Jeffrey Elliot Feiner

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which confirmed a College committee's decision requiring him to complete a remedial program and attend for a caution.

The discipline stemmed from the physician making a mandatory fitness-to-drive report to the Ministry of Transportation following an argument with a patient, and subsequently disclosing the patient's personal health information to her father.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory immunity for reporting under the Highway Traffic Act does not oust the College's regulatory jurisdiction.

The Court further held that the Board's conclusions regarding the unsupportable nature of the report and the breach of patient confidentiality were reasonable.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an interim decision and order of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded agreed costs of $10,000 to the responding party.

The appellant appealed an Associate Justice's decision dismissing a motion for production of two documents (a Statement of Work and final report prepared by Ernst & Young) that were referenced in an affidavit filed by a non-party representative.

The underlying dispute concerned whether Ernst & Young's acquisition-related records should be produced in a broader non-party production motion.

The Associate Justice declined to compel production of the two documents, finding that doing so would be improper and would unduly interfere with the orderly progress of the action by creating a risk of inconsistent findings between the refusals motion and the main motion.

The appeal court upheld this decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's discretionary determination that the requests were improper, and that her consideration of fairness, proportionality, and the risk of inconsistent results was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether its prior decision in Religious Hospitallers of St. Joseph Housing Corp. v. Regional Assessment Commissioner should be overruled.

That case had interpreted s. 3(1)12(iii) of the Assessment Act to require a charitable, non-profit philanthropic corporation seeking a municipal tax exemption to show it provided relief to the poor by "some form of endeavour." The appellant, Stamford Kiwanis Non-Profit Homes Inc., argued that this requirement was not supported by the statute or legislative intent.

The Court agreed, finding that Religious Hospitallers was wrongly decided, had not been followed in subsequent jurisprudence, and introduced a vague and unworkable "endeavour" requirement.

The Court overruled Religious Hospitallers, clarified the applicable test for exemption, and allowed the appeal, granting the appellant a property tax exemption for its affordable housing properties.

The Member, a Registered Nurse, faced allegations of professional misconduct for verbally, physically, and emotionally abusing a highly vulnerable, non-verbal, and blind patient during a COVID-19 outbreak.

The Member admitted to the allegations, acknowledging she used inappropriate language, forcefully handled the patient, and breached the College's standards of practice.

The Discipline Committee found the Member committed professional misconduct.

Accepting a joint submission on penalty, the Committee ordered an oral reprimand, a three-month suspension, and terms including meetings with a regulatory expert and employer notification.

The Member, a registered nurse, faced allegations of professional misconduct for submitting false claims to her employer's group benefit plan totalling $7,620.26, of which she received $3,469.90.

The Member admitted to the allegations through an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The Discipline Committee found that the Member committed professional misconduct by contravening standards of practice, misappropriating property, falsifying records, and engaging in dishonourable and unprofessional conduct.

The Committee accepted a Joint Submission on Order, imposing a reprimand, a 3-month suspension, and terms including meetings with a regulatory expert and employer notification.

The applicant, Langs Community Development Corporation (LCDC), sought a declaration that its property was exempt from municipal property tax under s. 3(1)(12)iii of the Assessment Act, arguing it was a charitable, non-profit corporation organized for the relief of the poor and supported by public funds.

The respondents opposed, arguing LCDC did not meet the statutory requirements.

The court found that LCDC shared an identity in patrimony with Langs Farm Village Association (Langs), was supported in part by public funds (through a significant grant from the City of Cambridge), and was organized for the relief of the poor, both independently and by virtue of its shared identity with Langs.

The application for tax exemption was granted.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a 2008 Quebec default judgment against the defendants in Ontario.

The defendants raised a two-year limitation period defence under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued that the action was not prescribed due to acknowledgment of debt, discoverability, or promissory estoppel.

The court found no valid written acknowledgment, rejected the discoverability argument as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the defendants were domiciled in Ontario and had means to enforce the judgment, and dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to a lack of evidence of an intention to affect legal relations regarding the limitation period.

The action was dismissed as prescribed, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant, a non-profit corporation providing affordable housing, appealed a decision dismissing its application for a municipal tax exemption under s. 3(1)12(iii) of the Assessment Act.

The application judge found that the appellant was not 'organized for the relief of the poor' because it did not engage in 'some form of endeavour' to provide relief, relying on the Court of Appeal's decision in Religious Hospitallers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings or application of binding precedent, though a concurring opinion suggested the Religious Hospitallers decision should be revisited.

This is a costs endorsement following the successful dismissal of a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) action against media defendants (Corus and JNN defendants) under section 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court determined that the successful defendants were entitled to full indemnity costs, as per the statutory presumption in section 137.1(7) of the CJA, finding no factors to displace this presumption.

The plaintiff failed to file responding costs submissions.

The court awarded the Corus defendants $92,820.00 in legal fees plus HST and disbursements, and the JNN defendants $66,402.00 in legal fees plus HST and disbursements, totaling $79,443.78.

