ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: April 23, 2025
COURT FILE No.: Toronto DFO-22-43259-00
BETWEEN:
Marvin Findlayter
Applicant
— AND —
Candice Pusey
Respondent
Before Justice Jennifer S. Daudlin
Heard on October 23-25, 2024.
Reasons for Judgement released on April 23, 2025
Marvin Findlayter............................................................................................... self-representing
Lorna Yates......................................................................................... counsel for the respondent
DAUDLIN J.:
Part One – Introduction
1.1 Overview
1This trial concerns the financial responsibilities of the applicant, Marvin Findlayter (the “father”), toward his daughter, Maya (2).
2There are two final parenting orders of Justice Sager that were made on consent:
(1) On December 11, 2023, the respondent, Candice Pusey (the “mother”), who is Maya’s primary caregiver, was granted sole decision-making responsibility.
(2) On February 27, 2024, all parenting matters were otherwise resolved, and providing that the father shall have no regular or vacation parenting time with Maya.
3The trial follows a temporary child support order made by Justice Sager on July 13, 2023 (the “temporary support order”), in which the court imputed annual income of $151,868 to the father based on his prior earnings, qualifications, and capacity to earn. The court ordered table child support of $1,312 per month and a proportional contribution to the after-tax cost of Maya’s daycare and health- and dental-related expenses, commencing April 1, 2023. The father has not complied with that order and is in significant arrears.
4At trial, the mother submits the court should finalize the terms of the temporary support order until October 31, 2024, and order ongoing child support and a contribution to section 7 expenses based on an imputed annual income to the father of $102,776. She also asks for an order that the father maintain life insurance as security for support.
5The father asks to have his annual income assessed in an amount lower than the amount imputed to him by Justice Sager. He asks that child support be calculated from the date of the child’s birth. For ongoing support purposes, he seeks that child support be calculated based on his actual employment income in Jamaica, which he reports to be approximately $52,804 CAD per year. He disputes the mother’s entitlement to certain section 7 expenses and asked for an order imputing her income at $145,000.
1.2 Issues to be Decided
6The issues to be decided at trial are as follows:
(1) What is the father’s annual income for each year he is required to pay child support? Should income be imputed to him in any of these years, and if so, how much?
(2) What section 7 expenses are reasonable and necessary within the meaning of the Child Support Guidelines, and how should these be shared?
(3) Should the father be ordered to obtain or maintain life insurance to secure support?
Part Two – Relevant Background
2.1 Family History
7The father is 43 years old. The mother is 39 years old.
8The parties began a casual relationship in March 2020, which ended soon after. The relationship resumed in early 2021. The mother became pregnant in May 2021.
9In July 2021, the mother moved from Toronto into the father’s residence in Caledonia, Ontario.
10The parties’ relationship ended in November 2021, and the mother moved in with her parents in Stratford, Ontario.
11Maya was born on […], 2022.
12Shortly after Maya’s birth, the father requested paternity testing, which was completed on February 18, 2022, confirming paternity.
13In March 2022, the mother and Maya moved to Etobicoke, Ontario, where they have remained.
14After Maya’s birth, she lived with the mother. The father did not live with the child at any time.
15The father filed his application on November 15, 2022, and the mother responded with her answer/claim on December 20, 2022. Both parties sought sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence of Maya, child support, including section 7 expenses, and other financial relief.
16On February 2 and December 11, 2023, Justice Sager issued temporary parenting time orders on consent.
17On December 11, 2023, also by consent, Justice Sager granted the mother final sole decision-making responsibility for Maya.
18The father last exercised in-person parenting time with Maya on February 3, 2024. He subsequently ceased all parenting time, relocated to Jamaica in February 2024, and consented to a final order made by Justice Sager on February 27, 2024, providing that he have no regular or holiday parenting time. Prior to that, his parenting time from Maya’s birth was sporadic and inconsistent, gradually declining over time. This occurred despite the existence of temporary parenting time orders, and included extended periods during which he had no contact with the child at all.
19The father currently resides in Jamaica. When he first relocated, he indicated that the move was intended to be temporary; however, at trial, he stated that he no longer plans to return to Canada.
2.2 Employment History
2.2.a. The Father
20The father holds a degree in Computer Engineering from the University at Buffalo and a Project Management Certificate from the University of Toronto.
21Prior to Maya’s birth, the father worked in the technology sector as a business analyst and project consultant. His employment history includes a multi-year engagement with the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), where he worked on the PRESTO fare payment system.
22The father also operated through his professional corporation, The Findlayter Group Inc. (“FGI”), and derived additional income from at least two of his three unencumbered rental properties located in Toronto, Mississauga, and Caledonia.
23The father’s consulting contract with the TTC ended in late 2021, shortly before the parties’ separation. He did not seek to renew the contract or obtain new employment, stating that he intended to remain at home with Maya following her birth, in accordance with discussions he says the parties had during the pregnancy.
24After the separation, the father did not return to the workforce and did not immediately begin searching for work, citing emotional and health-related difficulties, the death of his father in 2022, and contractual limitations linked to his prior engagement with the TTC/PRESTO. He also pointed to a lack of available opportunities in his field at the time. Despite this, he did not pursue retraining, upgrade his education, or take any steps to transition into a related or alternative area of employment following the end of his consulting contract.
25The father stated that he began searching for work in the second half of 2022 and claimed to have applied for over 170 jobs in Canada and the United States without success. He described efforts that included engaging with recruiters, submitting applications to consulting and IT roles, and attempting to generate income through property renovations and third-party lending. However, the evidence does not support this narrative. His job search activity appears to have begun in earnest only after the mother brought a motion for child support in June 2023, and there is little indication that he pursued consistent or sustained efforts to secure employment prior to that time.
26On July 13, 2023, Justice Sager imputed annual income of $151,868 to the father, commencing April 1, 2023, based on his prior earnings history, and earning capacity.
27In February 2024, the father accepted a job offer and relocated to Jamaica. He began working in April 2024 under a two-year employment contract with Hardware & Lumber Limited. He reported his earnings in that role at approximately $52,804 CAD annually.[1] He has stated that the relocation was driven by financial necessity, and health-related concerns.
28The father continues to own FGI and maintains three unencumbered rental properties in Ontario (referred to separately as “Burnhamthorpe”, “Abell”, and “Caledonia”). He reports that FGI has not generated new revenue since 2022. He has not provided updated disclosure showing current business activity or income from the corporation. Although he obtained a business valuation for FGI from Stephen Kerzman for the purposes of trial, he elected not to call Mr. Kerzman as a witness and did not make the valuator available for cross-examination.
