Gail Sinclair

The applicants, including several current and former sex workers and a sex worker advocacy organization, brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA), which criminalized the purchase of sexual services and related activities.

The applicants argued that the provisions violated sections 7, 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter by replicating the harms of the previous prostitution laws struck down in Bedford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions did not violate sections 7, 2(d), or 15 of the Charter.

While the Attorney General conceded that certain provisions violated section 2(b) freedom of expression, the court found these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a proportionate response to the pressing and substantial objective of reducing the demand for sex work and protecting vulnerable persons from exploitation.

The applicants sought an order requiring the federal government to regulate Twitter to prevent it from refusing to sell them 'promoted tweets' for their political documentary film.

The Attorney General moved to dismiss the application for failing to state a reasonable cause of action.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test for positive rights under section 2(b) of the Charter, finding that the applicants were not effectively precluded from meaningful expression, as they could still use regular tweets and other advertising mediums.

The court also held that the relief sought was not justiciable, as it would require the court to set legislative priorities.

The motion was granted and the application was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Canada sought judicial review of a decision by the Canadian Human Rights Commission to refer a complaint by Christopher Karas to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.

The complaint alleged that Health Canada discriminated against him on the basis of sexual orientation through its oversight of Canadian Blood Services' blood donor deferral policy for men who have sex with men (MSM).

The Attorney General argued that Health Canada was not a proper party and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Federal Court held that the Commission's investigator's report formed part of its reasons and that the decision to refer the matter to the Tribunal was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Canadian Constitution Foundation challenged the constitutionality of section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibited making or publishing false statements about political figures with the intent to affect election results.

The provision was amended in 2018 to remove the word 'knowingly'.

The applicant argued this amendment rendered the provision an unjustifiable infringement on freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that the removal of 'knowingly' was a substantive change, meaning the offence no longer required proof that the statement was known to be false.

Without this knowledge element, the provision failed the minimal impairment test under section 1 of the Charter.

Consequently, section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act was declared to be of no force or effect.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of section 91 of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibits certain false statements during an election period, and sought an urgent hearing timetable to have the matter decided before the end of the ongoing federal election.

The court dismissed the request for an expedited timetable, noting that the applicant delayed in bringing the application despite the legislation being in force for months.

The court emphasized that complex Charter challenges require careful preparation and should not be decided under artificial urgency, especially when a decision would likely not be rendered in time to materially impact the election.

Two Canadian citizens residing abroad for more than five years challenged the constitutionality of provisions of the Canada Elections Act that denied the right to vote in federal elections to non-resident citizens absent from Canada for five consecutive years or more.

The Attorney General conceded a breach of s. 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The majority held that the five-year limit could not be justified under s. 1, finding that the restriction was not minimally impairing and that the vague electoral fairness objective was outweighed by the deleterious effects of disenfranchising well over one million non-resident Canadians.

The relevant impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect and the Act was modified to extend the vote to all non-resident citizens.

The court was tasked with approving legal fees for class counsel in the Brown action, part of the Sixties Scoop national settlement.

The supervising judge previously rejected a $75 million total fee agreement as excessive, suggesting class counsel in Brown should receive $25 million and counsel in the companion Riddle action $12.5 million.

However, after the Federal Court awarded the maximum $37.5 million to class counsel in Riddle, the court concluded it would be extremely unfair to award class counsel in Brown, who did the heavy lifting, anything less.

Consequently, the court approved the maximum $37.5 million in legal fees for class counsel in Brown.

Aroland First Nation and Ginoogaming First Nation sought partial summary judgment for a declaration that the Crown's duty to consult under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, is triggered by ongoing invasive testing (integrity digs and hydrostatic testing) on established natural gas pipelines traversing their traditional territories.

The defendants opposed, arguing no duty to consult or that the matter was unsuitable for partial summary judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding that the issue could not be fairly and justly decided through partial summary judgment due to the need for a careful, incremental approach to Aboriginal law, disputed facts regarding adverse impact, significant overlap with broader issues of duty scope and breach, and the novelty of the case.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion to approve a national settlement agreement regarding the 'Sixties Scoop' class action.

The settlement provided between $550 million and $800 million in compensation and established a $50 million national foundation for reconciliation.

The court found the core settlement provisions fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

However, the court refused to approve the $75 million legal fees provision, finding it excessive and unreasonable in the context of a mega-fund settlement, and directed that the legal fees provision be de-linked from the rest of the settlement.