The decision emphasizes the complexity and length of anti-SLAPP motions in justifying the quantum of costs.

The plaintiff mortgage brokerage brought a motion for summary judgment against the corporate defendant and its CEO for unpaid brokerage fees.

The CEO had fraudulently misrepresented to the plaintiff that the real estate agents on the sale of the property had agreed to reduce their commission by 50%, inducing the plaintiff to discharge its mortgage and defer its fees.

The court found the CEO personally liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and ordered both defendants to pay the full $350,000 fee plus substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant, a non-profit housing corporation providing affordable and rent-geared-to-income housing, sought a declaration that its three properties were exempt from municipal taxation under section 3(1)12(iii) of the Assessment Act.

The respondents conceded the applicant served the poor but argued it was not 'organized for the relief of the poor' as required by the exemption.

Applying binding appellate authority, the court found that because the applicant's operations were fully funded by government subsidies and tenant rents, and its day-to-day management was outsourced to a for-profit entity, it did not provide relief through its own endeavors or funds.

The application was dismissed.

The Appellant brought a motion for leave to file a Supplementary Reply Report in its property assessment appeal, citing the sudden passing of its expert's spouse as an exceptional circumstance.

MPAC brought a separate motion to restrict the Appellant from raising new issues and leading evidence regarding functional and external obsolescence based on production volumes in its Reply Report.

The Assessment Review Board granted the Appellant's motion to file the Supplementary Reply Report due to exceptional circumstances.

However, the Board also granted MPAC's motion, finding that the Appellant failed to properly plead the issue of obsolescence based on production volumes in its Statement of Issues and that the evidence was not proper reply.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a committee's decision to issue a caution regarding his obstetrical care of a patient whose infant died.

The applicant argued the committee breached procedural fairness by rejecting his proposal for a remedial agreement and ignoring his expert's report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the board's decision reasonable, as the committee was not bound by its decision-making framework guidelines and was entitled to weigh the expert evidence using its own specialized medical knowledge.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court found that the plaintiff had not remedied the deficiencies identified in a previous ruling by Diamond J., nor had the law changed to overcome these deficiencies.

The claims for intentional interference with economic relations failed because the third party (Contac) had released its claims against the defendants.

The conspiracy claim failed as it alleged a conspiracy between a corporate officer acting within his corporate capacity and the corporation itself, which is a legal impossibility.

The court also affirmed that a sole shareholder cannot sue for harm done to the corporation when the corporation itself has released its claims.

The motion to strike was granted without leave to amend, and partial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants.

The Requestor sought Party status in a Zoning By-law Amendment appeal regarding a mixed-use development.

The Requestor held a registered right to purchase commercial space in the development and raised concerns about the proposed parkland dedication affecting this right.

The Tribunal denied the motion, finding that the Requestor's interest was a private legal matter outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction, not a valid planning issue.

Furthermore, the Requestor failed to participate in the earlier municipal and Tribunal processes despite having notice.

York University and York University Development Corporation (YUDC) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision denying their request for reconsideration of an order requiring the production of certain records.

The applicants argued the Adjudicator erred in finding the records were under the control of York University pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and in her approach to the reconsideration threshold.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Adjudicator reasonably applied the two-part control test from National Defence and reasonably placed the onus on the applicants to establish grounds for reconsideration.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which determined that the current value assessment of a landfill site should exclude the value of a facility used to generate electricity from landfill gas.

The appellants argued the facility was a commercial activity, not used exclusively for landfilling activities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the generation of electricity from landfill gas is an environmental control activity required by the site's environmental compliance approval, and thus falls within the definition of landfilling activities under O. Reg. 282/98.

Tallman Truck Centre Limited appealed an order staying its action against K.S.P. Holdings Inc. The stay was imposed because Tallman failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with the co-defendant, Secure Capital Advisors Inc., which fundamentally altered Secure's adversarial position to a cooperative one with Tallman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Tallman's appeal, affirming that such agreements, regardless of type (Mary Carter or Pierringer-type), require immediate disclosure as they change the litigation landscape.

The court reiterated that failure to immediately disclose constitutes an abuse of process, for which a stay of proceedings is the only appropriate remedy, regardless of intent or perceived prejudice.

CPI Security Services Inc. (CPI) brought a motion for costs after 2465855 Ontario Ltd. o/a The Westin Prince, Toronto (Westin) accepted CPI's Rule 49 offer to settle but then defaulted on payment and costs.

CPI sought $54,121.12 in costs.

The court fixed CPI's costs of the action on a partial indemnity basis and costs of enforcing the settlement on a substantial indemnity basis, totaling $47,037.30.

The court found Westin's general claims of COVID-19 financial impact insufficient to justify default and noted Westin's lack of communication.

The court also reduced CPI's claimed costs for undertakings and pre-trial preparation, deeming them excessive.