Jeffrey Luke Fisher

Martin Moore pleaded guilty to multiple offences including attempted disarming of a peace officer, break and enter, fraud under $5000, and assaulting a peace officer.

The court rejected a joint sentencing submission of 120 days custody, finding it unhinged from the circumstances and offender's conduct.

The judge emphasized that an attempt to disarm a peace officer is as serious as a successful disarmament under s. 270.1 of the Criminal Code, and that the offender's failure to succeed is not mitigating.

The court imposed a global sentence of 300 days custody with enhanced presentence credit, probation, and ancillary orders, highlighting numerous aggravating factors including breach of recognizance, false identification, and violent conduct.

This sentencing decision addresses the appropriate custodial sentence for Baskaran Balasooriyan, convicted of possession of stolen property over $5000, attempted abduction of a 12-year-old child, mischief, criminal harassment, and breach of release order.

The court considered the applicability of the Kienapple principle to stay counts, the availability of a s. 161 order to protect children, and the appropriateness of a conditional sentence order.

The judge rejected the defence's proposed conditional sentence and stay of mischief, emphasizing the high moral culpability, risk to the community, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The sentence imposed included 420 days custody for attempted abduction (fully credited for presentence custody), 60 days for possession, and a suspended sentence for breach, followed by probation, DNA, s. 161, and s. 109 orders.

The defendant, Nockeem Peck, was charged with possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking.

He brought a Charter application to exclude the heroin as evidence, arguing it was obtained through an arbitrary detention in violation of his s. 9 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding that no detention occurred prior to a lawful arrest, as police merely approached the vehicle and observed a crime in progress before any interaction.

The court distinguished the facts from cases where police conduct constituted detention (e.g., physical obstruction or authoritative demands).

Alternatively, the court found the evidence would have been admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the minimal intrusion and good faith of the police.

Peck was subsequently convicted of possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking.

The court delivered reasons on sentencing for convictions of possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a significant consecutive sentence, merging with a pre-existing term, resulting in a substantial remnant sentence after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The defence argued for a time-served sentence, citing mitigating factors including the offender's lack of prior record at the time of the index offences and alleged hardship during incarceration.

The court, emphasizing the principles of deterrence and denunciation, particularly in the context of the ongoing drug epidemic, found the Crown's proposed sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offences and the offender's culpability, rejecting the defence's arguments for a lesser sentence.

The accused was convicted of possession of stolen property over $5000, attempted abduction of a person under 14, mischief, and criminal harassment.

The court applied the doctrine of recent possession to find knowledge of the stolen vehicle.

For the attempted abduction, the court found the accused's repeated attempts to lure the child into his car constituted enticement with intent to deprive parents of possession.

The mischief charge was upheld as the accused's conduct interfered with the victim's enjoyment of the public park.

Criminal harassment was proven as the accused's repeated communication caused the victim to reasonably fear for her safety, and the accused was reckless as to whether his conduct would cause harassment.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, specifically evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a laptop and subsequent searches conducted under warrants for a vehicle and inmate property.

The court found the warrantless laptop search to be a serious Charter breach due to reckless disregard for rights, leading to the exclusion of observations made from the laptop.

However, evidence obtained from the search of a vehicle and the applicant's inmate property vault, which were conducted under warrants, was admitted.

The court reasoned that the connection between the initial laptop breach and the subsequent warrant searches was attenuated, the privacy expectation in the vehicle was minimal, and the evidence from the vehicle was independently discoverable.

The appellant, Joshua Normand, sought leave to appeal a four-year global sentence imposed for mischief, criminal harassment, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and unsafe storage of a firearm.

The appellant, who is Metis, argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of restraint and did not give sufficient weight to mitigating factors, including his Gladue report.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was fit, noting the serious nature of the offences, the appellant's prior record, and that the sentencing judge had properly considered and applied the principle of restraint and mitigating factors, including the Gladue report.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

Katie Brittain was charged with possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

At a preliminary inquiry, the court assessed the admissibility of an utterance made by Brittain to police and the sufficiency of evidence for committal to trial.