29The father has acknowledged that he earned some income through property renovations and third-party lending, but there is limited documentation to substantiate the nature, extent, or consistency of these sources. While the properties remain mortgage-free and income-generating, the father has not provided a full or current accounting of rental income or associated expenses.
2.2.b. The Mother
30The mother holds a diploma in Advertising from Conestoga College and a diploma in Interactive Multimedia Design and Production from Humber College. At the time of Maya’s birth, she was employed by RBC in digital marketing and communications and has remained continuously employed with the bank since 2019.
31The mother is currently employed as the Director of Sales Enablement and Communication at RBC Royal Trust, a role she has held since 2023.
2.3 Relevant Findings on the Motion for Temporary Child Support
32The mother’s motion for temporary child support was argued on June 16, 2023.
33In reasons released on July 13, 2024, Justice Sager found that the father was intentionally underemployed and had failed to provide adequate medical evidence to support his claim that health issues prevented him from earning at his previous level. The court found that the father had chosen to reduce his income and rely on rental and investment earnings, despite his capacity to earn significantly more, based on his education, experience, and prior income.
34The father’s position that health concerns justified his underemployment was rejected, as the limited evidence did not establish that he was unable to pursue consulting or comparable work.
35Justice Sager imputed an annual income of $151,868 to the father, ordered child support based on that amount commencing April 1, 2023, and directed the parties to share Maya’s after-tax childcare and health and dental expenses proportionate to their incomes.
36While Justice Sager’s findings with respect to the father’s income are not binding on the court, they are informative.
Part Three – Credibility of the Parties
37The mother was a reliable and thoughtful witness. She answered questions directly, acknowledged the limits of her recollection where appropriate, and gave evidence that was consistent with the documentary record. Her testimony remained measured and focused on the issues before the court. She did not exaggerate her criticisms of the father, and her evidence was generally supported by communications between the parties and the procedural history of the case.
38The father’s evidence, by contrast, was inconsistent and frequently evasive. He struggled to answer questions directly, often inserted commentary that strayed from the issues at hand and resisted making reasonable concessions even when confronted with contrary documents. His account of key matters, including his employment history and parenting efforts, was not supported by the evidence. He maintained a narrative that was undermined by the timing and content of his own communications and financial disclosure.
39While the father’s conduct in this litigation was not marked by overt hostility, his testimony reflected a tendency to deflect responsibility and to frame himself as unfairly treated, rather than addressing the substantive issues in a straightforward manner. He did not demonstrate insight into the impact of his choices, particularly in relation to his parenting time and employment decisions.
40Where the parties’ evidence diverged, the court prefers the mother’s version of events.
41The analysis of the evidence that follows is conducted within the context of these credibility findings.
Part Four – The Law and Analysis
4.1 Prospective Support
4.1.a. The Law
42Claims made after the application date constitute prospective, not retroactive, support and are presumptively payable.[2]
4.1.b. Analysis and Conclusion
43The mother is only claiming support from April 1, 2023. This is after the answer/claim was filed.
44The father did not dispute his obligation to pay support after April 1, 2023, only the amount of support that would be paid. In fact, at trial, he sought a retroactive adjustment to […], 2022 - the date of Maya’s birth.
45Although the mother originally claimed retroactive support to Maya’s date of birth in her answer and claim, she did not pursue that relief at trial. Instead, she confirmed that she sought support beginning April 1, 2023, the date of Justice Sager’s temporary order. The court accepts that date as appropriate and proceeds with the analysis of the parties’ incomes.
4.2 Determination of Income
4.2.a. The Law
46Having determined the period for which support is payable, the court must determine the parties’ income for each year support is owed.
47In child support cases, the court must determine the payor’s income in a manner that fairly reflects their actual financial capacity to contribute to the support of their children. Section 19(1) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines permits the court to impute income to a parent where it considers it appropriate in the circumstances. This discretion is broad and allows the court to ensure that a child receives the level of support to which they are entitled, even in cases involving hidden income, inconsistent disclosure, or self-employment.
48Section 18 of the Guidelines also applies where a party controls a corporation, authorizing the court to consider both the income reported and the pre-tax corporate earnings reasonably attributable to that individual.
49Imputation of income is not punitive. It is a remedial mechanism grounded in the child’s right to support and in the obligation of both parents to contribute to their child’s needs according to their capacity. The court is not limited to the line 150 income reported on a party’s tax return, especially where that figure does not reflect the true resources available to the payor.
50The leading authority on imputation based on intentional underemployment is Drygala v. Pauli.[3] In that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed a three-part test:
(1) Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
(2) If so, is the unemployment or underemployment justified by reasonable educational or health needs?
(3) If not, what income is appropriately imputed?
51Even where a party is not intentionally underemployed, the court may impute income based on other factors, including lack of disclosure, unexplained income sources, or personal benefits drawn from business structures.
52The party seeking imputation bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Once that burden is met, the onus shifts to the opposing party to provide a credible explanation and to prove the accuracy of their income position.[4]
53Where a party controls a corporation or is self-employed, they carry an additional obligation to provide full and comprehensible disclosure of business income and expenses.[5] This includes a duty to present financial records in a clear, user-friendly format so that the recipient and the court can assess income without incurring unnecessary expense.[6]
54Courts routinely scrutinize deductions claimed by self-employed individuals. If the evidence suggests that the individual benefits personally from those deductions—such as by writing off housing or vehicle costs that salaried employees would typically pay from personal income—the court may add such expenses back when calculating income.[7]
55Rental income also forms part of a party’s financial capacity. Where a party owns income-generating properties, the court may impute income based on actual or potential rental income, especially where the properties are unencumbered or where the party fails to provide clear disclosure of revenues and expenses. The court may also assess whether expenses claimed against rental income confer personal benefits or are inflated to reduce reportable income. In such cases, the court may add back improperly claimed expenses or assess income based on market rental values.[8]
56Where a party fails to make full financial disclosure or provides information that is incomplete, inconsistent, or misleading, the court may draw an adverse inference and impute income accordingly.[9] Courts may also impute income where a party hides or misrepresents relevant income information, including the receipt of undeclared cash income.[10]
57In some cases, the court may find that the evidence overall lacks credibility and, on that basis alone, may impute income.[11]
58Courts may also consider a party’s lifestyle as an indicator of unreported income. If a party appears to live beyond their reported means, that fact can support imputation.[12]
59The above principles are not exhaustive. The court retains broad discretion to impute income where the circumstances warrant it, and to ensure that support obligations are based on a fair and accurate assessment of each party’s financial means.
4.2.b. Analysis and Conclusion
The Father’s Income
60The court must determine the father’s income for the purposes of establishing child support from April 1, 2023, the date of the temporary support order made by Justice Sager.
