Alana Robert

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for breach of fiduciary duty and knowing assistance, the defendants sought costs.

The Primary Defendants sought full indemnification pursuant to the plaintiff's corporate by-laws, while the Consultant Defendants sought full indemnity costs based on the plaintiff's unfounded allegations of dishonesty and self-dealing.

The court awarded the Primary Defendants full indemnification totaling over $9.4 million, finding no reason to depart from the by-laws.

The Consultant Defendants were awarded substantial indemnity costs of approximately $2.4 million, as the plaintiff's conduct in pursuing serious, unfounded allegations justified an elevated scale of costs.

The applicants sought court review of legal fees claimed by six lawyers (the Legal Team) who represented the Robinson Huron Treaty Litigation Fund in litigation to enforce the Crown's obligations under the Robinson Huron Treaty of 1850.

The Legal Team claimed $510 million as a 5% contingent success fee on a $10 billion settlement.

The court found the Partial Contingency Fee Agreement was neither fair when signed nor reasonable at the time of hearing.

The court determined the Legal Team acted in conflict of interest when advising clients on their own fees and failed to ensure clients received independent legal advice.

The court assessed the fair and reasonable value of the Legal Team's services at approximately $40 million (double their billable fees of $23 million plus $6.5 million in disbursements already paid), rejecting the $510 million claim as champertous and disproportionate to the settlement amount.

The applicants brought preliminary objections to the admissibility of two pieces of evidence in an application proceeding concerning contingent fee recognition.

The respondent law firm and lawyers sought recognition of contingent fees claimed under a Partial Contingency Agreement dated June 17, 2011.

The court ruled on the admissibility of an expert report from a former Federal Court judge and a third affidavit from one of the respondent lawyers.

The court found that expert evidence on the complexity of the case, risks involved, and results achieved was not necessary, as these matters were within the experience and knowledge of the court and were adequately addressed through extensive evidence and comprehensive legal submissions.

The court also found the expert lacked the requisite qualifications to opine on the specific topics.

The court reserved judgment on the admissibility of the third affidavit pending further consideration of its relevance.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal the decision of Steele J. dated October 30, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The applicants sought an assessment of a $510 million partial contingency fee paid to the lawyer respondents by the Robinson Huron Treaty Litigation Fund (RHTLF) and a determination of whether the $10 billion settlement proceeds were assets of the RHTLF Trust.

The court directed an assessment of the legal fees under the Solicitors Act, finding that the First Nations were liable to pay the bills and that special circumstances warranted assessment.

The court also confirmed that the settlement proceeds are assets of the Trust.

The plaintiff and several defendants brought cross-motions to compel answers to undertakings, questions taken under advisement, and refusals from examinations for discovery.

The underlying action involves allegations by the plaintiff that the defendants engaged in a plan to cause financial harm and confer unlawful benefits upon their departure from the organization.

The court applied principles of relevance and proportionality, ordering the parties to answer certain questions and fulfill specific undertakings while upholding refusals for questions that were irrelevant, disproportionate, or improper.

The applicants, including several current and former sex workers and a sex worker advocacy organization, brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA), which criminalized the purchase of sexual services and related activities.

The applicants argued that the provisions violated sections 7, 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter by replicating the harms of the previous prostitution laws struck down in Bedford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions did not violate sections 7, 2(d), or 15 of the Charter.

While the Attorney General conceded that certain provisions violated section 2(b) freedom of expression, the court found these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a proportionate response to the pressing and substantial objective of reducing the demand for sex work and protecting vulnerable persons from exploitation.

This is an appeal from a medical negligence judgment.

The appellants, two doctors, challenged the trial judge's findings on standard of care and causation after Ms. Stevenhaagen suffered severe neurological injuries following an angioplasty procedure and subsequent aortic rupture.

The trial judge found the doctors liable for failing to consult a cardiovascular surgeon promptly and for transferring the patient to the Coronary Care Unit instead of directly to the operating room after temporary stabilization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's conclusions that the standard of care was breached and that this breach caused Ms. Stevenhaagen's injuries, applying the 'but for' test for causation.

York University and York University Development Corporation (YUDC) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision denying their request for reconsideration of an order requiring the production of certain records.

The applicants argued the Adjudicator erred in finding the records were under the control of York University pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and in her approach to the reconsideration threshold.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Adjudicator reasonably applied the two-part control test from National Defence and reasonably placed the onus on the applicants to establish grounds for reconsideration.