C.N. Herold

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action was a subrogated claim brought by an insurer in the names of the respondents for damages arising from a fuel oil spill.

The appellants argued the action was a nullity because the respondents were undischarged bankrupts when the claim was issued, meaning their causes of action had vested in their Trustees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurer's subrogation rights crystallized before the husband's assignment in bankruptcy, and the Trustee had disclaimed interest in the insurance claims.

Thus, the insurer was entitled to commence the action in the husband's name.

The appellants appealed a motions judge's decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment based on the expiry of the limitation period.

The motions judge found a genuine issue for trial regarding when the respondent knew or ought to have known that the water leakage was caused by the appellants' acts or omissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the motions judge's conclusion or his decision not to exercise fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04, as resolving the discoverability issue would require considering virtually all trial evidence.

The applicant hospital sought judicial review of an interim order made by the Ontario Labour Relations Board requiring the provision of properly trained security personnel in a forensic psychiatric unit.

The respondents argued that reviewing the interim order before the Board had completed its proceedings would be an inappropriate, fragmented approach.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the application premature as the Board's proceedings were still ongoing and the impugned order was only one aspect of a broader safety regime being considered.

The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent unions.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences against several young persons, including sexual interference, sexual assault, internet luring, and making and possessing child pornography.

The Crown applied for a long‑term offender designation under s. 753.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed psychiatric risk assessment evidence and found the offender presented a moderate risk of sexual reoffending, with a pattern of grooming behaviour toward vulnerable adolescents.

The court concluded that the statutory criteria for a long‑term offender designation were satisfied and that risk could be managed in the community through supervision.

A global penitentiary sentence of seven years and one month was imposed along with a five‑year long‑term supervision order and several ancillary orders.

During long‑term offender sentencing proceedings, the defence sought to qualify a psychotherapist as an expert in the risk assessment of sexual offenders.

The proposed expert had administered certain assessment tools and prepared reports concerning the accused’s treatment and recidivism risk.

The court applied the admissibility criteria for expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and examined the witness’s qualifications, training, and professional background.

The judge concluded that the witness lacked sufficient training and expertise in risk assessment methodology to qualify as an expert in that field.

The witness was permitted to testify about treatment methods and testing used in therapy but was prohibited from providing opinion evidence on the accused’s risk of sexual recidivism.

The accused, charged with invitation to sexual touching, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated trial date was 34.7 months.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was attributable to the Crown's failure to disclose relevant computer forensic evidence until shortly before the original trial date, necessitating an adjournment.

Finding that the delay exceeded the guidelines and caused actual prejudice to the accused, the court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) confirming a decision to take no further action on his complaint against a psychiatrist.

The applicant argued that HPARB should have held an oral hearing rather than a written review, alleging a failure to accommodate his hearing impairment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that HPARB reasonably exercised its discretion to proceed in writing after attempts to accommodate the applicant's hearing impairment at an oral hearing were unsuccessful, and the applicant failed to show good reason why a written hearing was inappropriate.

The applicant pharmacy sought judicial review of a decision by the Executive Officer terminating its ability to bill the public drug program due to alleged fraudulent and unsubstantiated claims.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness because it was not given sufficient time to provide evidence addressing the discrepancies.

The Divisional Court held that, given the severe economic consequences to the applicant's business, the duty of fairness required granting the applicant a short additional period to submit supporting evidence.

The application was allowed in part, and the applicant was granted an extension to make further submissions while a stay of the termination remained in place.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel upholding a finding of professional misconduct and a six-month suspension.

The misconduct arose from the appellant's breach of a bail condition prohibiting him from practicing criminal law without supervision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Law Society's jurisdiction, the application of the civil standard of proof, the assessment of credibility, or the rejection of arguments based on res judicata and abuse of process.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Financial Services Commission of Ontario decision finding that the respondent was injured in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The respondent was injured while attempting a headstand on a 'stripper pole' inside a mobile party bus.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the decision, finding it was reasonably open to the decision-maker to conclude that, given the specific nature of the vehicle, the headstand constituted an ordinary use of the vehicle and did not break the chain of causation.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The respondent appealed a motion judge's ruling that leave was required to appeal a temporary spousal support order made under the Divorce Act.

The respondent argued that the Divorce Act provided an unfettered right of appeal that superseded the leave requirements of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divorce Act's appeal provisions must be read in conjunction with provincial procedural rules, meaning leave to appeal an interlocutory order is still required.

The representative plaintiffs in two certified class proceedings regarding allegedly defective implantable defibrillators appealed orders of the motion judge.

The motion judge had ordered the bifurcation of discovery and trial of common issues relating to the quantification of compensation for waiver of tort from the liability issues.

In one of the actions, the motion judge also refused to certify punitive damages as a common issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to bifurcate the proceedings to ensure a fair and expeditious determination.

The Court also upheld the refusal to certify punitive damages as a common issue, agreeing that entitlement to punitive damages could not be rationally determined without first determining individual issues of causation and compensatory damages.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denying benefits for carpal tunnel syndrome.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, noting the Tribunal's strong privative clause.

The court found that the Tribunal reasonably relied on the lack of temporal linkage between the applicant's employment and his diagnosis, as well as credibility findings and medical evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario suspending its liquor licence for six days for permitting drunkenness and serving an intoxicated patron.

The appellant argued it was denied procedural fairness when the Board restricted cross-examination regarding an adjacent establishment, that the Board failed to articulate a legal test for intoxication, and that the penalty was excessive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error of law in applying the plain meaning of intoxication, and that the penalty was reasonable.

The appellant wife appealed an order setting aside final orders made at an uncontested trial regarding custody, access, and support.

The respondent husband's pleadings had previously been struck.

The motion judge set aside the final orders relying on Rule 15(14) of the Family Law Rules and the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that Rule 15(14) applies only to motions to change, not set aside, final orders.

The court further found that the stringent tests for setting aside a default judgment or invoking inherent jurisdiction were not met, and the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors regarding disclosure.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that the respondent undertook property renovations in detrimental reliance on the appellants' negligent misrepresentations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence showed the respondent commenced renovations long before any representation was made, and the trial judge failed to establish a substantial connection between the alleged losses and the misrepresentations.

The trial decision was set aside and the claim dismissed.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal which found that monthly administrative fees charged to tenants over and above the cost of hydro constituted illegal rent.

The landlord argued the issue fell under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Energy Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tenant Protection Act is remedial legislation that takes precedence over the Ontario Energy Board regulation.

The Court found the Tribunal's decision that the additional charges were illegal and had to be refunded was reasonable and correct.

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which affirmed a Hearing Officer's finding of discreditable conduct and the penalty of dismissal.

The misconduct involved an inappropriate relationship and harassment of a 16-year-old girl.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of reasonableness simpliciter to the Commission's decision.

The Court found no error in the Commission's treatment of the Hearing Officer's credibility assessments, evidentiary rulings, or the penalty imposed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, parents of children at Arthur District High School, sought judicial review of the Upper Grand District School Board's decision to close the school.

They argued the Board failed to comply with statutory duties and its own accommodation review policy, thereby denying the community meaningful participation in the decision-making process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board had considered numerous alternatives, provided necessary information, and afforded the community a fair opportunity to participate in the consultation process.

The plaintiffs in a personal injury action appealed an order requiring their expert witnesses to answer questions regarding the foundation and assumptions of their opinions during cross-examination on affidavits filed in response to a summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's ruling that cross-examination on an expert's affidavit should be subject to the same rules as other affiants and is not strictly limited to the four corners of the affidavit.