61From April 1, 2023 onward, the father asks the court to determine his income based on his previous year’s reported line 150 income. He states that his income for 2022 was $13,944, followed by $36,258 in 2023, and $52,804 from April 2024 going forward, the latter reflecting his current salary from employment in Jamaica.
62The father opposes any imputation of income and denies receiving income beyond what is disclosed in his tax filings. He opposes any attribution of additional income to retained earnings from FGI or to rental income from his properties.
63The mother, in contrast, asks the court to impute annual income of $151,868 to the father for 2023 and up until the end of October 2024, consistent with the July 13, 2023, temporary support order. She argues that this amount reflects his historical earnings, his earning capacity, and his ongoing access to corporate and rental income. From November 1, 2024, going forward, she proposes an imputed annual income of $102,776. Her position accounts for the father’s actual employment income in Jamaica as well as income attributable to his rental properties and control of FGI.
64The parties requested relief can be visually represented as follows:
| Period of Support | Mother’s proposed Imputed Income | Father’s Proposed Income |
|---|---|---|
| April 1-December 31, 2023 | $151,868 (based on the temporary order) | $13,944 (2022 income) |
| January 1-March 31, 2024 | $151,868 | $36,258 (2023 income (annualized)) |
| March 31-October 31, 2024 | $151,868 | $52,804 (current income, converted to CAD) |
| November 1, 2024, forward | $102,776 (current income, converted to CAD + rental income) | $52,804 |
65Although the father requested that support be calculated retroactively from Maya’s birth, the court declines to do so. His proposal was to rely on only the 2021 retained earnings of FGI—totalling $108,454—to satisfy his support obligations for 2022, and then shift to his substantially lower reported personal income for 2023 and beyond. In doing so, he asked the court to treat FGI as active in 2021 but effectively closed in subsequent years, despite continuing to draw personal benefit from the corporation through deductions, management fees, and access to funds. This selective and inconsistent treatment of FGI’s status and income reflects a strategic effort to minimize his overall support obligation, rather than a fair or credible representation of his financial capacity.
66The court accepts the mother’s submissions on the issue of income and finds her evidence to be credible, internally consistent, and well supported.
67The father was intentionally underemployed from late 2021 through mid-2023. Despite his extensive qualifications, a long history of contract work in the IT and consulting sector, and a billing rate of up to $125 per hour, he made no serious efforts to seek work until March 2023, shortly before the support motion. He acknowledged an 18-month employment gap, during which he voluntarily withdrew from the workforce, lived off investment income and savings, and admitted he was “enjoying [his] time off.”
68Although the father cited health concerns, he provided no reliable medical evidence that would prevent him from full-time employment. He confirmed during cross-examination that his blood pressure was controlled with medication and lifestyle adjustments, that he does not suffer from arrhythmia or mitral valve issues, and that he uses a CPAP machine to manage sleep apnea. These admissions confirm that his health did not preclude employment during the relevant period.
69Beginning in March 2023, the father took some steps to re-enter the workforce. His job search included applications to various roles, correspondence with recruiters, and outreach to professional contacts. These efforts intensified after July 2023, following the release of Justice Sager’s decision imputing income to him. While this belated initiative reflects some recognition of his support obligations, it does not excuse the extended period of inaction that preceded it. From late 2021 through early 2023, the father made no meaningful attempt to secure employment, retrain, or otherwise restore his earning capacity. He did not engage in a consistent or credible job search and provided no evidence of efforts to adapt to changing market conditions in his field. His eventual job search—though more active—was reactive rather than proactive, and insufficient to offset the prolonged underemployment that deprived Maya of the financial support to which she was entitled.
70The father also failed to retrain or upgrade his credentials during the period of unemployment, despite his awareness that market conditions had shifted. Aside from completing a “Scrum Master” certification in March 2024, he took no meaningful steps to enhance his employability. At the same time, he maintained a LinkedIn profile advertising extensive experience in IT and project management—contradicting his claim that his past work had been misunderstood or mischaracterized. It was only under cross-examination that he admitted to embellishing his credentials on that profile.
71At trial, the father testified that he had historically earned between $100 and $125 per hour as a consultant. Based on a conservative 35-hour work week, this would place his average annual earning capacity between approximately $168,000 and $210,000, even allowing for four weeks of unpaid vacation. What this does not account for, however, is income derived from FGI or the father’s rental properties.[13]
72In addition to employment income, the father maintained and derived benefit from rental properties and FGI, a professional corporation he solely owns and controls. Although he testified that he intended to wind up FGI, he presented no supporting documentation—such as resolutions, tax filings, or corporate dissolution records—to support this claim. On the contrary, the father continued to claim business-related expenses for a home office and vehicle, without providing supporting records, mileage logs, or documentation of meetings or contracts. He acknowledged receiving management fees from his rental properties through FGI, despite owning the properties personally. The court finds that FGI continued to operate as an active entity and that the father derived personal benefit from its retained earnings and tax deductions.
73The court finds that the father’s attempt to rely on FGI’s retained earnings for one year—while subsequently disclaiming them on the basis that the corporation was no longer operating—reflects an effort to manipulate his income position rather than meet his child support obligations in good faith. This position is undermined by the fact that he continued to draw personal benefit from FGI in the form of deductions, management fees, and access to retained earnings, even in years where he claimed the corporation was inactive. His approach lacked transparency and coherence and was unsupported by credible evidence. The court draws an adverse inference from his failure to disclose comprehensive financial information, particularly in relation to his self-employment, rental income, and corporate holdings.
74The court imputes income to the father based on his earning capacity, rental income, and continued access to financial benefits through FGI. The father’s evidence on income was internally inconsistent, vague, and at times evasive. By contrast, the mother’s evidence and submissions were detailed, logical, and supported by a robust evidentiary foundation.
75There are several ways the court could calculate the father’s income for support purposes, particularly given the combination of reported earnings, rental income, and corporate resources. However, the court adopts the mother’s proposed calculations as they are reasonable in the circumstances, adjusted to account for four weeks of unpaid vacation. Her approach fairly accounts for the father’s intentional unemployment, reflects his earning capacity based on his own admissions, and balances the extended period of non-employment against the actual income he earned—and should have earned—from his rental properties and continued access to benefits through FGI.
76For 2023, the mother calculated the father’s income at $171,442, calculated based on the following:
(1) In 2023, the father’s total reported income was $64,077. This included:
(a) $25,000 in employment income paid through FGI,
(b) $1,821 in interest and investment income, and
(c) $37,256 in net rental income.
