Christiaan A. Jordaan

The applicant, Charles Thomas McNair, sought a declaration that his homeowner’s insurance policy with Aviva Insurance Company of Canada covered a claim arising from a fatal collision involving his Sea-Doo watercraft.

The court considered whether the policy’s 30-day grace period for newly acquired watercraft extended coverage to the Sea-Doo, which was powered by a jet-pump propulsion system.

The court found the policy ambiguous and, applying principles of insurance contract interpretation, held that the grace period did provide coverage.

The court also determined that the incident occurred within the 30-day grace period, as acquisition was defined by possession and control, not merely payment.

The court ordered Aviva to indemnify McNair for costs and disbursements incurred in defending the underlying action and awarded full indemnity costs.

The decision addresses whether coverage for Extra Expense and Professional Fees under insurance policies issued to two Ontario summer camps is subject to the $1,000,000 sublimit in the Infectious Disease Extension, following business interruption due to COVID-19.

The court finds that both Extra Expense and Professional Fees are subject to the $1,000,000 sublimit, rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments for additional coverage.

The court also addresses principles of insurance contract interpretation and the onus of proof in such disputes.

This appeal concerned a motion judge's order regarding a class action.

The core issues were whether a discontinued cause of action and defendants could be added to an existing class action (the Martin action) and whether that action would then be governed by the old Class Proceedings Act, 1992, or the amended Act.

The motion judge had ordered the "recast" Martin action to proceed under the amended Act and denied leave to add a party (MicroPort Orthopedics Inc.) based on limitations.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in ordering the Martin action to be governed by the amended Act, as Section 39 of the amended Act clearly dictates that actions commenced before October 1, 2020, remain under the old Act.

The court also found an error in dismissing the motion to add MicroPort Orthopedics Inc. based on the Limitations Act, stating that limitation periods are typically individual issues in class actions.

The appeal and cross-appeal were allowed in part, clarifying that the Martin action continues under the old Act, and a re-filed Rowland action (including MicroPort Orthopedics Inc.) would proceed under the amended Act.

The applicants sought indemnity under a professional liability 'claims made' policy.

The insurers denied coverage based on an exclusion clause for claims arising from wrongful acts committed prior to the policy period if the insured's Chief Legal Counsel knew or could have reasonably foreseen that such acts would result in a claim.

The court found that prior to the policy commencing, the applicants' Chief Legal Counsel had sufficient knowledge of alleged wrongful acts by an employee to reasonably foresee that a claim would be brought.

The application was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

Two sets of appellants (manufacturers of optical disc drives) appealed the certification of a price-fixing class proceeding in British Columbia.

The majority held that the discoverability rule applies to extend the two-year limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the Competition Act, that fraudulent concealment can toll a limitation period without requiring a special relationship between the parties, that umbrella purchasers (persons who bought from non-defendant manufacturers) have a cause of action under s. 36(1)(a), that s. 36(1) does not bar concurrent common law and equitable claims, and that a plaintiff's expert methodology need only establish that overcharges reached the indirect-purchaser level to certify loss as a common issue.

Côté J. dissented in part, finding that the discoverability rule does not apply to s. 36(4)(a)(i) and that umbrella purchasers have no cause of action under s. 36(1).

Both appeals were dismissed.

Loan Away Inc. sought an interlocutory injunction against Western Life Assurance Company to compel payments and prevent termination of insurance policies, and also sought to amend its statement of claim to add IWS Creditor Group Inc. and consolidate arbitrations.

Western Life Assurance Company brought a cross-motion to stay the action based on an arbitration clause.

The court dismissed Loan Away's request for an interlocutory injunction due to lack of an undertaking as to damages and failure to meet the strong prima facie case and irreparable harm tests for a mandatory injunction.

The court granted Western's motion to stay the action and refer the issues to arbitration, including the arbitrator's jurisdiction over a permanent injunction.

