Jeffery Wilson

The court was tasked with approving legal fees for class counsel in the Brown action, part of the Sixties Scoop national settlement.

The supervising judge previously rejected a $75 million total fee agreement as excessive, suggesting class counsel in Brown should receive $25 million and counsel in the companion Riddle action $12.5 million.

However, after the Federal Court awarded the maximum $37.5 million to class counsel in Riddle, the court concluded it would be extremely unfair to award class counsel in Brown, who did the heavy lifting, anything less.

Consequently, the court approved the maximum $37.5 million in legal fees for class counsel in Brown.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion to approve a national settlement agreement regarding the 'Sixties Scoop' class action.

The settlement provided between $550 million and $800 million in compensation and established a $50 million national foundation for reconciliation.

The court found the core settlement provisions fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

However, the court refused to approve the $75 million legal fees provision, finding it excessive and unreasonable in the context of a mega-fund settlement, and directed that the legal fees provision be de-linked from the rest of the settlement.

The plaintiff brought a class action for damages arising from the "Sixties Scoop" alleging that Canada breached its obligation under the 1965 Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement to consult Indian bands before extending child welfare services to reserves.

This failure resulted in the loss of aboriginal identity for thousands of children placed with non-aboriginal foster or adoptive parents.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding Canada liable for breaching a common law duty of care, though it did not establish a fiduciary duty.

The case will proceed to the damages assessment stage.

In a family law proceeding arising from a child’s motion, the court refused a late adjournment request brought by the respondent and his partner.

The court held that the absence of historical counsel’s file, alleged deficiencies in the child’s financial disclosure, and incomplete questioning did not justify delaying urgently needed interim child support, particularly where the respondent himself was in breach of disclosure obligations.

The court also dismissed a non-party partner’s motion to add herself and her children as parties, finding they were not proper parties and that any relevant evidence could have been advanced by affidavit.

The motion proceeded without adjournment.

A child brought a motion to vary an earlier interim family law order to obtain interim child support, interim disbursements, DNA testing or alternatively a declaration of parentage, and to vacate a non-contact provision.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the absence of a pending trial, deterioration in the child’s financial circumstances, the respondent’s continuing disclosure failures, and the respondent’s renewed reliance on paternity uncertainty.

Applying the statutory child support scheme, the court held that the parents’ prior agreement could not bargain away the child’s right to support, imputed income of $200,000 to the alleged father, and ordered interim Guideline support retroactive to April 1, 2014.

After the respondent stated he would refuse DNA testing if ordered, the court drew an adverse inference from that refusal and the surrounding evidence, and made a declaration of parentage.

The court also ordered $50,000 in interim disbursements, vacated the prior non-contact order upon filing of an undertaking, and adjourned the motion to strike the Answer while giving a final deadline for disclosure.

The applicant and respondent both sought costs following a leave to appeal application where success was divided.

The applicant sought $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis, arguing they were successful on the dominant issue regarding the appointment of a litigation guardian.

The respondent sought $10,000, arguing they were successful on five of the six issues.

The court found that success was divided and ordered that no costs be payable by either party.

Following unsuccessful motions and an appeal challenging two arbitration awards in a family law dispute, the successful party sought recovery of full costs totalling over $62,000.

The court considered the Family Law Rules governing costs, including the impact of settlement offers and the principle of proportionality.

Although the successful party achieved a result as favourable as his offer to settle, the court assessed the reasonableness of the total costs claimed.

Balancing proportionality, the complexity of the proceedings, and expectations of the losing party, the court awarded reduced costs consisting of $40,000 in legal fees plus tax and $1,333 in disbursements.

The parties separated after a long marriage during which they built a successful real estate business.

Following separation, the appellant was convicted of sexual assault, unilaterally terminated the business partnership, and diverted commissions to himself.

The trial judge awarded the respondent $200,000 in lump sum spousal support.

The appellant appealed the entitlement, form, and quantum of the award, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application and the appeal, finding the lump sum award appropriately addressed the economic disadvantage and hardship suffered by the respondent.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a class action and dismissing a motion to strike the amended statement of claim.

The class action was brought on behalf of Aboriginal children removed from their homes and placed in non-Aboriginal homes in Ontario between 1965 and 1984.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification judge's reliance on a 1965 Agreement that was not pleaded as the basis for the alleged fiduciary duty and duty of care, and noting the matter was of sufficient importance.