(2) To this, a total adjustment of $17,999 was made, which includes:
(a) $5,950 was added as additional revenue from FGI, representing invoiced amounts for renovation work completed in 2023.
(b) $9,366 in personal and discretionary expenses was added back, as these were claimed through FGI but not supported by documentation. These included $2,095 in occupancy costs, $3,703 in vehicle expenses, $752 for meals and entertainment, $1,443 for telephone and communication, and $1,373 for office supplies. Because there was no evidence that the father required these expenses for business purposes—particularly as he did not work during the year—they are treated as personal benefits.
(c) $2,683 was added to reflect the tax gross-up on these discretionary expenses.
(d) No personal expenses were added back from the rental income.
(3) $90,000 for deliberate underemployment.[14]
77For 2024, the mother calculated the father’s income at $149,709, calculated based on the following:
(1) $41,250 of employment income. This amount reflects his salaried income from Hardware & Lumber, earned from April through December. The calculation does not include any employment income or interest and other investment income the father may have earned through the year, as no evidence was led on these sources.
(2) $62,994 net rental income from all three properties. The court accepts that the father continues to earn rental income from three unencumbered properties. While the father did not provide clear rental income figures for 2024, the court accepts the mother’s detailed estimates, based on prior years’ rental activity and excluding any deductions for management fees, which the father previously claimed without justification.[15]
(a) $15,100 for Burnhamthorpe (pro-rated from April to December to account for the time the father lived in the residence).
(b) $21,894 for Abell, and
(c) $26,000 for Caledonia.
(d) No discretionary expenses or personal benefits were identified or added back for 2024.
(3) $45,465 for deliberate underemployment.
78The mother does not seek to impute the same level of income to the father starting on November 1, 2024 as was imputed in prior years, and that position is reasonable in the circumstances. The court will impute income to the father in the amount proposed by the mother—$102,776—which reflects a combination of his anticipated employment income of $52,804 CAD (converted from Jamaican dollars) from Hardware & Lumber and estimated net rental income of $49,972 from all three properties.
79The court finds that the income the mother seeks to impute to the father starting on April 1, 2023, is entirely reasonable, given her compelling calculations to impute even more income to him.
80Accordingly, the father’s child support obligation based on his imputed annual income and pursuant to the Guidelines is as follows:
| Start Date of Support | Imputed Annual Income | Monthly CSG Support Obligation |
|---|---|---|
| April 1, 2023 | $151,868 | $1,312 |
| November 1, 2024 | $102,776 | $932 |
81The father’s income for 2023 was imputed at $151,868, triggering the analysis under section 4 of the Guidelines. This provision permits discretion to depart from the Table amount where the payor’s income exceeds $150,000 and the Table amount would be inappropriate in the circumstances. The court considered whether such a deviation was warranted but found no basis to depart. As affirmed in Francis v. Baker[16], there is a strong presumption in favour of applying the Table amount, and there was no compelling evidence before the court that doing so would result in an unfair or unjust obligation.
82Between April 1, 2023, and October 31, 2024, the father’s total child support obligation is $24,928, calculated at $1,312 per month over 19 months.
83While the father has never paid child support in accordance with the terms of Justice Sager’s order, he has made some contributions. The mother provided evidence that the father paid a total of $16,196.38 in basic child support between April 1, 2023 and October 24, 2024. This amount was not disputed by the father, and he shall be credited accordingly.
84The father’s single payment of $194 towards childcare for Maya is addressed in the next section.
85Accordingly, the father’s arrears of child support for the period of April 1, 2023 until October 24, 2024, are fixed in the amount of $8,731.62.
The Mother’s Income
86The mother’s income is only relevant for the purposes of determining the parties’ respective contributions to Maya’s special and/or extraordinary expenses.
87The mother has only claimed a contribution to section 7 expenses for Maya, from the effective date of Justice Sager’s order – April 1, 2023 – forward.
88The father does not dispute the mother’s assessed income for 2023, and he provided no evidence to challenge her evidence or documentation.
89The father seeks to impute an annual income to the mother in the amount of $145,000 beginning April 1, 2024. He takes the position that this reflects her earning capacity and should be used for support purposes. He provided no evidence to support this position.
90The mother is a T4 employee. The court accepts the mother’s evidence as credible, consistent, and supported by her affidavit and income records.
91The mother returned to work following a maternity leave in February 2023. Her adjusted income for 2023 was $141,219. This figure includes her employment income of $136,011 from her position as Director of Digital Marketing at RBC Wealth Management, Employment Insurance income of $1,914, with the balance of $1,749 reflecting a gross-up of dividend, capital gains, and other interest and investment income in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines.
92In July 2024, the mother’s base salary was increased to $135,000, and then on September 16, 2024, the mother’s salary increased from $135,000 annually to $145,000 when she moved to her new role as Director of Sales Enablement and Communication at RBC Royal Trust. The mother may receive a bonus at the end of the year, but the bonus is discretionary.
93For the period ending September 8, 2024, the mother’s gross year-to-date income was $87,519.50. Assuming another week’s pay at a rate of $135,000 annually, the balance of the year being paid at the rate of $145,000 annually, and assuming no bonus, her total income for 2024 is projected to be approximately $132,615.
94The court finds that the mother’s income for support purposes is:
(1) $141,219 in 2023.
(2) $132,615 in 2024.
(3) $145,000 in 2025.
4.3 Special and Extraordinary Expenses
4.3.a. The Law
95The law on section 7 expenses under the Child Support Guidelines is well-established.
96Section 7 sets out an exhaustive list of special and extraordinary expenses that may be ordered in addition to the table amount of child support and sets out statutory criteria including the necessity and reasonableness of the expense, and the proportional sharing of net costs between the parents.
97While the section does not prescribe a formal test, the courts have developed a structured analytical framework to guide its application. This framework, confirmed in decisions such as Titova v. Titov[17], requires the court to assess whether the expense falls within one of the enumerated categories, whether it is necessary in relation to the child’s best interests, whether it is reasonable in relation to the means of the parties and their historical spending patterns, whether it qualifies as extraordinary (where applicable), and whether any subsidies, tax benefits, or child contributions must be taken into account before apportioning the net cost.
98The expenses that may be claimed under section 7 are set out in subsection 7(1) of the Child Support Guidelines and include after-tax childcare, health and dental insurance for the child, and significant medical or health-related costs. Also included are extra school or educational expenses, post-secondary costs, and extracurricular activities—but only if they are considered “extraordinary.”
