his rights under sections 7 and 10(b) of the Charter were breached, particularly when police asked for his cell phone password without restating his right to counsel.

The court found the statements were voluntary, noting the accused had an operating mind and was not subjected to oppressive conditions or inducements.

The court also held that asking for a cell phone password in these circumstances was a routine question that did not require a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from an altercation at a bush party.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence, but the trial judge rejected his testimony and convicted him.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on ungrounded common-sense assumptions about human behaviour to reject the appellant's testimony and by failing to consider corroborative defence evidence before concluding the appellant was not credible.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The offender was convicted of the first-degree murder of one young woman and the manslaughter of another.

Both victims were vulnerable and their bodies were dismembered and disposed of in a callous manner.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 25 years for the murder.

For the manslaughter, the court found extreme aggravating factors, including the complete desecration of the victim's body, and imposed a sentence of 18 years imprisonment to be served concurrently.

Judge-alone homicide trial arising from the disappearance of two young women connected by forensic and circumstantial evidence to the accused’s apartment, including DNA evidence, body dismemberment, body-part storage in a chest freezer, and extensive inculpatory statements.

The court admitted count-on-count similar act evidence under the Handy framework, finding sufficient connectivity between the two incidents to support limited uses including death, culpable homicide, coincidence rebuttal, and after-the-fact conduct analysis.

On the evidence relating to one victim, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused death by repeated blunt-force head strikes during a sexual assault, and that the murder was first degree under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

On the other count, the court found the accused unlawfully caused death and dismembered the body, but the evidentiary gap on intent left a reasonable doubt on murder, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The accused was charged with two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to tender two lengthy videotaped statements given by the accused to police.

A voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the statements under the common law confessions rule.

The court analyzed the police conduct, including the use of emotional appeals, discussions of potential deals, and the conditions of the interviews.

The court found that the police did not use oppressive circumstances, impermissible trickery, or prohibited inducements (quid pro quo) that overbore the accused's will.

Both statements were ruled voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and admissible at trial.

In a judge-alone first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit discreditable conduct evidence from former sexual partners, acquaintances, and material found on the accused's electronic devices to support an inference of violent sexual propensity relevant to the alleged murder during sexual assault or unlawful confinement.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court held that the proposed evidence showed, at most, an interest in BDSM activities including choking, with significant consensual components, and did not establish a specific propensity to engage in non-consensual violent sexual conduct as alleged.

The court found the inferential chain from prior consensual or mixed sexual practices to the charged non-consensual homicidal conduct was logically flawed and insufficiently probative of the actus reus of first-degree murder.

The application was dismissed, and the court added that any limited probative value would in any event have been outweighed by prejudice through distraction from the core trial issues.

The accused, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, brought multiple Charter applications seeking the exclusion of evidence.

He alleged violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel regarding initial utterances to police, his s. 9 right against arbitrary detention regarding his arrest for one of the murders, and his s. 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure regarding the forensic re-testing of a seized knife and freezer, as well as the use of a general warrant to obtain Google data.

The court dismissed all applications, finding no Charter breaches.

The court held the accused was not detained prior to his arrest, the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, no residual privacy interest remained in the lawfully seized physical items, and the general warrant was appropriately issued.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and failing to appear in court.

The Crown's case on identity was circumstantial.

The defendant claimed he was a passenger and that another occupant, Jesse Abroquah, was driving.

The court found the defendant was the driver based on eyewitness evidence from a passing motorist who observed the vehicle's trajectory and the occupants' emergence from the vehicle.

The defendant's roadside statement that Abroquah was driving was rejected as a deliberate lie.

The court found the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, his driving constituted dangerous operation, he intentionally refused the breath demand, and he knowingly failed to appear in court.

The defendant's Charter application regarding alleged failure to provide a change of clothing was dismissed.

The defendant was found guilty on all four counts.