Catharine Moore

The plaintiffs brought a motion on consent to certify a class action on behalf of Métis and non-status Indigenous persons who were placed in the care of non-Indigenous foster or adoptive parents and lost their Indigenous identity, following the 60s Scoop class action.

The Federal Court found the mandatory requirements of Rule 334.16 of the Federal Courts Rules were met, noting that the claim disclosed a cause of action, proposed an identifiable class and common questions, and that a national class proceeding was the preferred procedure.

The Court granted the motion to certify the class action.

The court was tasked with approving legal fees for class counsel in the Brown action, part of the Sixties Scoop national settlement.

The supervising judge previously rejected a $75 million total fee agreement as excessive, suggesting class counsel in Brown should receive $25 million and counsel in the companion Riddle action $12.5 million.

However, after the Federal Court awarded the maximum $37.5 million to class counsel in Riddle, the court concluded it would be extremely unfair to award class counsel in Brown, who did the heavy lifting, anything less.

Consequently, the court approved the maximum $37.5 million in legal fees for class counsel in Brown.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion to approve a national settlement agreement regarding the 'Sixties Scoop' class action.

The settlement provided between $550 million and $800 million in compensation and established a $50 million national foundation for reconciliation.

The court found the core settlement provisions fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

However, the court refused to approve the $75 million legal fees provision, finding it excessive and unreasonable in the context of a mega-fund settlement, and directed that the legal fees provision be de-linked from the rest of the settlement.

The appellant appealed from an order of Justice K. Pedlar dated October 18, 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs, with reasons to follow.

The appellant suffered a back injury and was temporarily disabled, preventing him from making regular Canada Pension Plan (CPP) contributions.

When his disability became permanent, he applied for a CPP disability pension but was denied for failing to meet the recency of contributions test.

He argued that the CPP's 'drop-out' provision, which exempts periods of severe and permanent disability from the contribution calculation, violated his s. 15(1) Charter equality rights by not extending the same exemption to persons with temporary disabilities.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the distinction did not demean the dignity of persons with temporary disabilities and therefore did not constitute discrimination under s. 15(1).