James Leslie Vigmond

This decision concerns the interpretation of a contingency fee retainer agreement between Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. and Richard Walter Clare (the "Client") and their former law firm, Harrison Pensa LLP ("HP").

The court found that HP was not entitled to a contingency fee on a judgment obtained by the Client on appeal after new counsel was retained.

The agreement only entitled HP to a contingency fee on damages recovered prior to or at trial.

The court also rejected HP’s claim for compensation under quantum meruit, holding that the enforceable agreement governed the parties’ rights and obligations.

The defendant brought a motion seeking to compel the plaintiff to attend a second psychiatric medical examination and to extend the time for serving the expert report.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a change in counsel and dissatisfaction with a previously retained expert's communication style at a prior trial were not sufficient reasons to order a further examination.

The court emphasized that trial fairness did not require a new examination, especially given the potential for delay to the impending trial date.

The respondent, Harrison Pensa LLP, brought a motion to transfer an application from Toronto to London.

The application concerned a dispute over a contingency fee agreement between Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. and Richard Walter Clare (applicants) and Harrison Pensa LLP.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding a significant connection to London, where the contingency fee agreement was drafted and the related trial took place.

The court determined that London was a "significantly better" venue and granted the motion to transfer the proceeding to London.

The appellant, Leslie J. O’Connor, appealed a trial judge's decision to discharge a jury and render judgment in favour of the respondent, Peter St. Marthe, following a motor vehicle accident.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in ruling that counsel improperly elicited inadmissible opinion evidence from a non-party expert (Dr. Mussett) regarding the respondent's ability to work, and whether the judge erred in discharging the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding Dr. Mussett's opinion on employability was inadmissible as it went beyond the scope of his original assessment and was highly prejudicial.

The court also found no error in discharging the jury, given the significant impact of the inadmissible evidence and the trial judge's assessment of trial fairness.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' expert epidemiologist, Dr. Michael Freeman.

The court granted the motion, finding that Dr. Freeman lacked specialized knowledge in the specific medical areas (metabolics and neurology) relevant to the causation question.

His "comparative risk" methodology was deemed outside the mainstream study of epidemiology for specific causation, and his reports indicated a lack of objectivity by primarily critiquing other experts rather than offering independent analysis within his own expertise.

The court also noted that his proposed evidence was not necessary, as the plaintiffs' other expert covered the same points.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the action from Barrie to Toronto, arguing that all parties, the motor vehicle accident, and the plaintiff's medical treatment were predominantly located in Toronto, with no substantial connection to Barrie other than the plaintiffs' counsel's practice location.

The plaintiffs opposed, asserting that remaining in Barrie would avoid significant delays and be more cost-effective.

The court granted the transfer, finding that Toronto was a significantly better venue based on a holistic application of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the convenience of parties and witnesses, the location of events and damages, and the local community's interest.