The court found the utterance was not spontaneous, was made while Brittain was detained/arrested and uncauioned, and therefore not voluntary and inadmissible.

Without the utterance, there was insufficient evidence to establish knowledge, possession, and control of the seized drugs.

Consequently, the accused was discharged.

The applicant, Jahvar Green, charged with multiple firearms offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude a firearm found in a car he was driving.

He argued arbitrary detention (s. 9) due to racial profiling and unreasonable search/use of force (ss. 7, 8).

The court found no racial profiling, as the officer did not see the applicant's race before the initial interaction.

The court also ruled that no detention occurred when the applicant fled from the officer's initial signal to stop, as there was no submission or acquiescence.

Detention began lawfully when the applicant was directed to stop in a Starbucks drive-thru.

The court further found the officer's belief that a firearm was in a satchel was objectively reasonable, justifying the search and use of force.

The application to exclude the firearm was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit four statements from a deceased witness (J.T.) at a preliminary hearing under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the "prima facie air of reliability" test to determine admissibility.

It found the portions of J.T.'s statements related to the kidnapping credible and trustworthy due to corroborating evidence, despite procedural deficiencies in statement-taking.

However, the portions related to drug possession and the identification of "Z" were deemed unreliable and were excised, as J.T.'s account was inconsistent and self-serving regarding her involvement with drugs.

The court affirmed its power to excise unreliable portions of a statement.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the respondent, Danny Francisco Correa, following his convictions for voyeurism, attempted sexual assault, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The Crown also requested a determinate sentence and a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The respondent opposed the dangerous offender designation, arguing that the facts were ambiguous and that he did not pose a substantial risk of reoffence, suggesting a provincial sentence followed by probation.

The court found the respondent to be a dangerous offender, citing his demonstrated failure to control sexual impulses, the escalation in seriousness of his offences, and his lack of insight into his mental and sexological disorders (schizophrenia and pedohebephilia).

The court imposed a determinate sentence of two years in penitentiary (in addition to 2.5 years of pre-sentence custody) and a 10-year long-term supervision order, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, a SOIRA order for life, and a 10-year firearm prohibition.

The decision emphasized the necessity of a supervised, compulsory treatment environment in a penitentiary due to the respondent's history of non-compliance and denial of his issues, concluding that a lesser measure would not adequately protect the public.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a street altercation where he stabbed the complainant 13 times with a folding knife.

The trial judge granted a directed verdict of acquittal on a weapons possession charge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing a Scopelliti application to call a witness regarding the complainant's prior violent conduct while intoxicated and in restricting cross-examination on a prior peace bond; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing a Corbett application to exclude evidence of the appellant's prior firearm conviction; and (3) the trial judge failed to inform the jury of the acquittal on the weapons charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and two counts of failing to remain.

The appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge erred in finding reasonable grounds for arrest by misapprehending the evidence regarding the odour of alcohol, and whether the trial judge erred in articulating the test for identification based on circumstantial evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the misapprehension of evidence regarding the "strong odour" of alcohol did not undermine the overall analysis for reasonable grounds, given other strong indicia of impairment and connection to the vehicle.

On the identification issue, the court affirmed that no specific incantation is required for circumstantial evidence, and the trial judge's finding of "the logical inference" was sufficient to demonstrate proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction appeal challenged whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and search the appellant.

The trial judge found such grounds existed based on police observations of the appellant's vehicle making three stops at different locations within 15 minutes, with interactions at each location involving known drug users.

The sentence appeal challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence provision under the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The applicants, Brandon Dean Brooks and Bryan Frederick Styles, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing their drug-related charges to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was approximately 36 months.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, deducting periods attributable to a discrete event (judge's illness) and defence delay (one applicant's failure to appear).

After deductions, the net delay was 28 months, which did not exceed the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court also found no proven prejudice under the R. v. Morin principles.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed for both applicants.