Lorna M. Yates

In a family law proceeding, the respondent husband brought an unopposed Form 14B motion seeking validation of service of his answer, which had been uploaded to an electronic document exchange website known as “SIX.” The issue was whether uploading a document to the website constituted regular service under rule 6(2)(c) of the Family Law Rules, which permits service by depositing a copy at a document exchange to which the person’s lawyer belongs.

The court considered the technical operation of the platform and interpreted the terms “depositing” and “document exchange” in the context of electronic communication.

The court held that the website functioned as a document exchange and that the opposing lawyer “belonged” to it by having access and notice through the platform.

Service was therefore valid under the rule.

In a family law proceeding between unmarried cohabiting parties with two children, the respondent sought disclosure relating to the applicant’s assets and financial circumstances.

The respondent advanced a claim of unjust enrichment based on a joint family venture and requested valuation reports for corporate interests, stock options, and other assets, as well as a completed net family property statement to assess wealth accumulated during cohabitation.

The court held that meaningful disclosure was necessary to evaluate the alleged joint family venture and ordered the applicant to obtain valuations and complete the financial disclosure.

The court relied on the principles from Kerr v. Baranow concerning the sharing of wealth created during cohabitation.

Directions were also given regarding disclosure timelines, questioning, and further case management prior to settlement conference.

In a family law proceeding involving equalization and support issues, the responding spouse sought an advance on the equalization payment or interim disbursements for legal and expert fees.

The parties had previously consented to an order requiring disclosure, retaining a joint income analysis expert, and permitting the respondent to encumber the matrimonial home for certain legal and accounting costs.

The court reviewed the existing consent order and a subsequent disclosure order and concluded that the issues of interim disbursements and advances had already been adequately addressed.

No additional relief was granted, and the matter was left to proceed with completion of expert reports and continued case management.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision denying him leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The Court of Appeal had ordered the appeal to be heard by a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter as a panel appeal, noting that the appropriate route is to seek leave to appeal from a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

With the consent of the parties, the matter was converted to a motion for leave to appeal to be determined by one member of the panel sitting as a Superior Court judge.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that had dismissed a previous motion for leave to appeal.

The previous motion was dismissed due to the moving party's failure to pay costs and comply with prior procedural orders.

The court dismissed the current motion, finding that the previous judge properly exercised discretion in dismissing the motion based on procedural default and non-payment of costs.

The court noted the moving party lacked standing to appeal interlocutory orders until complying with or varying the prior orders.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent spouse brought a motion seeking an order requiring the applicant spouse to place him on her extended health and dental plan so he could obtain psychological counselling.

The applicant opposed the request on the basis that the moving party was subject to prior court orders prohibiting further motions until compliance with outstanding temporary orders, including substantial unpaid costs, and that he remained in arrears.

The court also noted that the requested relief was incidental to a support claim where no support order had been made or requested, and that the benefits plan likely did not permit the addition of a separated spouse.

The court concluded the claim failed on multiple grounds and dismissed the motion.

Following a family law trial concerning property division and support, the court determined costs after receiving written submissions.

The husband had made an offer to settle that was more favourable to the wife than the eventual judgment, engaging the presumptive entitlement to costs under the Family Law Rules and supporting substantial indemnity recovery.

Although the husband sought up to $792,447.47 in full recovery costs, the court found the claim disproportionate given the relatively brief and uncomplicated four‑day trial.

Applying the fairness and reasonableness principles from Boucher v. Public Accountants Council and reviewing comparable family law authorities, the court reduced the amount significantly.

The wife was ordered to pay $265,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, with payment tied to the sale of her home unless an undertaking was not provided.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order requiring the respondent to participate in arbitration pursuant to a mediation–arbitration agreement addressing parenting access issues concerning the parties’ child.

The respondent sought to strike or stay the motion on the basis that the applicant was in substantial arrears of child support under a prior Georgia judgment and had failed to comply with other obligations under that order.

The court held that the mediation–arbitration agreement constituted a binding contract entered into with independent legal advice and that the parties were required to comply with its terms.

The alleged breaches of the Georgia judgment were properly addressed in separate proceedings under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act and did not justify refusing enforcement of the arbitration agreement.

The respondent’s motion to strike or stay was dismissed and the applicant’s motion compelling arbitration was granted.

In a high‑conflict custody dispute involving a proposed relocation of children from Ontario to Los Angeles, the moving party sought an order appointing private counsel for two children after the Office of the Children's Lawyer declined involvement due to timing constraints.

The responding party opposed the request, arguing that counsel appointment would reinforce parental influence and that an updated assessment should occur first.

The court held that it had jurisdiction under rule 4(7) of the Family Law Rules to authorize counsel for children and exercised its discretion to appoint separate lawyers on a limited mandate.

