Michael Leitold

The offender pleaded guilty to robbery with a prohibited weapon, which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence.

The offender, an Indigenous man, experienced exceptionally harsh pre-trial custody conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre, including medical neglect, frequent lockdowns, and the deliberate destruction of Indigenous cultural items by correctional officers.

The court distinguished recent case law and held that the egregious state misconduct warranted significant Duncan credit.

The court applied 611 days of enhanced credit on top of the Summers credit, effectively reducing the remaining sentence to one day.

Following a judge-alone trial resulting in convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited by court order, the court imposed sentence.

The offender had a prior record including a 2008 drug trafficking conviction and two weapons prohibition orders in force.

The court received an Impact of Race and Culture Assessment addressing systemic anti-Black racism and the offender's disadvantaged upbringing in a marginalized community.

Despite finding those systemic factors attenuated the offender's moral blameworthiness to some degree, the court rejected a conditional sentence, finding insufficient evidence of rehabilitative efforts since the last conviction and that the offender had demonstrated a complete disregard for prior court orders.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of four years and 160 days, reflecting consecutive terms for the firearm, prohibition breach, and trafficking offences, with credits for pre-sentence custody, bail restrictions, and a Charter breach relating to the right to counsel.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed a directed verdict application in a case where the accused, Ryan Vernaza-Vinces, was charged with flight from a police officer contrary to section 320.17 of the Criminal Code.

The key legal issue was whether the Crown must prove that the police were operating a motor vehicle while pursuing the accused under the new section 320.17, which replaced the older section 249.1(1).

The court held that the current statutory language does not require proof that police were in a motor vehicle during pursuit, overruling obiter dicta from prior Superior Court decisions.

The decision clarifies the essential elements of the offence under the updated provision.

The decision concerns the prosecution of Brandon Caleb for trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of a loaded firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, expert testimony, and physical evidence, established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Caleb trafficked in cocaine and possessed a loaded firearm at his residence.

The court rejected alternative explanations and found the evidence did not support reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

The applicant, Brandon Caleb, sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that the delay in bringing his case to trial violated his right under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reviewed the procedural history, including the complexity of the Project Venom prosecution, the joining and severing of accused, and the Crown’s management of the case.

Applying the framework from R. v. Jordan, the court found that although the presumptive ceiling for delay was exceeded, the case was sufficiently complex and the Crown had a concrete plan to minimize delay.

Exceptional circumstances justified the delay, and the application was dismissed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay, arguing a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under R. v. Jordan, despite the total delay of 16 months and 9 days being below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that the defence demonstrated a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, primarily due to significant and inexplicable delays by the police in providing crucial video disclosure (complainant's statement, 911 audio, and medical records) for over seven months.

The court emphasized the constitutional disclosure obligations of the Crown and the police's role in timely disclosure.

The application for a stay was granted, and the proceedings were stayed.

This sentencing decision concerns Michael Chapman, who pleaded guilty to approximately 20 counts under the Criminal Code and two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The offences included mail theft, dangerous driving, fleeing police, operating a stolen vehicle, identity theft, fraudulent credit card use, property damage, and uttering threats, alongside trafficking cocaine and methamphetamine.

Aggravating factors included a criminal record, significant victim impact, and the dangerous nature and quantity of drugs.

Mitigating factors were the guilty plea, remorse, addiction as a contributing factor, successful engagement in addiction treatment, completion of high school, strong family support, and a job offer.

The Crown sought a total sentence of approximately four years of incarceration, while the defence argued for a suspended sentence or a community-based sentence.

The court imposed a total net sentence of 20 months, to be served as a conditional sentence, followed by 12 months of probation, a DNA order, a lifetime s. 109 prohibition, and a two-year driving prohibition.

The judge found a conditional sentence appropriate, balancing the seriousness of the offences with the offender's rehabilitation and the principle of restraint, concluding that community safety would not be endangered.

Justin Barrett pleaded guilty to failing to comply with a release order, possession of cocaine, fentanyl, a prohibited loaded firearm, and an oversized magazine.

The sentencing hearing was delayed for a 'Morris' report.

Both Crown and defence sought a conditional sentence, differing on its legal basis and length.

The court considered aggravating factors (loaded, modified firearm in public, flight from police, breach of house arrest, drug possession) and significant mitigating factors, including social context evidence (trauma, poverty, racism, lack of support, positive rehabilitation efforts).

The court found Mr. Barrett's moral blameworthiness significantly reduced.

A conditional sentence of two years less one day was imposed for the firearms charges (concurrently with a 60-day conditional sentence for other offences), followed by one year of probation, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The sentence included a de-escalating house arrest and curfew period.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the date of arrest to the anticipated end of the trial was 50.5 months.