99Section 7(1.1) defines “extraordinary expenses”. Whether an expense is extraordinary depends on the cost, the parents’ incomes, the child’s needs, and what the family spent on such items before separation. The onus is on the requesting parent to prove that the expense qualifies under the enumerated categories and that it is both reasonable and necessary in light of the child’s best interests and the means of the parents.
100The analytical framework, as confirmed in Titova v. Titov, and restated in Ostapchuk v. Ostapchuk[18], requires the court to:
(1) Determine the incomes of the parties for child support purposes.
(2) Confirm whether the expense falls within one of the listed categories in s. 7.
(3) Assess whether the expense is “extraordinary” if it falls under s. 7(1)(d) or (f).
(4) Determine whether the expense is necessary in relation to the child’s best interests and reasonable in relation to the means of the parties and their historical spending patterns.
101The court must also consider any available subsidies, tax deductions, or credits that could offset the expense, as required by s. 7(3).
102Reasonableness and necessity are assessed in context, having regard to the child’s needs, the family’s circumstances, and the nature of the expense. In A.E. v. A.E.[19], the court emphasized that the necessity of an expense is linked to the child’s best interests, including their emotional, physical, and social development, and that continuity in the child’s education and activities is a relevant consideration—particularly following separation. The court noted that extracurricular activities may support self-esteem, social interaction, and structured routines.
103Similarly, in MacNeil v. MacNeil[20], the court affirmed that participation in physical activities is not a luxury, but an important contributor to a child’s healthy development. While individual expenses may not always meet the threshold for being “extraordinary,” they may be found to qualify when considered cumulatively, depending on the overall financial and personal circumstances of the family.
104Subsection 7(2) of the Guidelines provides that section 7 expenses should be shared by the parents in proportion to their incomes, after accounting for any contribution from the child. However, the court has discretion to depart from strict proportionality where the circumstances warrant it. For example, in Zhao v. Xiao[21], the court upheld an order dividing expenses based on the parties’ household incomes. Courts may consider a range of factors when determining a fair apportionment and may order a different division if it is justified in the circumstances.[22]
105Consent and prior notice of section 7 expenses, while not strictly required by statute, are significant. Courts may deny or reduce reimbursement for expenses incurred unilaterally without prior consultation where such consultation was possible and reasonable.[23] However, if the payor parent has exhibited chronic non-cooperation or refused to engage meaningfully, courts have recognized that insisting on consent may be impractical.[24]
106Ultimately, the court exercises its discretion in determining the appropriateness, reasonableness, and apportionment of each claimed section 7 expense, guided by the statutory framework, the best interests of the child, and the financial realities of both households.
4.3.b. Analysis and Conclusion
107The mother seeks an order requiring the father to bring his share of Maya’s daycare expenses current to the date of trial and to comply with his ongoing obligations for special and extraordinary expenses. Her proposal includes:
(1) A proportionate cost-sharing arrangement, net of applicable tax credits or deductions. The proposed expenses include:
(a) Daycare and before-and-after school care.
(b) Up to one sport and one arts activity per season (each capped at $250 per season or $1,000 annually).
(c) Uninsured health and dental expenses (including orthodontics).
(d) Post-secondary expenses to be shared proportionally based on income at the relevant time.
(2) Both parents would be required to maintain extended health coverage, authorize direct claims, and reimburse one another promptly for any recovered costs.
(3) Consent would be required in writing for all other expenses, not to be unreasonably withheld, and payments to third-party providers should be made directly or within 14 days of proof of payment.
108The only current section 7 expense is the cost of daycare, which the court finds clearly necessary given the mother’s employment and the child’s age. The father acknowledged that he has not complied with Justice Sager’s order requiring him to contribute, and admitted in cross-examination that such care is needed.
109The mother’s documentary and affidavit evidence regarding childcare expenses was detailed and uncontested. The court finds that these expenses fall within section 7(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines, are necessary in relation to Maya’s best interests, and are reasonable having regard to the parties’ respective means.
110The mother’s proposals regarding future expenses—namely, extracurricular activities, uninsured health and dental expenses, and post-secondary education—are similarly grounded in Maya’s best interests and are reasonable in both scope and cost-sharing approach. The proposed caps are modest and appropriate. The mother is not presently seeking contribution toward these costs, but it is appropriate to set out the framework for sharing such expenses as they arise.
111The mother has also acted reasonably in setting out a structure for reimbursement, consent, and health coverage. These terms are consistent with the principles set out in section 7 and the relevant case law.
112The father offered no alternative proposal. Although he expressed hesitation about future contributions, he did not dispute the reasonableness of the mother's outline or its basis in the evidence. His position in closing—seeking to base child support and contributions on the mother’s total income—supports proportional sharing.
113The parties’ income for determining the proportionate share of their contribution to Maya’s section 7 expenses is as follows:
| Period | Father’s Income | Mother’s Income | Father’s % Share | Mother’s % Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr. 1-Dec. 31, 2023 | $151,868 | $141,219 | 51.8 | 48.2 |
| Jan. 1-Oct. 31, 2024 | $151,868 | $132,615 | 53.4 | 46.6 |
| Jan. 1, 2025 onward | $102,776 | $145,000 | 41.5 | 59.5 |
114The net after-tax cost of daycare in 2023 was $2,868.92. The father made no contributions during that year. The father’s proportionate share is calculated to be $1,486.10.
115For 2024, the anticipated daycare expense is $8,838.18. The after-tax cost is not yet known.
116The father made one payment of $194.00 to the mother as a contribution to the cost of Maya’s childcare on August 23, 2024. He shall be credited accordingly.
4.4 Security for Support
4.4.a. The Law
117Section 34(1) of the Family Law Act (the Act) sets out a broad range of remedies available to the court when making a support order under section 33. These include orders for periodic or lump sum payments, for payment of specific expenses such as medical or educational costs, and for payments to be directed to a third party or into a trust. The court may also make enforcement-related orders, including the deduction of support from income and the securing of support through a charge on property or other mechanisms.
118In Kumar v. Kumar[25], the court outlined at paragraph 6 a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when determining whether to order security for support:
(1) A history of dissipation of assets.
(2) A likelihood that the payor will leave the jurisdiction.
(3) A past refusal by the payor to comply with a support obligation.
(4) A poor or unstable employment history, threats to leave employment, lack of income, or a pattern of uncooperative behaviour toward the recipient.
(5) The existence of assets in Ontario that could serve as a basis for a security order; or
(6) A declaration by the payor that they will not comply with a support order.
119Clause 34(1)(i) permits the court to order “that a spouse who has a policy of life insurance as defined under the Insurance Act designate the other spouse or a child as the beneficiary irrevocably.” The authority under clause (i) applies only where the person is a “spouse.” The definition of “spouse” in the Act depends on context and purpose.
