Wade Reginald Poziomka

The defendant was charged with two counts under the Building Code Act: failing to comply with an order to comply (count 1) and causing construction of a building without a permit (count 2).

The prosecution proved the actus reus of both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that the defendant established a valid defence of legal non-conforming use on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant, as the current owner of property that had been in her family since the 1940s, demonstrated the requisite intent and commitment to rebuild structures destroyed in 1985 storms.

The court rejected alternative defences regarding direct evidence requirements, the existence of three independent structures, and due diligence.

Both counts were dismissed based on the legal non-conforming use defence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether it could hear an appeal of two interlocutory orders together with an appeal of a final order in a Charter challenge by 14 unhoused individuals against the City of Hamilton.

The interlocutory orders excluded physician evidence and demographic data relevant to the Charter claims.

The Court held that because the interlocutory and final orders were so interrelated, leave to appeal the interlocutory orders would inevitably have been granted, and thus the appeals could be heard together.

The motion to strike the grounds relating to the interlocutory orders was dismissed.

This decision addresses a stunt driving charge under subsection 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, focusing on the reliability of radar speed readings and the credibility of evidence from both the police officer and the accused.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v S. (W.D.) to assess credibility and reasonable doubt.

The officer's evidence regarding radar speed readings was found inconsistent and unreliable, particularly due to the deletion of elevated speed readings when switching radar modes and lack of corroborating visual observations.

The accused's evidence about operating a vehicle with a built-in radar detector and dash camera recordings was accepted as credible.

The prosecution failed to prove the essential element of elevated speed beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered three pre-trial motions in a Provincial Offences Act prosecution involving alleged violations of the Building Code Act.

The court granted the prosecution's request to amend the offence dates on the information to a date within the statutory limitation period, rejecting a broader date range that was statute barred.

The court refused to quash the information despite technical irregularities in the jurat signature, holding that substance prevails over form and that the information was properly laid under s.23(1.2) POA.

The court also ruled that the doctrine of discoverability applies to the limitation period under s.36(8) BCA, making the continuing offence argument irrelevant for limitation purposes.

The court granted leave to reapply on amendment and limitation issues based on trial evidence and remains seized of the matter.

The applicants, 14 homeless individuals, sought a declaration that the City of Hamilton's enforcement of its Parks by-law from August 2021 to August 2023 breached their Charter rights under s.7 (life, liberty, security of the person) and s.15 (equality), and sought damages.

The applicants argued they were prevented from staying overnight and forced to move daily due to insufficient accessible shelter beds.

The court found that applicants were not prevented from staying overnight and declined to extend Charter protection to allow indefinite daytime encampments, disagreeing with prior jurisprudence (Victoria v. Adams, Waterloo v. Persons Unknown) on the basis that encampments are inherently dangerous and unsanitary, and the City's actions were not in bad faith.

The court also found no s.15 violation, as homelessness is not an enumerated or analogous ground, and the by-law did not differentially treat disadvantaged groups.

The application was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the procedural fairness requirements when a court, on its own motion, strikes the pleadings of a self-represented Indigenous party for alleged contempt and abuse of process.

The motion judge had found the appellant, an alleged protest leader, in defiance of court orders, struck his pleadings, and granted a permanent injunction with significant costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by conflating contempt and abuse of process, failing to provide the appellant with adequate procedural safeguards, and denying him a fair opportunity to be heard, especially given his self-represented and Indigenous status.

The appeal was allowed, the orders striking pleadings and granting the permanent injunction were set aside, and the costs award was also set aside.