After deducting 1.25 months for defence delay, the net delay was 49.25 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown argued that the delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic should be deducted as an exceptional circumstance.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the trial could not have proceeded during the pandemic period in any event due to the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The offences involved large quantities of drugs and occurred while the offender was on bail for the first offence.

The court imposed a total sentence of six years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The offender received enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, plus an additional nine months credit for harsh conditions experienced during frequent lockdowns at the Toronto South Detention Centre, resulting in a remaining sentence of 19 months and 3 weeks.

The accused, charged with robbery and accessory after the fact, brought a motion to adjourn her jury trial due to late disclosure by the Crown.

The late disclosure included a police video re-enactment of the getaway route, undisclosed photographs, and a new will-say statement from a complainant that significantly altered the evidentiary landscape.

The court found that proceeding to trial without giving the defence adequate time to investigate and adapt to the new evidence would prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial.

The motion for an adjournment was granted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon following an incident on Christmas morning 2014 in which he stabbed the victim once in the chest with a knife.

The Crown sought fifteen months' imprisonment while the defence sought less than six months.

The court considered the defendant's background, including his status as a permanent resident, his mental health and substance abuse issues, his positive pre-sentence report, and the relatively modest physical injuries sustained by the victim.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of approximately six months based on pre-sentence custody credit, suspended the passing of sentence, and placed the defendant on three years' probation with conditions including community service, substance abuse and mental health counselling, and a no-contact order with the victim.

The accused was charged with several firearm offences and possession of cocaine after police executed a search warrant at a residence and located a shotgun and crack cocaine in a bedroom where the accused was found.

The Crown relied primarily on police testimony to establish that the accused had knowledge and control of the contraband.

The court found significant reliability issues in the police evidence, including inconsistencies regarding whether entry photographs were taken before or after the search and a lack of contemporaneous notes documenting critical events.

The court also found insufficient evidence connecting the accused to the bedroom or demonstrating control over its contents.

As a result, the Crown failed to prove knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with drug-related offences following a police search warrant executed at his residence.

The Crown sought to rely on the "step six" process from R. v. Garafoli to have the court consider redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) that were excised to protect the identity of a confidential informant.

The defence opposed this request, arguing that the Crown's summary of the redacted material did not provide sufficient information to mount a proper challenge to the warrant's validity.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of whether the summary adequately disclosed the nature of the redacted information under the three Debot criteria: credibility of the informant, corroboration, and compellability.

The court found that the step six process could be applied on a partial basis, allowing the Crown to rely on the unredacted ITO for certain paragraphs where the summary provided sufficient detail, while restricting the Crown to the redacted version for other paragraphs where the summary was inadequate.

The appellants applied for admission to a Master's program but were denied because they could not comply with the department's funding policy, which required a portion of external funding to come from the supervising professor's research grants.

The appellants sought judicial review, arguing the policy was an admission standard requiring Senate approval and that its application was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the funding policy was a reasonable administrative supplement to minimum admission requirements, not an admission standard, and that the university's discretionary decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing it was denied natural justice when the Board refused its request for an adjournment.

The landlord had requested the adjournment because its representative was unavailable, but provided no evidence or explanation for the unavailability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board did not err in principle by refusing the adjournment, as the landlord provided no plausible explanation and the prejudice was of its own making.

One judge dissented, arguing the Board failed to balance the prejudice to both parties.

The applicants sought judicial review of Laurentian University's decision to deny them admission to graduate studies.

The Divisional Court held that the decision was discretionary and did not attract certiorari or mandamus.

Applying the factors from Khan v. University of Ottawa, the court found that only minimal procedural fairness was required in this context.

The court concluded there was no flagrant violation of the rules of natural justice and dismissed the application, rejecting allegations of bias or retaliation.

The applicant sought a stay of a Board order revoking its liquor licence pending an appeal.

The Board had revoked the licence after finding the applicant allowed drug sales and drunkenness on the premises.

The applicant argued it should have been allowed to introduce fresh evidence at the Board hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the applicant failed to meet the three-part RJR-MacDonald test, particularly failing to establish irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario proposed to revoke the liquor licence of the Cabbagetown Restaurant & Bar.

The Board heard evidence from police, local residents, and community representatives regarding rampant drug trafficking, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct at the premises.

The Board found that the licensee permitted drug sales and drunkenness, failed to retain liquor purchase records, and that the continuation of the licence was contrary to the public interest.

The liquor licence was revoked immediately.

The licensee brought a motion to reopen the hearing to introduce fresh evidence, including five new witnesses and a petition, regarding the public interest aspect of a proposal to revoke its liquor licence.

The Board applied the two-part test from Sagaz and dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence would not change the outcome of the hearing and could have been obtained prior to the hearing with reasonable diligence.