Lorna M. Yates

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave for the former trial solicitor of Michael Scott De Longte to intervene in the appeal, limited to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court found the solicitor’s participation necessary to complete the record and assist in the proper adjudication of the issue, as the allegations of ineffective assistance were central to the appeal and mirrored in a related professional negligence action.

The court also declared that solicitor-client privilege had been waived by Mr. De Longte and set out a schedule for the exchange and filing of fresh evidence, cross-examinations, and facta.

No costs were awarded on the motion.

This decision addresses the imputation of income for child support purposes where the father was found intentionally underemployed and failed to provide full financial disclosure, including income from a professional corporation and rental properties.

The court imputed income to the father based on his earning capacity, rental income, and corporate benefits, rejecting his lower reported income and job search claims.

The mother’s income was accepted as disclosed.

The court also considered the appropriate sharing of special and extraordinary expenses under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines and declined to order life insurance as security due to lack of evidence but ordered a charge on the father’s Ontario properties to secure support obligations given his relocation to Jamaica and non-compliance history.

The parties separated after a 20-year marriage.

The trial resolved issues of equalization, income determination, child and spousal support, and post-separation adjustments.

The court preferred the applicant's expert's asset-based valuation of the family businesses over the respondent's earnings-based approach.

The court imputed income to the respondent due to tax-free earnings from day trading losses.

The respondent was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $345,325.02 and significant retroactive child support.

The court also found the respondent engaged in serious misconduct by improperly accessing the applicant's privileged emails.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the Respondent's violation of the rule in Browne v. Dunn by adducing evidence on substantive issues (equalization payment, income for support, unreported cash sales, business valuation, and child residency) without having put these points to the Applicant or her bookkeeper during cross-examination.

The court found a serious and voluminous breach of trial fairness.

As a remedy, the court ordered that the Applicant and her bookkeeper be recalled to address the new evidence, rather than excluding the Respondent's evidence, to ensure all relevant evidence is heard and credibility can be fairly assessed.

The Respondent was ordered to pay the costs associated with recalling the witnesses.

The Applicant, Donna Rose Meffe, sought full indemnity costs following a two-week trial where she was largely successful on most issues, including the date of separation, business valuations, and spousal support.

The Respondent, Dominic Anthony Meffe, who was self-represented, opposed the costs request, arguing for partial indemnity and alleging unreasonable conduct by the Applicant.

The court found the Applicant predominantly successful and the Respondent's conduct unreasonable, citing his failure to comply with disclosure orders, "document dumps," and unreasonable positions on key issues.

The court fixed costs at $190,000 payable forthwith and allowed registration of the order against the Respondent's properties due to his history of non-compliance with court orders.

This costs endorsement arises from a successful motion by Prem Kumar Kapila, an added respondent, to be removed from a family law proceeding initiated by his son, Sahil Kapila, against his former daughter-in-law, Rubi Chhina.

Prem sought full recovery of his costs from Rubi, who had named him as a party without proper claims.

The court awarded Prem $10,250 plus HST in costs, finding Rubi's reliance on former counsel's advice and her claim of modest means insufficient to deviate from the cost consequences of Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

The court emphasized Prem's offer to settle and Rubi's control over significant funds as factors supporting the award.

In supplementary reasons following an interim support motion, the court determined outstanding issues regarding section 7 expenses and costs.

The court found that a monthly nanny expense of $1,560 was a legitimate section 7 expense, ordering the respondent to pay his proportionate share based on an imputed income of $100,000.

The court declined to award costs to either party, noting divided success and that neither party's offer to settle was better than the outcome.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support against the respondent father, who is serving a life sentence in prison.

The parties disputed the respondent's income, with the applicant claiming it was $243,531 based on funds received during the relationship, and the respondent claiming it was $50,000 from prison work, rental properties, and sports betting.

The court rejected both figures, finding the respondent's disclosure unreliable but the applicant's lifestyle analysis excessive.

The court imputed the respondent's income at $100,000 and directed the parties to calculate support based on that amount, with spousal support at the mid-range of the SSAGs.

The applicant brought an enforcement motion after the respondent, who is incarcerated, failed to pay a court-ordered $15,000 generalized support payment.

The respondent unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal the support order and delayed payment until shortly before the enforcement motion was heard.

The court found the enforcement motion was justified due to legitimate doubt about payment and awarded the applicant costs of $2,754.55 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Applicant sought to strike the Respondent's pleadings and vest title in two Ontario properties due to the Respondent's persistent non-compliance with numerous court orders regarding financial disclosure, support payments, and asset preservation.

The Respondent had failed to provide full disclosure of his overseas business interests and had accumulated significant arrears.