Loan Away's request to consolidate arbitrations was denied due to lack of consent from all parties, and its motion to add IWS as a party was also denied as no tenable cause of action was pleaded against IWS.

The appellants brought a class action against defendant manufacturers and suppliers alleging they conspired to fix the price of lithium-ion batteries sold in Canada between January 2000 and December 2011.

The conspiracy allegedly impacted all purchasers, including "umbrella purchasers" whose batteries originated from non-defendants, as the cartel's price increases caused non-conspirators to also raise prices.

The certification judge certified only a statutory claim under the Competition Act for non-umbrella purchasers.

The Divisional Court certified an unlawful means conspiracy claim but excluded umbrella purchasers, citing indeterminate liability concerns.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the principle of indeterminate liability does not apply to either the statutory claim or the unlawful means conspiracy claim, and that umbrella purchasers should be included in the class with a subclass created for non-umbrella purchasers regarding aggregate damages quantification.

The defendants moved for leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action.

The underlying motion argued that the plaintiffs' notice of action was a nullity and that the statement of claim was delivered after the two-year limitation period expired.

The motions judge had found the notice of action sufficient and relied on the Rules of Civil Procedure to cure any defects.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions regarding the required level of detail in a notice of action and good reason to doubt the correctness of the underlying decision.

The plaintiff, S.I. Systems Partnership, brought a motion to amend its Statement of Claim to increase general damages and add a claim for inducement of breach of contract, based on information obtained during discoveries.

The defendants opposed, arguing prejudice due to increased costs and the tenability of the new claim.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that the proposed amendments were not frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and any prejudice to the defendants could be compensated by costs and further discoveries.

The plaintiffs moved, on consent, for certification of a proposed medical device class action for settlement purposes, approval of a national settlement, and approval of class counsel fees under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The action concerned allegations that surgical mesh hernia repair products were defectively designed and inadequately warned against, causing injuries due to device ring breakage or buckling.

The court found that the certification criteria under s. 5(1) of the Act were satisfied, noting an identifiable class and common issues regarding negligent design and failure to warn.

The court further held that the proposed $1.375 million settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class given significant litigation risks and the small number of qualifying claimants.

A 30% contingency fee and disbursements were also approved as reasonable in light of the work performed and the risks undertaken by class counsel.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a proposed class action for damages pursuant to s. 130 of the Securities Act.

The defendants consented to certification, except for the plaintiff's proposed class definition which included purchasers in the secondary market.

The court held that s. 130(1) of the Act does not provide a statutory cause of action to purchasers in the secondary market, and revised the class definition accordingly before granting certification.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Applicants (Hollinger Inc. et al.) sought approval of settlement agreements with their former auditors (KPMG) and lawyers (Torys).

The Non-Settling Defendants, including Conrad Black and David Radler, opposed the settlements, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and that the included third-party releases and bar orders would deprive them of procedural rights to discovery.

The court held it had jurisdiction under the CCAA to manage litigation as a corporate asset.

The court approved the Pierringer-style settlements, finding that the procedural rights of the Non-Settling Defendants could be adequately protected through active case management and the application of the principle of proportionality in discovery.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing its action for delay at a status hearing.

The action had not progressed beyond the pleadings stage five years after it was commenced.

The plaintiff failed to comply with a timetable agreed upon at a previous status hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the status hearing judge did not err in considering the entire history of the delay, inferring the defendants' belief that the action was abandoned, and dismissing the action without evidence of actual prejudice to the defendants.

The applicant pharmacy sought judicial review of a decision by the Executive Officer terminating its ability to bill the public drug program due to alleged fraudulent and unsubstantiated claims.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness because it was not given sufficient time to provide evidence addressing the discrepancies.

The Divisional Court held that, given the severe economic consequences to the applicant's business, the duty of fairness required granting the applicant a short additional period to submit supporting evidence.

The application was allowed in part, and the applicant was granted an extension to make further submissions while a stay of the termination remained in place.