120Section 1 of the Act defines “spouse” narrowly to mean either of two persons who are married to each other or who have entered into a void or voidable marriage in good faith. This definition governs property and certain other rights under the Act.
121However, for the purposes of support obligations—including those under section 33—the relevant definition is found in section 29 of the Act.
122Under section 29, “spouse” includes not only married persons but also either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years, or who are in a relationship of some permanence if they are the parents of a child as defined in section 4 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA).
123Section 4 of the CLRA defines a parent to include a person who is determined to be a parent under Part I of that Act, which encompasses both biological and presumptive legal parentage.
124A “relationship of some permanence” under section 29 of the Act refers to a relationship where, despite not cohabiting for three years, the parents intended to be in a spousal relationship. The analysis is case-specific and considers factors such as emotional and financial interdependence and shared parenting intentions.[26]
125As such, for the purposes of making a support order under section 33, and by extension an order under clause 34(1)(i), the court may treat as “spouses” both married and qualifying unmarried partners. If the payor holds a life insurance policy, the court may rely on clause (i) to require the irrevocable designation of the other spouse or a child as beneficiary.
126The court cannot order life insurance coverage under clause 34(1)(i) of the Act unless the parties were spouses. However, it may order life insurance as security for support under clause 34(1)(k)[27], which provides an additional and broader mechanism to secure support.
127Clause 34(1)(k) allows the court to secure payment under a support order “by a charge on property or otherwise.” This includes the power to require the purchase and maintenance of life insurance, whether or not a policy is already in place.
128The Ontario Court of Appeal in Katz v. Katz[28], affirmed that clause 34(1)(k) is broad enough to authorize an order requiring a support payor to obtain life insurance to secure their obligation. The Court noted that section 34(4) of the FLA provides that a support order binds the estate of the payor unless the order states otherwise. On that basis, it is appropriate for the court to require insurance as a means of ensuring that the support obligation continues to be met in the event of the payor’s death. The court may also give directions concerning the use of the insurance proceeds to satisfy the outstanding support obligation.[29]
129However, the Court of Appeal cautioned that where no insurance policy is already in place, the court should proceed carefully. It is preferable to have evidence of the payor’s insurability and the cost of obtaining coverage so that the order is specific, enforceable, and realistic. The amount of insurance ordered should reflect the total support likely to be payable over the duration of the order and should not exceed that amount.
130The Ontario Court of Justice jurisdiction to make orders under section 34(1)(i) and (k) is limited by section 34(2) to cases where the support is necessary for the provision of necessities or to prevent the dependant from becoming or continuing to be a public charge.
131The term “provision of necessities” has been interpreted to mean things without which life would be unduly harsh.[30] A liberal interpretation of subsection 34(2) promotes access to justice and ensures that support recipients are able to access appropriate remedies before this court.[31]
132Any request for security must be supported by sufficient evidence. The court must be provided with details of the payor’s insurability, the availability and cost of the proposed coverage, and the payor’s ability to comply with the order. Without this evidentiary foundation, an order for security may be impractical or unenforceable.[32]
4.4.b. Analysis and Conclusion
133The mother seeks an order for security for support in the amount of $100,000 on the basis that the father has failed to comply with his support obligations, is actively encumbering one of his rental properties, has no intention of returning to Canada from Jamaica, and resides in a jurisdiction with which Ontario does not have a reciprocal enforcement agreement for child support.
134The court finds that the parties were never spouses within the meaning of section 29 of the Act. Although they share a child, their relationship was neither continuous nor of sufficient permanence to meet the statutory definition. They cohabited only briefly during the mother’s pregnancy, and there is no evidence of a shared domestic or financial life beyond that period. Accordingly, the mother is not a “spouse” for the purposes of clause 34(1)(i), and the court has no jurisdiction to require the father to irrevocably designate a beneficiary under a life insurance policy, under that clause.
135There is no evidence that the father currently maintains a life insurance policy. Nor was any evidence presented as to his insurability, the cost or availability of obtaining coverage, or his ability to comply with such an order. In the absence of that evidentiary foundation—and in light of the statutory limitation under clauses 34(1)(i) and (k)—no order shall be made requiring the father to obtain or maintain life insurance at this time.
136However, the court retains jurisdiction under clause 34(1)(k) to secure the payment of child support “by a charge on property or otherwise.” The father owns three unencumbered rental properties in Ontario. The evidence at trial indicates that one of those properties—the Burnhamthorpe property—is in the process of being encumbered or disposed of. The father has permanently relocated to Jamaica, a jurisdiction that lacks a reciprocal enforcement agreement with Ontario for the collection of child support. He has failed to comply with past support orders, and his current residence abroad significantly impairs enforcement.
137Before granting an order under clause 34(1)(k), the court must be satisfied that the support is necessary to provide for the “provision of necessities” within the meaning of section 34(2) of the Family Law Act. Although the mother earns a significant income—approximately $145,000 annually—that fact does not negate the need for support from the father or eliminate the court’s jurisdiction. The child is entitled to be supported by both parents, and the analysis must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the child’s best interests and the realities of modern separated families.
138A broad and liberal interpretation of “provision of necessities” is essential to ensure that children receive adequate support that reflects their needs and the standard of living they would have enjoyed had the family remained intact. This approach recognizes that the term encompasses more than mere subsistence; it includes the provision of a stable home environment, access to education, healthcare, and opportunities for personal development. It is not just the basic physical needs of a child that must be met. Child support is to ensure a child is not disadvantaged and that they can enjoy a similar standard of living to that of their parents, to the extent possible. In assessing the phrase “provision of necessities”, the court must consider the full context of the child’s circumstances and adopt an approach that safeguards the child’s overall well-being.
139Maya is a three-year-old child who requires stable and predictable financial support to meet her housing, daycare, healthcare, and developmental needs. Despite the mother’s efforts and her ability to provide a stable home, she has borne the full burden of financial responsibility due to the father’s ongoing non-compliance. This has constrained the resources available to Maya. As recognized in Easton v. McAvoy and G.B. v. L.S., the court must consider not only the avoidance of hardship, but also the child’s right to share fairly in both parents’ means, and the supporting parent’s ability to obtain effective remedies and access to justice.
140While the court declines to order the father to obtain or maintain life insurance, it finds that a form of security for support remains necessary and appropriate. The mother’s request to fix that security at $100,000 is reasonable and proportionate, having regard to the anticipated duration and quantum of the father’s remaining support obligations, including section 7 expenses. A charge in that amount will therefore be ordered against the father’s Ontario properties to ensure enforceability and to safeguard Maya’s right to consistent financial support.
