Barry Clement Stagg

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting an unarmed construction worker at a worksite following a motor vehicle collision and attempted theft of a work van.

The Crown sought a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The sentencing judge found no evidence of planning but noted the aggravating factors of introducing a loaded firearm into a public altercation.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 12 years.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting and killing his roommate.

The Crown sought 17 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court found the execution-style shooting of an unarmed victim in her home to be highly aggravating.

Despite the offender's challenging background and mental health issues, the court prioritized deterrence and denunciation, imposing a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 16 years.

The defendant, Kenton Lee-Diggs, was found guilty of cruelty to animals, impaired driving, and mischief.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the gratuitous violence against a defenceless animal and the victim's trauma, and mitigating factors including family support and employment prospects.

The court imposed a jail term, probation, and ancillary orders, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while also considering rehabilitation.

The defendant, Kenton Lee-Diggs, was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device, mischief under $5000, and cruelty to animals.

Following a dismissed Charter voir dire, the defendant conceded the impaired driving and mischief charges.

The court found the defendant guilty of cruelty to animals based on the complainant's credible and detailed testimony.

However, the defendant was found not guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample because the specific demand for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) as charged was never made by any officer; rather, demands were made for an approved instrument.

This is a Charter application brought by the accused, Kenton Lee-Diggs, alleging violations of his s. 7 (security of person) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The accused claimed a s. 7 violation due to being forced to urinate in an interview room, and s. 10(b) violations due to an unreasonable delay in accessing counsel and being denied counsel of choice.

The court found no s. 7 violation, as the accused did not clearly communicate his need for a washroom to officers.

Regarding s. 10(b), the court found no violation of the right to counsel of choice, noting the accused declined an early offer to contact his lawyer and did not express dissatisfaction with duty counsel.

The court also found no unreasonable delay in accessing counsel, attributing much of the time to the accused's uncooperative conduct and the reasonable operational demands of a busy police station.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the impugned evidence was ruled admissible for trial.

Seymour Young pleaded guilty to manslaughter while using a firearm.

The offence occurred during a drug transaction where the 15-year-old victim attempted to rob Young with an imitation firearm, leading Young to fatally shoot the victim.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, involvement in the drug trade, and the victim being a child.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, genuine remorse, no prior criminal record, and a difficult upbringing marked by violence and deprivation.

The court also accounted for the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody due to the COVID-19 pandemic, granting a seven-month reduction to the sentence.

A final sentence of five years' imprisonment was imposed, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and a mandatory DNA order.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the respondent, Danny Francisco Correa, following his convictions for voyeurism, attempted sexual assault, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The Crown also requested a determinate sentence and a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The respondent opposed the dangerous offender designation, arguing that the facts were ambiguous and that he did not pose a substantial risk of reoffence, suggesting a provincial sentence followed by probation.

The court found the respondent to be a dangerous offender, citing his demonstrated failure to control sexual impulses, the escalation in seriousness of his offences, and his lack of insight into his mental and sexological disorders (schizophrenia and pedohebephilia).

The court imposed a determinate sentence of two years in penitentiary (in addition to 2.5 years of pre-sentence custody) and a 10-year long-term supervision order, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, a SOIRA order for life, and a 10-year firearm prohibition.

The decision emphasized the necessity of a supervised, compulsory treatment environment in a penitentiary due to the respondent's history of non-compliance and denial of his issues, concluding that a lesser measure would not adequately protect the public.

C.J. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault against his 16-year-old step-daughter, which occurred while she was sleeping.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less one day, while the defence proposed six months' custody.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, the breach of trust inherent in the step-father relationship, and the assault occurring while the victim was asleep.

Mitigating factors included C.J.'s lack of a prior criminal record, steady employment, and a guilty plea that spared the victim from testifying.

The court imposed a 16-month custodial sentence, along with a 20-year SOIRA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a 2-year probation order.

Michael Duru, charged with attempt murder and endangering life, sought a new bail hearing after his previous bail was cancelled due to breaches.