The plaintiff brought a class action for damages arising from the "Sixties Scoop" alleging that Canada breached its obligation under the 1965 Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement to consult Indian bands before extending child welfare services to reserves.

This failure resulted in the loss of aboriginal identity for thousands of children placed with non-aboriginal foster or adoptive parents.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding Canada liable for breaching a common law duty of care, though it did not establish a fiduciary duty.

The case will proceed to the damages assessment stage.

The respondents, Canadian citizens living in the United States for more than five years, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Canada Elections Act that prohibited them from voting in federal elections.

The application judge found the provisions violated section 3 of the Charter and were not saved under section 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the provisions infringed section 3, they were demonstrably justified under section 1.

The majority found the pressing and substantial objective was to preserve the social contract between citizens' obligation to obey the law and their right to elect lawmakers, and that the five-year limit was a minimally impairing and proportionate means of achieving this objective.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion challenging s. 6 of the Indian Act and the Registrar’s Proof of Paternity Policy under s. 15 of the Charter after being denied Indian status registration because her paternal grandfather was unknown and unknowable.

She alleged discrimination based on race, gender, illegitimacy, and family or marital status.

The court held that all applicants bear the same onus to prove entitlement to registration and that unknowable paternity is not an analogous ground under s. 15.

No Charter infringement was established, so the constitutional claim failed, although the court expressed concern in obiter that the policy’s evidentiary demands may not be fully consistent with the Act’s purpose and history.

The appellants brought an application alleging that the federal and provincial governments violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to implement effective strategies to reduce homelessness and inadequate housing.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the application on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was not justiciable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application raised political rather than legal issues, lacked a judicially discoverable and manageable standard, and was therefore not justiciable.

The Attorney General of Canada moved for a stay pending appeal of a judgment declaring provisions of the Canada Elections Act that restricted non-resident citizens from voting unconstitutional.

The application judge had found the five-year non-residency limit violated section 3 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the risk of irreparable harm was balanced between the parties, and the balance of convenience favoured refusing the stay to allow newly enfranchised non-resident citizens to vote in upcoming federal by-elections.

Current and former sex workers challenged three Criminal Code provisions prohibiting bawdy-houses, living on avails, and public communication for prostitution purposes.

The Court held the provisions deprived security of the person by materially increasing risks of violence and preventing safety-enhancing measures, and that the deprivations were not in accordance with fundamental justice due to gross disproportionality and overbreadth.

The Court affirmed that lower courts may revisit precedent when a new legal issue or significant evidentiary change is shown, and confirmed deference to trial findings on social and legislative facts absent palpable and overriding error.

Section 210 (as related to prostitution), section 212(1)(j), and section 213(1)(c) were declared unconstitutional.

Invalidity was suspended for one year to permit legislative response.

The applicants brought an application alleging that the provincial and federal governments breached ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter by making decisions and implementing program changes which eroded access to affordable housing.

The respondents brought motions to dismiss the application on the grounds that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and that the issues raised were not justiciable.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the application, finding that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to provide affordable housing, and the impugned decisions did not deny the applicants a benefit given to others under s. 15.

The court also held that the issues raised were not justiciable as they involved broad policy choices.

Several public interest organizations sought leave to intervene as friends of the court on a motion to strike a constitutional application alleging that federal and provincial housing policies violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to ensure adequate housing.

The proposed interveners argued they could provide perspectives relating to poverty, disability, housing policy, international human rights obligations, and constitutional remedies.

The court emphasized that intervention on a Rule 21 motion is exceptional and requires a showing that the intervener will make a useful legal contribution beyond the parties’ submissions without prejudicing the proceeding.

Interventions focused primarily on social context or policy impacts were rejected because the motion concerned a narrow legal question regarding whether the application disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted limited intervention status to three groups with specific expertise relevant to Charter interpretation, international human rights law, and constitutional remedies, while dismissing the remaining intervention motions.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to stay the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, which struck down several prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional, pending appeal.

The moving party argued that the judgment created a legislative void with profound implications for the public interest.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that there was a serious issue to be tried, the government would suffer irreparable harm to the public interest without a stay, and the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion was granted and the judgment was stayed for a limited period to permit appellate review.

The appellant sued Canada for a declaration that its refusal to compensate him for internment and forced labour during World War II violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The appellant died before the action came to trial, and his estate trustees obtained an Order to Continue.

Canada successfully moved to vary the order so that the estate could only pursue non-Charter claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the estate's appeal, applying Supreme Court precedent to hold that an estate does not have standing to pursue relief under the Charter, including under section 7.