The appointed lawyers were directed only to determine and report the children's views and preferences regarding the proposed relocation, rather than to act with the full rights of a party.

The court emphasized that the narrow role was necessary to ensure the children's voices were heard within tight procedural timelines.

In a high-conflict custody trial between a mother and paternal grandparents, the court held that the children's best interests required their immediate removal from the grandparents' primary care and placement in the mother's sole custody.

The court found the grandparents had systematically interfered with and undermined the mother-child relationship, fostering irrational fear and unhealthy attachment dynamics in the children.

A jointly retained psychiatrist's opinion recommending removal from the grandparents' influence was accepted, while the respondents' critique evidence was rejected as unhelpful.

The father, who was recovering from addiction and unable to assume parenting responsibility, received supervised access.

The grandparents' claim for child support was reserved.

The applicant brought a motion in a high‑conflict family proceeding seeking to strike the respondent’s Answer and Claim, stay the pleadings, and declare the respondent a vexatious litigant due to repeated motions, alleged disclosure failures, and unpaid costs orders exceeding $34,000.

The respondent, who was self‑represented and unemployed, argued his substantive issues had never been determined on their merits and sought leave to bring a motion for directions.

The court reviewed the Family Law Rules, including rules 1(8), 13(17), and 14(23), and the jurisprudence governing the extreme remedy of striking pleadings.

The court concluded the respondent’s conduct, while problematic, did not rise to the level of deliberate, egregious non‑compliance justifying striking pleadings or declaring him a vexatious litigant, particularly given the ongoing parenting issues involving the children.

The motion was dismissed and the court imposed a case‑management timetable and scheduled a settlement conference to move the litigation forward.

Following a long marriage with three children, the court determined property equalization, spousal support, and child support issues after the parties agreed on a parenting plan.

The primary dispute concerned valuation of significant real estate assets for net family property calculation.

The court preferred one expert appraisal over another and determined the values of the matrimonial home and a farm property, resulting in an equalization payment payable to the applicant.

Despite the long marriage and the applicant’s role as homemaker, spousal support was denied due to the applicant’s substantial assets and investment income.

Guideline child support was ordered based on the respondent’s reduced income following job loss, and the parties were required to share section 7 expenses equally.

In a post‑separation parenting dispute, the moving party sought an order requiring a psychologist to file and disclose a parenting assessment report prepared during earlier proceedings.

The court held that the report had not been formally ordered under s. 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and, in any event, the underlying application had already been resolved by a final parenting order.

As a result, the court lacked jurisdiction to compel production of the report to the parties.

The court further held that even if jurisdiction existed, disclosure to the parents was not shown to be in the children’s best interests.

The motion was dismissed, with the court directing that the report may be provided to professionals involved with the family only upon request and awarding costs against the moving party.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment denying her spousal support following a 32-year marriage.

The trial judge found that after equalization, the appellant had a net worth of approximately $1.4 million and that the parties' ability to maintain their pre-divorce lifestyle had diminished due to the respondent's job loss, not the divorce.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Divorce Act and his conclusion that spousal support was not warranted given the appellant's assets, earning capacity, and remarriage.

The appellant wife appealed an order that terminated her spousal support and was marked as a final order, despite being made on a motion for interim support.

The Divisional Court found the motions judge lacked jurisdiction to make a final order on an interim motion.

The Court also held the motions judge erred in principle by terminating support without considering the wife's ongoing economic disadvantage and financial need, despite imputing an income to her.

The appeal was allowed, and interim spousal support was ordered at a reduced rate based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines until September 2008.

The appellant wife appealed a review order that reduced her spousal support from $2,700 to $1,350 per month and imposed a termination date.

The parties had been married for 25 years.

The reviewing judge had reduced support based on the respondent husband's expected reduction in income and a finding of 'double-dipping' related to the equalization of his business.

The Divisional Court found that the reviewing judge erred in principle by imposing a time limit on support without analyzing whether the objectives of the Divorce Act were met, noting that time-limited support is only appropriate in unusual circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and the original support order was reinstated.

The appellant wife appealed an order setting aside final orders made at an uncontested trial regarding custody, access, and support.

The respondent husband's pleadings had previously been struck.

The motion judge set aside the final orders relying on Rule 15(14) of the Family Law Rules and the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that Rule 15(14) applies only to motions to change, not set aside, final orders.

The court further found that the stringent tests for setting aside a default judgment or invoking inherent jurisdiction were not met, and the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors regarding disclosure.

The appellant husband appealed an order varying his child support obligations.

A previous consent order had set support below the Child Support Guidelines table amount.

The motions judge found a material change in circumstances, as the husband was no longer obligated to support the two eldest children, and increased the support for the remaining three children to the Guidelines amount.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence, as there were no special provisions justifying a departure from the Guidelines.