Following a re-hearing of a class action certification motion relating to the ‘Sixties Scoop’, the court addressed costs after granting certification and dismissing the federal Crown’s motion to strike.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, but the court held that such costs require reprehensible or outrageous conduct and were not justified.

Applying a partial indemnity scale and reviewing historical certification-motion cost awards, the court found the plaintiffs’ request modest given the complexity of the litigation and the work spanning both the original and rehearing motions.

The court fixed costs at an all-inclusive amount reflecting fairness to the losing party and proportionality to comparable certification proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the Federal Crown regarding the 'Sixties Scoop', alleging breach of fiduciary duty and negligence for funding provincial child welfare services that placed on-reserve aboriginal children in non-aboriginal homes without protecting their cultural identity.

The Federal Crown brought a cross-motion to strike the pleadings under Rule 21.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims would fail, given the evolving nature of aboriginal law.

The court granted the certification motion, revising the class definition and common issues to focus specifically on the impact of the 1965 Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her appeal from a trial decision making her child a Crown ward.

She argued the appeal judge erred in applying s. 57(4) of the Child and Family Services Act by failing to properly consider fresh evidence of community members willing to care for the child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the appeal judge that the fresh evidence did not present an actual plan of care, though it noted positive developments regarding a relative's new plan of care.

The parties made costs submissions following an appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties, the Court of Appeal ordered that there be no costs awarded for the motion for leave to appeal or the appeal.

The appellant mother appealed an order directing the return of her child to Australia pursuant to the Hague Convention.

The application judge found the child was habitually resident in Australia and that returning the child would not pose a grave risk of harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of habitual residence or the grave risk of harm threshold.

Application under the Hague Convention seeking the return of a young child to Australia after the respondent parent remained in Ontario with the child following a trip from Melbourne.

The court considered whether the child’s habitual residence was Australia or Ontario and addressed defences of acquiescence and grave risk of harm under Article 13(b).

The evidence demonstrated that the parties had jointly relocated to Australia with a settled intention to live there, including relinquishing their Ontario residence and establishing living arrangements in Melbourne.

The court rejected claims that the move was merely exploratory and found no clear evidence of consent or acquiescence by the applicant to the child remaining in Ontario.

The respondent also failed to establish the high threshold of grave risk of harm necessary to prevent return.

The child was ordered returned to Australia with conditions and undertakings.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court order that set aside the conditional certification of their proposed class action against Canada regarding the placement of Aboriginal children in non-Aboriginal foster care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the case management judge erred by conditionally certifying the action when the statement of claim did not disclose a viable cause of action.

The Court also agreed that the certification motion should be heard by a different judge to avoid the original judge sitting in review of his own decision.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, quashing the Divisional Court's costs award because it failed to consider the public interest and novel legal issues raised by the case.

Following the wife's unsuccessful appeal of a temporary family law order, the husband sought partial indemnity costs of $13,369.72.

The court declined to award costs against the wife's former counsel personally, finding the conduct did not meet the required threshold.

Considering the wife's limited financial means and the overriding principle of reasonableness, the court fixed costs at $5,000 and deferred payment until the parties equalize their net family property.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision dismissing his application under the Hague Convention for the return of his six-year-old daughter to Peru.

The mother had wrongfully retained the child in Ontario but invoked the Article 13(b) 'grave risk' exception, citing a history of domestic violence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that returning the child to Peru would expose her to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or place her in an intolerable situation.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the mother's custody claim to proceed in Ontario.

The mother appealed a temporary order requiring her to return the children to Timmins from Toronto.

She had unilaterally moved the children to Toronto pending a mobility motion.

The appeal judge found that the motion judge did not err in principle, did not fail to apply the best interests of the child test, and did not give undue weight to the mother's conduct in unilaterally moving the children.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a high‑conflict custody dispute involving a proposed relocation of children from Ontario to Los Angeles, the moving party sought an order appointing private counsel for two children after the Office of the Children's Lawyer declined involvement due to timing constraints.

The responding party opposed the request, arguing that counsel appointment would reinforce parental influence and that an updated assessment should occur first.

The court held that it had jurisdiction under rule 4(7) of the Family Law Rules to authorize counsel for children and exercised its discretion to appoint separate lawyers on a limited mandate.

The appointed lawyers were directed only to determine and report the children's views and preferences regarding the proposed relocation, rather than to act with the full rights of a party.

The court emphasized that the narrow role was necessary to ensure the children's voices were heard within tight procedural timelines.