Frank Csathy

The applicant, Charles Thomas McNair, sought a declaration that his homeowner’s insurance policy with Aviva Insurance Company of Canada covered a claim arising from a fatal collision involving his Sea-Doo watercraft.

The court considered whether the policy’s 30-day grace period for newly acquired watercraft extended coverage to the Sea-Doo, which was powered by a jet-pump propulsion system.

The court found the policy ambiguous and, applying principles of insurance contract interpretation, held that the grace period did provide coverage.

The court also determined that the incident occurred within the 30-day grace period, as acquisition was defined by possession and control, not merely payment.

The court ordered Aviva to indemnify McNair for costs and disbursements incurred in defending the underlying action and awarded full indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, Vida Mansori, brought a claim under the Occupiers' Liability Act after slipping and falling in a public washroom at a condominium building managed by the defendants.

The plaintiff suffered significant injuries.

The court considered expert evidence on the slip resistance of the washroom tiles and the defendants' maintenance schedule.

The court found that the washroom floor was not inherently unsafe and that the defendants had taken reasonable steps to ensure safety, including regular cleaning and security checks.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove negligence on the part of the defendants, dismissing the action.

Damages were provisionally assessed at $100,000 had liability been found.

The plaintiff, a welder, was injured on the defendant Yaya Foods Corporation's premises due to a faulty excavator operated by an independent contractor.

Yaya Foods brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was not liable as an occupier under the Occupiers' Liability Act for the independent contractor's equipment failure.

The court granted the motion, finding that the OLA does not impose a duty on an occupier to inspect the tools used by an independent contractor for safety.

Consequently, Yaya Foods was not found liable for the equipment's lack of maintenance, and the action against them was dismissed.

Intact, an insurer, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action to recover $2.9 million in excess remediation payments for an environmental spill from other parties (pollutant owners/controllers and their insurer).

Intact sought recovery under s. 99(2)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act and the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Intact, as a voluntary payor beyond its policy obligations and without direct harm to its own property, did not qualify for compensation under s. 99(2)(a) of the EPA.

Furthermore, the unjust enrichment claim failed because the primary benefit of the payments accrued to Intact's own insured, and the payments were made voluntarily with knowledge of the respondents' position.

The appellant's property was destroyed by fire caused by tenants extracting marijuana resin, and his insurer denied coverage based on exclusion clauses.

After the loss, section 129.1 of the Insurance Act was enacted, limiting such exclusions for innocent persons.

The appellant sought to apply this new provision retroactively to his claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that section 129.1 does not apply retroactively to losses that occurred before its enactment.

The court distinguished between retrospective and retroactive application of legislation, emphasizing the strong presumption against retroactivity.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the jury notices filed by the defendants in two related actions: a motor vehicle accident claim and a broker negligence claim.

The plaintiffs argued the trial was too complex for a jury and cited uncertainties regarding jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court dismissed the motion, adopting a modified 'wait-and-see' approach, holding that it was premature to strike the jury notices for a trial scheduled seven months away, and that the actions were not too complex for a jury.

The plaintiff insured sought coverage after his tenants caused an explosion and fire while attempting to extract marijuana resin.

The insurer denied coverage based on a marijuana exclusion clause.

The plaintiff argued that a subsequent amendment to the Insurance Act (s. 129.1) protecting innocent insureds should apply.

The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the marijuana exclusion clause applied irrespective of the amendment because it excluded a specific use of the property regardless of the insured's knowledge.

Furthermore, the court held that the amendment could not be applied retrospectively as it would affect the insurer's vested contractual rights.

The plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury after being hit by a golf ball hit by the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion to increase the damages claimed and to strike the jury notice due to anticipated trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the amendment to damages on consent.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice, adopting a 'wait and see' approach to determine if the region's new civil trial protocol could accommodate urgent civil jury trials, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to renew the motion later.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that their medical malpractice action against the hospital defendants had been settled.

The motion judge had found that the appellants' offer to consent to a dismissal was contingent on the remaining defendants undertaking not to allege negligence against the hospital defendants, and that this undertaking had been fulfilled.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellants had revoked their offer in writing before the remaining defendants purported to fulfill the undertaking.

As the offer was withdrawn before the condition precedent was met, no settlement was reached.

The appellants purchased a home after making it clear to their real estate agent and home inspector that they were allergic to mould.

After moving in, they experienced allergic reactions to mould.

The trial judge apportioned liability 50% to the inspector, 25% to the agent, and 25% to the appellants for contributory negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the finding of contributory negligence, as the trial judge had found the appellants lacked the knowledge to appreciate the warning signs in the report.

The Court also set aside the finding of negligence against the agent, as no expert evidence was called regarding the standard of care.

The inspector was held 100% liable.

The plaintiffs sued the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA) and others following the drowning death of a 7-year-old child who allegedly slipped down the concrete banks of Mimico Creek.

The TRCA moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no involvement with the adjacent apartment properties.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, and the TRCA appealed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the TRCA's affidavit evidence only addressed the adjacent properties and failed to address the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the design, maintenance, and attractive nuisance of the creek itself.

Because the TRCA did not meet its initial evidentiary burden to show there was no genuine issue for trial, the burden did not shift to the plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an insurance claim for economic loss following a fire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to reject a financial planner's letter and his conclusion that the appellant failed to prove economic loss for the period beyond the policy coverage based on tax returns.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The insurer moved for an order compelling the insured to attend a psychological examination pursuant to subsection 23(2) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insured argued the insurer's right to require an examination expired after mediation.

The arbitrator held that the insurer was entitled to require the examination to assess the ongoing claim for weekly benefits.

However, the arbitrator concluded that she lacked the express or implied statutory authority under the Insurance Act or the Schedule to compel the insured to attend the examination.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought weekly income benefits from the Insurer.

The parties disputed the calculation of the Applicant's gross weekly income and the deduction of collateral benefits, including workers' compensation and Canada Pension Plan benefits.

The Arbitrator determined that the Applicant's gross weekly income should be calculated based on his total income in the 52 weeks preceding the accident, including union benefit contributions and freelance income.

The Arbitrator also held that temporary total disability and future loss of earnings benefits from WCB, as well as CPP disability benefits, were deductible as payments for loss of income.

The Insurer was entitled to repayment of overpaid benefits, and the Applicant was awarded arbitration expenses and simple interest.