Jeffery Wilson

The court was tasked with approving legal fees for class counsel in the Brown action, part of the Sixties Scoop national settlement.

The supervising judge previously rejected a $75 million total fee agreement as excessive, suggesting class counsel in Brown should receive $25 million and counsel in the companion Riddle action $12.5 million.

However, after the Federal Court awarded the maximum $37.5 million to class counsel in Riddle, the court concluded it would be extremely unfair to award class counsel in Brown, who did the heavy lifting, anything less.

Consequently, the court approved the maximum $37.5 million in legal fees for class counsel in Brown.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion to approve a national settlement agreement regarding the 'Sixties Scoop' class action.

The settlement provided between $550 million and $800 million in compensation and established a $50 million national foundation for reconciliation.

The court found the core settlement provisions fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

However, the court refused to approve the $75 million legal fees provision, finding it excessive and unreasonable in the context of a mega-fund settlement, and directed that the legal fees provision be de-linked from the rest of the settlement.

The plaintiff brought a class action for damages arising from the "Sixties Scoop," alleging that Canada breached its obligation under the 1965 Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement to consult Indian bands before extending child welfare services to reserves.

This failure resulted in the loss of aboriginal identity for thousands of children placed with non-aboriginal foster or adoptive parents.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding Canada liable for breaching a common law duty of care, though it did not establish a fiduciary duty.

The case will proceed to the damages assessment stage.

Following unsuccessful motions and an appeal challenging two arbitration awards in a family law dispute, the successful party sought recovery of full costs totalling over $62,000.

The court considered the Family Law Rules governing costs, including the impact of settlement offers and the principle of proportionality.

Although the successful party achieved a result as favourable as his offer to settle, the court assessed the reasonableness of the total costs claimed.

Balancing proportionality, the complexity of the proceedings, and expectations of the losing party, the court awarded reduced costs consisting of $40,000 in legal fees plus tax and $1,333 in disbursements.

Following a re-hearing of a class action certification motion relating to the ‘Sixties Scoop’, the court addressed costs after granting certification and dismissing the federal Crown’s motion to strike.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, but the court held that such costs require reprehensible or outrageous conduct and were not justified.

Applying a partial indemnity scale and reviewing historical certification-motion cost awards, the court found the plaintiffs’ request modest given the complexity of the litigation and the work spanning both the original and rehearing motions.

The court fixed costs at an all-inclusive amount reflecting fairness to the losing party and proportionality to comparable certification proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the Federal Crown regarding the 'Sixties Scoop', alleging breach of fiduciary duty and negligence for funding provincial child welfare services that placed on-reserve aboriginal children in non-aboriginal homes without protecting their cultural identity.

The Federal Crown brought a cross-motion to strike the pleadings under Rule 21.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims would fail, given the evolving nature of aboriginal law.

The court granted the certification motion, revising the class definition and common issues to focus specifically on the impact of the 1965 Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement.

Application under the Hague Convention seeking the return of a young child to Australia after the respondent parent remained in Ontario with the child following a trip from Melbourne.

The court considered whether the child’s habitual residence was Australia or Ontario and addressed defences of acquiescence and grave risk of harm under Article 13(b).

The evidence demonstrated that the parties had jointly relocated to Australia with a settled intention to live there, including relinquishing their Ontario residence and establishing living arrangements in Melbourne.

The court rejected claims that the move was merely exploratory and found no clear evidence of consent or acquiescence by the applicant to the child remaining in Ontario.

The respondent also failed to establish the high threshold of grave risk of harm necessary to prevent return.

The child was ordered returned to Australia with conditions and undertakings.

Following the wife's unsuccessful appeal of a temporary family law order, the husband sought partial indemnity costs of $13,369.72.

The court declined to award costs against the wife's former counsel personally, finding the conduct did not meet the required threshold.

Considering the wife's limited financial means and the overriding principle of reasonableness, the court fixed costs at $5,000 and deferred payment until the parties equalize their net family property.

The mother appealed a temporary order requiring her to return the children to Timmins from Toronto.

She had unilaterally moved the children to Toronto pending a mobility motion.

The appeal judge found that the motion judge did not err in principle, did not fail to apply the best interests of the child test, and did not give undue weight to the mother's conduct in unilaterally moving the children.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a high‑conflict custody dispute involving a proposed relocation of children from Ontario to Los Angeles, the moving party sought an order appointing private counsel for two children after the Office of the Children's Lawyer declined involvement due to timing constraints.

The responding party opposed the request, arguing that counsel appointment would reinforce parental influence and that an updated assessment should occur first.

The court held that it had jurisdiction under rule 4(7) of the Family Law Rules to authorize counsel for children and exercised its discretion to appoint separate lawyers on a limited mandate.

The appointed lawyers were directed only to determine and report the children's views and preferences regarding the proposed relocation, rather than to act with the full rights of a party.

The court emphasized that the narrow role was necessary to ensure the children's voices were heard within tight procedural timelines.

Following a seven‑day trial concerning a Hague Convention application for the return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant father had sought the return of the child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, while the respondent mother successfully relied on the Article 13(b) exception to resist return.

The successful party sought full recovery costs of over $83,000, arguing complete success and reliance on discretionary factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules.

The court rejected the argument that costs could only be awarded under Article 26 of the Hague Convention and held that the ordinary operation of Rule 24 applied.

While some reductions were warranted, the court found the bill of costs generally reasonable and awarded the successful party $64,000 in all‑inclusive costs.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children, J.B. (age 14) and S.B. (age 12), whose parents have a lengthy history of conflict spanning approximately eight to nine years.

The children's emotional distress, particularly J.B.'s suicidal ideation and hospitalization, was directly linked to parental conflict over school choice and ongoing litigation.

The court determined that J.B. was at risk of emotional harm if returned to his father's care, as the father continued to involve the child in parental disputes despite court proceedings being ongoing.

The court ordered J.B. to remain in the temporary care of the society with supervised access to both parents, and S.B. to remain with his mother under society supervision.

A father brought an application under the Children’s Law Reform Act seeking shared custody of a newborn child born in California after the mother travelled there late in pregnancy.

The primary issue on the motion was whether Ontario had jurisdiction over custody despite the child never residing in Ontario.

The court found that both parents were habitually resident in Ontario before the mother travelled to California and that the mother’s intention to relocate permanently to California arose only after the child’s birth.

Invoking the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction to address a gap in the statutory definition of habitual residence, the court held that Ontario had jurisdiction to determine custody.

The court also held that the respondent’s earlier Notice of Constitutional Question constituted attornment to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court.

The applicant father sought the return of a child to Perú under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction after the respondent mother retained the child in Ontario beyond a court‑authorized travel period.

The mother conceded the retention was wrongful but relied on the Article 13(b) exception, arguing that returning the child would expose her to a grave risk of psychological harm or an intolerable situation due to persistent domestic violence, threats, harassment, and violent confrontations involving the father and his family in Perú.

After a full trial, the court found credible evidence of ongoing intimidation, physical altercations, and the child’s exposure to violence and instability.

The court concluded the mother met the high threshold under Article 13(b), and that undertakings or temporary protective measures would not sufficiently mitigate the risks, particularly given the likelihood of further harassment and possible arrest of the mother upon return.

The application for the child’s return was dismissed, allowing the mother’s custody claim in Ontario to proceed.