141Accordingly, the court orders that the father’s ongoing and outstanding support obligations be secured by a charge registered against all three of his Ontario properties—Burnhamthorpe, Abell, and Caledonia. The charge shall secure the child support and section 7 expenses payable from the date of this order until Maya ceases to be a child within the meaning of the Act, including all arrears outstanding at the time of registration and any that may accrue thereafter. The charge shall remain in place until Maya ceases to be a child within the meaning of the Act, and the earliest of:
(1) The father demonstrating full compliance with his support obligations, including the payment of all present arrears, and all support accrued until Maya ceases to be a child entitled to support under the Act; or
(2) Further order of the court.
142Although the registered charge secures the father’s support obligations, given the father’s history of non-compliance with court orders regarding support and his relocation to a non-reciprocating jurisdiction, the court finds it necessary to impose additional restrictions to protect the enforceability of that security.
143The father shall not refinance, encumber, transfer, or sell any of the charged properties without the prior written consent of the mother, which shall not be unreasonably withheld, or a further order of the court. This condition shall remain in effect unless and until all of the father’s support obligations—up to the point when Maya ceases to be a child entitled to support within the meaning of the Act—have been satisfied in full or the charge has been discharged by court order. The restriction ensures that sufficient equity remains available to meet the secured obligations and avoids placing the burden on the mother to respond to unilateral dealings with the properties.
144For clarity, nothing in this order prevents the father from treating with the properties, including through refinancing or sale, provided that sufficient equity remains to fully secure the outstanding support obligations and consent is obtained or a court order is granted. These conditions strike a necessary balance between protecting Maya’s support and allowing the father reasonable flexibility in managing his assets.
Part Five – Orders
145For the reasons outlined above, the court makes the following orders:
(1) The father shall pay child support to the mother in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines, as follows:
(a) $1,312 per month commencing April 1, 2023 and continuing on the first of each month until October 31, 2024, based on an imputed annual income of $151,868.
(b) $932 per month commencing November 1, 2024 and continuing on the first of each month until further written agreement between the parties or court order, based on an imputed annual income of $102,776.
(2) Arrears of Guideline table child support are forthwith payable for the period of April 1, 2023, until October 24, 2024, fixed in the amount of $8,731.62.
(3) Arrears of child support for the period after October 25, 2024, if any, shall be calculated by The Director of the Family Responsibility Office (FRO), based on the monthly child support amounts set out above and taking into account any verified payments made by the father during that period.
(4) For the purposes of calculating each party’s proportionate share of special and extraordinary expenses under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines, the parties’ incomes are fixed as follows:
(a) For April 1 to December 31, 2023: the father’s income is $151,868 and the mother’s income is $141,219.
(b) For the January 1, 2024 to October 31, 2024: the father’s income is $151,868 and the mother’s income is $132,615.
(c) For November 1, 2024 and ongoing until varied by written agreement or court order: the father’s income is $102,776 and the mother’s income is $145,000.
(5) The parties shall share Maya’s special and extraordinary expenses as follows:
(a) For April 1 to December 31, 2023: 51.8% father, 48.2% mother.
(b) For the January 1, 2024 to October 31, 2024: 53.4% father, 46.6% mother.
(c) For November 1, 2024 and ongoing until varied by written agreement or court order: 41.5% father, 59.5% mother.
(6) The father shall pay arrears of $1,486.10 to the mother for his share of Maya’s daycare expenses for 2023, forthwith.
(7) Commencing January 1, 2024, and continuing until October 31, 2024, the father shall contribute 53.4 percent of the cost of net after-tax childcare expenses for Maya, less a credit of $194.00 for a payment made on August 23, 2024.
(8) Commencing November 1, 2024, and continuing thereafter, the father shall contribute 41.5 percent to the future section 7 expenses in proportion to the parties’ incomes, which shall not require his consent in advance of contribution, including:
(a) Nursery school and daycare until September 2026; and
(b) Before- and after-school care commencing September 2026.
(c) The father shall contribute up to $250.00 per season, to a maximum of four seasons ($1,000.00 per year), for one (1) sport per season (e.g., soccer or swimming).
(d) The father shall contribute up to $250.00 per season, to a maximum of four seasons ($1,000.00 per year), for one (1) arts or music activity per season (e.g., dance).
(e) The parties shall share the cost of all uninsured health and dental expenses for Maya, including orthodontic care, in proportion to their incomes.
(9) Each party shall maintain Maya as a beneficiary under any extended health and dental insurance available through employment and shall execute all necessary documentation to enable the other to submit claims directly to their insurer. Any reimbursements received by a party for expenses paid by the other shall be forwarded to the paying party immediately upon receipt.
(10) For all other special or extraordinary expenses, the prior written consent of the other party shall be required before incurring the expense. Such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
(11) Where possible, the parties shall pay third-party service providers directly for their proportionate share of Maya’s special and extraordinary expenses. Where direct payment is not possible or a party does not make their payment directly, the other party may pay the full amount and seek reimbursement. Reimbursement shall be made within fourteen (14) days of receipt of a paid invoice or proof of payment.
(12) Maya’s post-secondary education and related expenses shall be treated as a future special and extraordinary expense within the meaning of section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines. These expenses include, but are not limited to, tuition, books and supplies, lodging, food, technology, and travel between home and school. The parties shall share these expenses in proportion to their respective incomes at the relevant time, subject to any contribution from Maya, including income from summer or part-time employment, scholarships, grants, or bursaries.
(13) The father’s ongoing and outstanding child support obligations, including any arrears and his proportionate share of special and extraordinary expenses under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines, shall be secured by a charge in the amount of $100,000 registered against the following real properties registered in his name:
(a) 2155 Burnhamthorpe Road, Unit 1005, Mississauga, Ontario.
(b) 68 Abell Street, Unit 825, Toronto, Ontario; and
(c) 40 Patterson Drive, Caledonia, Ontario.
(14) The father shall not refinance, encumber, transfer, or sell any of the above-noted properties, without:
(a) The prior written consent of the mother, which shall not be unreasonably withheld; or
(b) Further order of the court.
(15) The restriction in subparagraph (14), above, shall remain in effect unless and until all of the father’s support obligations—up to the point when Maya ceases to be a child entitled to support within the meaning of the Act—have been satisfied in full or the charge has been discharged by court order.
(16) For clarity, nothing in this order prevents the father from dealing with the properties, including through refinancing or sale, provided that sufficient equity remains to fully secure the outstanding support obligations and consent is obtained or a court order is granted.
