P. Theodore Matlow

The respondent public complainant sought partial indemnity costs of $9,316.87 from the applicant police officer following a proceeding.

The applicant did not dispute the quantum but argued no costs should be ordered because the matter was a test case concerning the standard of proof in police disciplinary cases.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that while the co-respondent police service did not seek costs, the proceeding was not a test case for the public complainant, who was maintaining a civil claim against the applicant.

The court awarded the requested costs to the respondent public complainant.

The applicant police officer sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) upholding his conviction for unnecessary exercise of authority.

The applicant argued that the hearing officer erred by applying the civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities) rather than a higher standard of 'clear and convincing evidence' under s. 84(1) of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in F.H. v. McDougall established that there is only one civil standard of proof, and that police discipline hearings remain civil proceedings governed by the balance of probabilities.

The plaintiff successfully appealed an order of the motion judge that had set aside a previous order striking the defendants' statement of defence and counterclaim for failure to pay costs.

Following the successful appeal, the parties agreed on costs for the leave to appeal and the appeal itself, but disputed the quantum of costs for the proceedings before the motion judge.

The Divisional Court declined to simply adopt the quantum previously awarded to the defendants by the motion judge, instead increasing the amount to reflect the time spent, responsibility undertaken, and the result that should have been achieved.

The court awarded the plaintiff total costs fixed at $50,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant's appeal and two interlocutory motions were dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $10,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the self-represented appellant argued for no costs against him and $1,300 in his favour.

The Divisional Court found no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court awarded the respondent $10,000 in costs, noting the extensive preparation and helpful submissions of respondent's counsel compared to the appellant.

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent municipality's requirement to obtain residential rental licences for its buildings.

The applicant argued its buildings were exempt as 'Apartment Buildings' under the by-law and objected to a statutory declaration requiring confirmation of compliance with provincial statutes, arguing they did not apply retroactively.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the buildings did not meet the conjunctive definition of an apartment building, and that the statutory declaration only required compliance with provincial laws to the extent they actually applied to the grandfathered buildings.

The respondent, Sharon Fair, brought a motion in writing to amend the Divisional Court's earlier written reasons, alleging clerical errors.

The applicant school board opposed the motion.

The court noted that the applicant had already obtained leave to appeal the judgment to the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that even if it had jurisdiction to amend its reasons, it would be unseemly to do so while an appeal was pending, and that justice would be better served by leaving the determination of any errors to the Court of Appeal.

Following an appeal, the defendant sought costs and submitted a bill of costs for $28,908.49, but indicated a willingness to accept $18,000.

The plaintiffs did not contest entitlement but argued the appropriate amount was $15,000.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was not overly complex and agreed with the plaintiffs' submission, fixing the costs of the appeal at $15,000 all-inclusive.

The mother appealed a trial judge's decision denying her request to relocate the child's primary residence and ordering that the child reside primarily with the father.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge made material errors, including relying on a witness who did not testify and failing to consider the mother's evidence that she would remain in her current city if the relocation was denied.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing, with the child to remain with the father on an interim basis pending the new hearing.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached a custom home construction contract and dismissing their counterclaim.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's dismissal of its claim for future lost profits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellants caused the delay, that the Consumer Protection Act did not apply because the real substance of the transaction was the purchase of real property, and that the respondent did not commit trespass.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to award the 20% markup as pure profit on the uncompleted portion of the cost-plus contract, and awarded the respondent $162,008.71 in damages.

The tenants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their residential tenancy and ordering eviction for non-payment of rent.

The tenants argued they were denied procedural fairness when the Board Member made an interim order requiring rent payments into trust and subsequently refused to hear their applications against the landlord when they failed to comply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Member had the statutory authority to control the hearing procedure and that her actions were a model of procedural fairness.

The plaintiff appealed a jury verdict arising from a motor vehicle accident where his motorcycle collided with the defendant's left-turning truck while the plaintiff was attempting to pass.

The jury apportioned liability 85% to the plaintiff and 15% to the defendant, and assessed total damages at $206,958.46, resulting in a net award of $16,500.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued the apportionment of liability and assessment of damages were unreasonable and that the jury relied on inadmissible lay opinion evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were adequate, the lay witness was properly confined to fact evidence, and the jury's verdict on both liability and damages was supported by the evidence and not plainly unreasonable or unjust.

The plaintiff appealed an order setting aside a previous order that struck out the defendants' statement of defence and counterclaim for failure to pay costs.

The motion judge had invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Court to set aside the order, citing the negligent representation of the defendants' former lawyer.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in invoking inherent jurisdiction when the matter should have been governed by Rule 59.06(2)(a).

Furthermore, the defendants were not entitled to relief because they failed to take reasonable steps to protect themselves despite being aware of red flags regarding their lawyer's negligence.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside orders of single judges that quashed his application for mandamus and allowed interveners to participate.

The applicant sought to compel three police forces to investigate alleged criminal conduct by the CN Police Service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, affirming that mandamus does not lie to compel police to investigate specific crimes, as police discretion in such matters is not subject to judicial dictation.

The court also upheld the costs awards and strongly criticized counsel for filing voluminous, uncoordinated materials, citing the culture shift required by Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict that assessed their damages from a motor vehicle accident at zero dollars.

The self-represented appellant argued the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance, specifically regarding the exclusion of medical consultation notes and limitations on expert testimony due to non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably balanced his duty to assist the unrepresented litigant with the need to ensure fairness to the defendants.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions finding it discriminated against an employee by failing to accommodate her disability and ordering her reinstatement with damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decisions on liability and remedy were reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.

The Court also rejected the applicant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application for judicial review, the court determined the costs to be awarded to the successful respondent university.

The applicant, who was self-represented, sought costs despite being entirely unsuccessful.

The court rejected the applicant's claim and awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondent, reducing the requested amount to reflect a more conventional award for an application of this type.

The respondent was awarded $18,805.89 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The Wabauskang First Nation applied for judicial review of a decision by the Director of Mine Rehabilitation acknowledging a Production Closure Plan submitted by Rubicon Minerals Corporation for a gold mining project.

The First Nation argued that Ontario failed to fulfill its duty to consult and accommodate and improperly delegated this duty to the mining company.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that Ontario's assessment of the potential claims was reasonable, that it fulfilled its duty to consult and accommodate, and that it only delegated procedural aspects of the consultation to the proponent while retaining ultimate legal responsibility.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal regarding insurance coverage for stolen marijuana plants, the respondent insurer sought costs.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, noting that while the respondent was entirely successful, the legal issues were novel and there was no guiding precedent.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, reflecting a modest allowance for junior counsel.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a professional association to withdraw him from its professional studies program for possessing unauthorized study notes during an examination.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because he was not given notice of the investigation or an opportunity to appear in person to show cause why the maximum penalty should not be imposed.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding serious breaches of procedural fairness by both the initial decision-maker and the appeals committee, and held that the decisions were unreasonable.

The matter was remitted for a rehearing to allow the applicant to make submissions in person regarding the appropriate penalty.

Following the dismissal of an appeal under the Building Code Act, the successful respondents sought costs.

The appellant argued no costs should be awarded or they should be limited to $10,000.

The Divisional Court found no reason to depart from the general rule that successful parties are entitled to partial indemnity costs, but found the amounts sought excessive.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $15,000 to the Township and Kopp, and $7,500 to Lystek.