The Crown opposed, citing prior breaches including a robbery conviction and a curfew breach.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

The judge found the robbery to be an unusual circumstance not indicative of a substantial risk of re-offence posing a public danger, and the curfew breach, while serious, did not warrant detention given Duru's lengthy compliance periods.

On tertiary grounds, the court found the Crown's case not to be overwhelming, thus not diminishing confidence in the administration of justice.

Bail was granted with varied conditions, including new sureties (mother and father) and an adjusted curfew to allow for night employment.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after striking the complainant with a beer bottle in a parking lot altercation.

The Crown's civilian witnesses provided inconsistent and unreliable testimony, while the defendant, who admitted to striking the complainant, claimed self-defense.

The court found the defendant's account credible, supported by photographic evidence showing injuries to the defendant and his friend, which contradicted the Crown's "one-sided attack" narrative.

The judge concluded that the defendant acted in self-defense, fearing for his life after the complainant aggressively drove his car at him and approached him in a rage.

The defendant was found not guilty of all charges.

During a criminal trial, the accused challenged the admissibility of a videotaped police statement, alleging it was involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights under ss. 7 and 10.

The court considered whether the accused invoked the right to counsel and whether police were required to cease questioning or provide further clarification.

The judge held the accused did not clearly assert the right to counsel and had been repeatedly advised of that right, including prior consultation with duty counsel.

Applying principles from leading Supreme Court authorities on voluntariness and the right to silence, the court found no threats, oppression, trickery, or absence of an operating mind.

The Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and no Charter breach was established.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon following an incident on Christmas morning 2014 in which he stabbed the victim once in the chest with a knife.

The Crown sought fifteen months' imprisonment while the defence sought less than six months.

The court considered the defendant's background, including his status as a permanent resident, his mental health and substance abuse issues, his positive pre-sentence report, and the relatively modest physical injuries sustained by the victim.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of approximately six months based on pre-sentence custody credit, suspended the passing of sentence, and placed the defendant on three years' probation with conditions including community service, substance abuse and mental health counselling, and a no-contact order with the victim.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the lawful limit.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand and the breath sample obtained.

The court considered whether the demand was made "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code and whether any breach would warrant exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that while there was a potential delay in making the demand, the "forthwith" requirement was satisfied and, in any event, the evidence would not be excluded as the breach was minimal, the real-life impact on the accused's Charter rights was negligible, and excluding highly probative evidence on a serious offence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

Media applicants sought access to a medical letter filed at the sentencing of Eric Newman (now known as Luka Magnotta) in 2005 on fraud charges.

The letter, from Rouge Valley Medical Centre, addressed Newman's mental health and psychiatric issues.

Newman opposed release, citing concerns about his fair trial rights in relation to serious criminal charges he faced in Montreal in 2012.

The court applied the open courts principle and the Dagenais-Mentuck test, ultimately granting the media's application for access to the letter.

The three accused were arrested while exiting an apartment building and entering a taxi, and each was found in possession of a loaded handgun.

They brought a Charter motion alleging violations of their rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10, arguing they were unlawfully detained and searched.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention and pat search based on the totality of the circumstances, including the high-crime area, a recent shooting, and the accused's behaviour.

The Charter motions were dismissed, the firearms were admitted into evidence, and the accused were found guilty.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, robbery, assault causing bodily harm, and aggravated assault against a sex trade worker.

The court found the accused's testimony regarding the events leading up to the physical altercation to be plausible and the complainant's evidence to be unreliable.

The court held that the accused was justified in using force to retrieve his keys from the complainant under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code, and that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally hit the complainant with his van.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample after a motor vehicle collision.

At the police station, the accused, who suffered from a panic disorder, was subjected to a routine level three strip search before being lodged in a cell.

The court found that the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter, as there were no reasonable and probable grounds to justify it and it was conducted merely as a matter of routine policy.

Concluding that the police conduct demonstrated a systemic disregard for established constitutional limits on strip searches, the court held that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter to preserve the integrity of the justice system.