(17) The charge shall remain in place until Maya ceases to be a child within the meaning of the Act, and the earliest of:
(a) The father demonstrating full compliance with his support obligations, including the payment of all present arrears, and all support accrued until Maya ceases to be a child entitled to support under the Act; or
(b) Further order of the court.
(18) Unless this Order is withdrawn from the Office of the Director of the Family Responsibility Office (FRO), it shall be enforced by the Director, and all amounts owing under this Order shall be paid to the Director, who shall in turn forward those amounts to the person to whom they are owed.
(19) For as long as child support is payable under this Order, the payor shall provide updated income disclosure to the recipient on an annual basis. If applicable, the recipient shall do the same. Such disclosure shall be provided within thirty (30) days of each anniversary of this Order, in accordance with section 24.1 of the Child Support Guidelines.
(20) This Order shall bear interest at the rate of 5% per annum on any payment or payments in default, from the date of default until payment is made.
(21) A Support Deduction Order and Support Deduction Order Information Form shall issue.
Part Six – Costs and Other
146The mother may seek costs of this proceeding. If the parties are unable to agree, costs shall be determined based on written submissions.
147The mother shall serve and file her costs submissions not exceeding five (5) pages, 1.5 spaced, attaching a Bill of Costs and any Offers to Settle and relevant documents (not to be counted towards the page limits) within forty-five (45) days of the date of this order. The father shall serve and file any responding costs submissions not exceeding five (5) pages, 1.5 spaced, also attaching a Bill of Costs and any Offers to Settle and relevant documents (not to be counted towards the page limits) within thirty (30) days of receipt of the mother’s cost submissions. The mother may serve and file any reply cost submissions not exceeding three pages, within fifteen (15) days of receipt of the father’s cost submissions. Any reference to case law shall be hyperlinked.
148Costs submissions may be filed by e-mailing the trial coordinator.
149Counsel for the mother shall prepare the draft order for issuing, inclusive of the Support Deduction Order and Support Deduction Order Information Form and may file same by e-mailing the trial coordinator. The father’s approval as to form and content of the draft order is dispensed with.
150Either party may bring any error in calculation to the court’s attention within ten (10) days of receiving this order, by way of a 14B Motion, which may be filed by e-mailing the trial coordinator.
Footnotes
[1] Converted from approx. six million Jamaican dollars, annually.
[2] Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.).
[3] Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 ONCA 41868, [2002] O.J. No. 3731 (Ont. C.A.).
[4] Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, [2009] O.J. No. 1552 (Ont. C.A.); Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663; Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719.
[5] MacKenzie v. Flynn, 2010 ONCJ 184; Whelan v. O’Connor, 2006 ONSC 13554, [2006] O.J. No. 1660; Yocheva v. Hristov, 2019 ONSC 1007.
[6] Meade v. Meade, 2002 ONSC 2806, 31 R.F.L. (5th) 88 (SCJ); Reyes v. Rollo, 2001 ONSC 28260.
[7] Izyuk v. Langley, 2015 ONSC 2409.
[8] Evans v. Evans, 2023 ONSC 3919.
[9] Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548; Woofenden v. Woofenden, 2018 ONSC 4583; Drummond v. Richardson, 2024 ONCJ 547.
[10] Kinsella v. Mills, 2020 ONSC 4785; Prillo v. Homer, 2023 ONCJ 8.
[11] Heard v. Heard, 2014 ONCA 196 at paras. 33–35; Gostevskikh v. Gostevskikh, 2018 BCSC 1441; M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207.
[12] Aitken v. Aitken, [2003] O.J. No. 2780 (SCJ); Jonas v. Jonas, [2002] O.J. No. 2117 (SCJ); Price v. Reid, 2013 ONCJ 373.
[13] The income derived from FGI includes funds paid to the father through his professional corporation, such as management fees from his rental properties and payments for renovation work. It also includes personal and discretionary expenses—such as vehicle costs, home office expenses, and telecommunications—claimed through FGI, which the court found were not supported by legitimate business activity and amounted to personal financial benefit.
[14] If the mother had sought to impute the father’s income at $171,442, the court would have considered $84,000 as the appropriate adjustment for underemployment. This figure is derived from the father’s acknowledged historical consulting rate of $100 per hour, applied over a 35-hour work week for 48 weeks, resulting in a notional annual income of $168,000. In light of the father’s delayed and limited job search efforts in 2023, a 50% reduction would have been applied to reflect his partial but insufficient efforts to re-enter the workforce.
[15] In 2023, the court did not add back any personal or discretionary expenses to the father’s reported rental income, as he was residing in one of the properties—Burnhamthorpe—and therefore did not derive rental income from that unit. For the remaining properties, Abell and Caledonia, the court relied on the net rental income figures reported in the father’s 2023 income tax return. The deductibility of expenses for that year was not challenged by the mother. In contrast, for 2024, the court did not accept certain deductions claimed by the father, including management fees, in the absence of sufficient supporting documentation. The court accepted the mother’s submissions that some of the expenses were either not incurred or not substantiated and therefore should not be deducted from the gross rental income. As a result, net rental income for 2024 was attributed based on available evidence and reasonable estimates.
[16] Francis v. Baker, 1999 SCC 659, [1999] 3 SCR 250.
[17] Titova v. Titov, 2012 ONCA 864.
[18] Ostapchuk v. Ostapchuk, 2003 ONCA 57399.
[19] A.E. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189.
[20] MacNeil v. MacNeil, 2013 ONSC 7012.
[21] Zhao v. Xiao, 2023 ONCA 453.
[22] Salvadori v. Salvadori, 2010 ONCJ 462, [2010] O.J. No. 4425 (OCJ); Buckley v. Blackwood, 2019 ONSC 6918.
[23] Mistry v. Mistry, 2019 ONSC 193; Smith v. Angel, 2014 ONSC 6787.
[24] Yeo v. Hutcheson, 2020 ONSC 1256; C.C. v. B.M.C., 2023 ONCJ 617.
[25] Kumar v. Kumar, 1998 CarswellOnt 1075 (S.C.).
[26] Desouza v. Desouza, (1999) 1999 ONCJ 19163, 48 RFL 4th 63 (OCJ).
[27] Reid v. Fortune, 2020 ONCJ 10.
[28] Katz v. Katz, 2014 ONCA 606.
[29] Laczko v. Laczko (1999), 1999 ONSC 14998, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 507 (Ont. S.C.).
[30] G.B. v. L.S. (2001), 2001 ONCJ 32833, 24 R.F.L. (5th) 270 (Ont. C.J.).
[31] Easton v. McAvoy, 2005 ONCJ 7379; Jones v. Hugo, 2012 ONCJ 211.
[32] Le v. Tran, 2012 ONCJ 4690.