The court granted the vesting order to protect the matrimonial home from foreclosure and conditionally struck the Respondent's pleadings, allowing for limited participation on parenting issues if financial compliance was not met within 90 days.

This family law trial addressed parenting arrangements, a proposed relocation of children to Brussels, child support, spousal support, the parties' separation/valuation date, and equalization payments.

The court denied the respondent's request to relocate the children, finding it not in their best interests to leave Toronto where they were settled and had strong bonds with both parents.

A shared parenting schedule was established.

The court imputed income to the respondent due to intentional underemployment and ordered prospective child and spousal support, but no retroactive support.

The separation date was fixed as February 26, 2017, and an equalization payment was ordered, with prejudgment interest accruing from the date of the final order.

Following a successful motion to strike the respondent’s motion to change support orders in a matrimonial proceeding, the applicant sought costs of $11,719.07.

The respondent filed no written submissions opposing the costs request.

The court reviewed the applicant’s bill of costs and found the amount fair and reasonable.

Full costs were awarded payable within 30 days.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent husband brought an unopposed Form 14B motion seeking validation of service of his answer, which had been uploaded to an electronic document exchange website known as “SIX.” The issue was whether uploading a document to the website constituted regular service under rule 6(2)(c) of the Family Law Rules, which permits service by depositing a copy at a document exchange to which the person’s lawyer belongs.

The court considered the technical operation of the platform and interpreted the terms “depositing” and “document exchange” in the context of electronic communication.

The court held that the website functioned as a document exchange and that the opposing lawyer “belonged” to it by having access and notice through the platform.

Service was therefore valid under the rule.

In a family law proceeding involving equalization and support issues, the responding spouse sought an advance on the equalization payment or interim disbursements for legal and expert fees.

The parties had previously consented to an order requiring disclosure, retaining a joint income analysis expert, and permitting the respondent to encumber the matrimonial home for certain legal and accounting costs.

The court reviewed the existing consent order and a subsequent disclosure order and concluded that the issues of interim disbursements and advances had already been adequately addressed.

No additional relief was granted, and the matter was left to proceed with completion of expert reports and continued case management.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent spouse brought a motion seeking an order requiring the applicant spouse to place him on her extended health and dental plan so he could obtain psychological counselling.

The applicant opposed the request on the basis that the moving party was subject to prior court orders prohibiting further motions until compliance with outstanding temporary orders, including substantial unpaid costs, and that he remained in arrears.

The court also noted that the requested relief was incidental to a support claim where no support order had been made or requested, and that the benefits plan likely did not permit the addition of a separated spouse.

The court concluded the claim failed on multiple grounds and dismissed the motion.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order requiring the respondent to participate in arbitration pursuant to a mediation–arbitration agreement addressing parenting access issues concerning the parties’ child.

The respondent sought to strike or stay the motion on the basis that the applicant was in substantial arrears of child support under a prior Georgia judgment and had failed to comply with other obligations under that order.

The court held that the mediation–arbitration agreement constituted a binding contract entered into with independent legal advice and that the parties were required to comply with its terms.

The alleged breaches of the Georgia judgment were properly addressed in separate proceedings under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act and did not justify refusing enforcement of the arbitration agreement.

The respondent’s motion to strike or stay was dismissed and the applicant’s motion compelling arbitration was granted.

The applicant brought a motion in a high‑conflict family proceeding seeking to strike the respondent’s Answer and Claim, stay the pleadings, and declare the respondent a vexatious litigant due to repeated motions, alleged disclosure failures, and unpaid costs orders exceeding $34,000.

The respondent, who was self‑represented and unemployed, argued his substantive issues had never been determined on their merits and sought leave to bring a motion for directions.

The court reviewed the Family Law Rules, including rules 1(8), 13(17), and 14(23), and the jurisprudence governing the extreme remedy of striking pleadings.

The court concluded the respondent’s conduct, while problematic, did not rise to the level of deliberate, egregious non‑compliance justifying striking pleadings or declaring him a vexatious litigant, particularly given the ongoing parenting issues involving the children.

The motion was dismissed and the court imposed a case‑management timetable and scheduled a settlement conference to move the litigation forward.

In a post‑separation parenting dispute, the moving party sought an order requiring a psychologist to file and disclose a parenting assessment report prepared during earlier proceedings.

The court held that the report had not been formally ordered under s. 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and, in any event, the underlying application had already been resolved by a final parenting order.

As a result, the court lacked jurisdiction to compel production of the report to the parties.

The court further held that even if jurisdiction existed, disclosure to the parents was not shown to be in the children’s best interests.

The motion was dismissed, with the court directing that the report may be provided to professionals involved with the family only upon request and awarding costs against the moving party.