Bryan Guertin

The appellant pleaded guilty to luring a child under 16 and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to give adequate weight to his youth and first-offender status.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, given the serious aggravating factors and the requirement to prioritize denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

A 17-year-old youth was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting a taxi driver multiple times without apparent motive, and of firearm offences related to a shooting incident three weeks prior.

The Crown sought an adult sentence.

The sentencing judge applied the two-stage test under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act as clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. I.M. and R. v. S.B. At stage one, the judge found the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the offender's intellectual disability in the mild range, complex trauma, disadvantaged background, impulsivity, and demonstrated capacity for rehabilitation while in custody.

At stage two, the judge imposed the maximum youth sentence of seven years custody followed by conditional supervision under an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision order, with concurrent one-year sentences for the firearm offences.

The court considered whether Devret Clarke, who shot and killed Gars-Ara Kourjakian, was not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder.

The evidence established that Clarke suffered from schizophrenia and was actively psychotic at the time of the offence.

The main issue was whether his mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing that his conduct was morally wrong.

After reviewing the evidence, including psychiatric opinions and Clarke’s own testimony, the court found that Clarke’s delusions led him to believe his actions were justified both by his own moral code and by societal norms, if society understood his experiences.

The court concluded that Clarke was NCR.

The accused, I.T., a young Black youth charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude or sanitize parts of his youth record for the purpose of assessing his credibility if he were to testify.

The court considered the traditional Corbett factors (nature, remoteness, similarity of convictions, and attack on Crown witness credibility) and, significantly, extended the consideration of systemic anti-Black racism, drawing on principles from R. v. King and R. v. Morris.

The application was allowed in part: a conviction for assault peace officer was excluded, firearm possession convictions were sanitized to "possession of a restricted weapon" and "possession of a restricted weapon contrary to a prohibition order", and a robbery conviction was substituted with "assault and theft".

The court found that these modifications balanced the probative value of the record against the heightened prejudicial effect due to racial stereotypes and the risk of improper propensity reasoning.

This is a pre-trial ruling in a murder trial concerning the admissibility of two types of evidence: lay recognition opinion testimony (video and voice) and prior discreditable conduct of the accused.

The court admitted the recognition evidence from two youth detention center staff members, finding they had sufficient familiarity with the accused to offer valuable identifying information, including unique mannerisms and gait.

The court also admitted evidence of the accused's prior possession and discharge of the alleged murder weapon three weeks before the killing, and possession of another handgun three days before, balancing its high probative value for identity and means/opportunity against its moral prejudice.

The court imposed limitations on how the relationship evidence between the accused and the staff witnesses could be presented to mitigate prejudice related to the accused's detention history.

The accused, Edwin Subia, was found guilty of possession and accessing child pornography, and attempting to obstruct justice.

This decision focuses on the sentencing, where the court considered the nature and quantity of the child pornography, the accused's prior record, and mitigating factors.

The judge declined to view the actual images, relying on detailed descriptions and balancing probative value against prejudicial effects and the open court principle.

The court imposed a sentence of three years in prison for possession, with a concurrent four-month sentence for obstruction of justice, and stayed the accessing charge.

Ancillary orders included a 15-year prohibition on contact with minors and internet use restrictions.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused during a police interview following his arrest for child pornography offences.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and that his rights under sections 7 and 10(b) of the Charter were breached, particularly when police asked for his cell phone password without restating his right to counsel.

The court found the statements were voluntary, noting the accused had an operating mind and was not subjected to oppressive conditions or inducements.

The court also held that asking for a cell phone password in these circumstances was a routine question that did not require a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from an altercation at a bush party.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence, but the trial judge rejected his testimony and convicted him.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on ungrounded common-sense assumptions about human behaviour to reject the appellant's testimony and by failing to consider corroborative defence evidence before concluding the appellant was not credible.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The offender was convicted of the first-degree murder of one young woman and the manslaughter of another.

Both victims were vulnerable and their bodies were dismembered and disposed of in a callous manner.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 25 years for the murder.

For the manslaughter, the court found extreme aggravating factors, including the complete desecration of the victim's body, and imposed a sentence of 18 years imprisonment to be served concurrently.

The accused was charged with two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to tender two lengthy videotaped statements given by the accused to police.

A voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the statements under the common law confessions rule.

The court analyzed the police conduct, including the use of emotional appeals, discussions of potential deals, and the conditions of the interviews.

The court found that the police did not use oppressive circumstances, impermissible trickery, or prohibited inducements (quid pro quo) that overbore the accused's will.

Both statements were ruled voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and admissible at trial.

The accused, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, brought multiple Charter applications seeking the exclusion of evidence.

He alleged violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel regarding initial utterances to police, his s. 9 right against arbitrary detention regarding his arrest for one of the murders, and his s. 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure regarding the forensic re-testing of a seized knife and freezer, as well as the use of a general warrant to obtain Google data.

The court dismissed all applications, finding no Charter breaches.

The court held the accused was not detained prior to his arrest, the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, no residual privacy interest remained in the lawfully seized physical items, and the general warrant was appropriately issued.

The offender was convicted of sexually abusing his stepdaughter between the ages of four and twelve.

The Crown sought a seven-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or reformatory term, citing the offender's mental health issues, lack of criminal record, and the historical nature of the offences.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

The court sentenced the offender to five years' imprisonment, balancing the profound harm caused to the victim against the offender's mental illness and rehabilitative efforts.

The accused applied for an order permitting him to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his upcoming trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing the accused's lengthy criminal record and past courtroom outbursts, though acknowledging he was not an escape risk.

The court granted the application, preferring the line of authority that locating an accused outside the prisoner's dock better reflects the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered that the accused be permitted to sit at counsel table, subject to discreet security measures.