Wade Reginald Poziomka

The moving parties brought an ex parte motion for an interim injunction to suspend the coming into force of provisions in Bill 97 that would exempt the Premier's cell phone call logs from disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The moving parties argued that the legislation violated section 2(b) of the Charter and that the records might be destroyed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no arguable case, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the government.

The court awarded costs of $1,500 to the Attorney General.

Ten groups brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning whether a municipal by-law prohibiting individuals from erecting tents or living in public parks violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to seven groups, finding they would provide unique and helpful perspectives on issues such as Charter damages, international human rights standards, and the social context of homelessness.

Leave was denied to three groups whose proposed submissions either expanded the scope of the appeal or duplicated arguments already raised by the parties.

The applicant, a Black municipal councillor, alleged he was subjected to racial profiling by a police officer.

After a Police Services Act (PSA) disciplinary hearing cleared the officer of misconduct, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) dismissed the applicant's human rights complaint under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding the matter had been appropriately dealt with.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision unreasonable because it failed to apply or justify its departure from established Supreme Court of Canada and HRTO jurisprudence, which holds that it is generally unfair to use a PSA proceeding to bar a human rights complaint due to differences in purpose, standard of proof, and available remedies.

The HRTO decisions were set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The defendant was charged with two counts under the Building Code Act: failing to comply with an order to comply (count 1) and causing construction of a building without a permit (count 2).

The prosecution proved the actus reus of both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that the defendant established a valid defence of legal non-conforming use on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant, as the current owner of property that had been in her family since the 1940s, demonstrated the requisite intent and commitment to rebuild structures destroyed in 1985 storms.

The court rejected alternative defences regarding direct evidence requirements, the existence of three independent structures, and due diligence.

Both counts were dismissed based on the legal non-conforming use defence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether it could hear an appeal of two interlocutory orders together with an appeal of a final order in a Charter challenge by 14 unhoused individuals against the City of Hamilton.

The interlocutory orders excluded physician evidence and demographic data relevant to the Charter claims.

The Court held that because the interlocutory and final orders were so interrelated, leave to appeal the interlocutory orders would inevitably have been granted, and thus the appeals could be heard together.

The motion to strike the grounds relating to the interlocutory orders was dismissed.

This decision addresses a stunt driving charge under subsection 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, focusing on the reliability of radar speed readings and the credibility of evidence from both the police officer and the accused.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v S. (W.D.) to assess credibility and reasonable doubt.

The officer's evidence regarding radar speed readings was found inconsistent and unreliable, particularly due to the deletion of elevated speed readings when switching radar modes and lack of corroborating visual observations.

The accused's evidence about operating a vehicle with a built-in radar detector and dash camera recordings was accepted as credible.

The prosecution failed to prove the essential element of elevated speed beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered three pre-trial motions in a Provincial Offences Act prosecution involving alleged violations of the Building Code Act.

The court granted the prosecution's request to amend the offence dates on the information to a date within the statutory limitation period, rejecting a broader date range that was statute barred.

The court refused to quash the information despite technical irregularities in the jurat signature, holding that substance prevails over form and that the information was properly laid under s.23(1.2) POA.

The court also ruled that the doctrine of discoverability applies to the limitation period under s.36(8) BCA, making the continuing offence argument irrelevant for limitation purposes.

The court granted leave to reapply on amendment and limitation issues based on trial evidence and remains seized of the matter.

The appellant, a non-profit organization, sought public interest standing to bring nine applications for judicial review challenging decisions made by the Ontario Integrity Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the applications, finding the appellant lacked standing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue as they merely challenged individual exercises of discretion rather than statutory interpretation.

The Court also agreed that the applications were not a reasonable and effective means to bring the issues before the courts, as they would conflict with the statutory scheme and its strict confidentiality provisions.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding that his 'ethical veganism' was not a creed under the Human Rights Code.

Prior to the decision, the parties had settled the underlying complaints, withdrawing them and agreeing not to refile, though preserving the right to seek judicial review on the preliminary issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review on the basis of mootness, finding no live controversy remained between the parties and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case.

The applicants, 14 homeless individuals, sought a declaration that the City of Hamilton's enforcement of its Parks by-law from August 2021 to August 2023 breached their Charter rights under s.7 (life, liberty, security of the person) and s.15 (equality), and sought damages.

The applicants argued they were prevented from staying overnight and forced to move daily due to insufficient accessible shelter beds.

The court found that applicants were not prevented from staying overnight and declined to extend Charter protection to allow indefinite daytime encampments, disagreeing with prior jurisprudence (Victoria v. Adams, Waterloo v. Persons Unknown) on the basis that encampments are inherently dangerous and unsanitary, and the City's actions were not in bad faith.

The court also found no s.15 violation, as homelessness is not an enumerated or analogous ground, and the by-law did not differentially treat disadvantaged groups.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision declaring her a vexatious litigant after she filed over 160 applications.

The applicant argued the HRTO hearing was procedurally unfair and the decision was unreasonable, seeking to adduce a surreptitious recording of the hearing as new evidence.

The Divisional Court admitted the recording but dismissed the application, finding that the HRTO provided a fair hearing and reasonably concluded the applicant's conduct was vexatious.

The applicant, a Member of Provincial Parliament, sought judicial review of a censure decision by the Legislative Assembly of Ontario following her social media posts about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The respondents moved to strike the application for want of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and dismissed the application, holding that the censure and the motion leading to it fell squarely within the established categories of parliamentary privilege, specifically the control over debates and proceedings and the disciplinary authority over members.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the matter, even on Charter grounds.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application alleging age discrimination in credit card travel insurance.

The HRTO had dismissed the application at a preliminary hearing, finding that s. 22 of the Human Rights Code applied.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review, finding that the adjudicator made a fundamental error by placing the onus on the applicant to prove that s. 22 did not apply, rather than on the respondents seeking to benefit from the exception.

The HRTO decisions were quashed and the matter was remitted for a new preliminary hearing before a different adjudicator.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of an Integrity Commissioner's decision finding he breached the municipal Code of Conduct by disclosing confidential and solicitor-client privileged information to external legal counsel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Integrity Commissioner's decision was reasonable because the applicant lacked authority to waive the municipality's privilege or disclose confidential procurement documents.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness during the investigation.

The applicant sought judicial review of an HRTO decision dismissing his human rights complaint under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code.

The HRTO had found that the applicant's concurrent civil action for wrongful dismissal, which sought damages for intentional infliction of mental distress and moral damages based on the same factual matrix, barred the human rights application.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the HRTO's decision, finding it was reasonable to conclude that the civil claim essentially sought remedies for the same alleged Code infringements despite not explicitly pleading the Code.

This appeal concerned the procedural fairness requirements when a court, on its own motion, strikes the pleadings of a self-represented Indigenous party for alleged contempt and abuse of process.

The motion judge had found the appellant, an alleged protest leader, in defiance of court orders, struck his pleadings, and granted a permanent injunction with significant costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by conflating contempt and abuse of process, failing to provide the appellant with adequate procedural safeguards, and denying him a fair opportunity to be heard, especially given his self-represented and Indigenous status.

The appeal was allowed, the orders striking pleadings and granting the permanent injunction were set aside, and the costs award was also set aside.

The Ontario Integrity Commissioner brought a motion to quash nine applications for judicial review commenced by Democracy Watch.

Democracy Watch sought to challenge decisions made by the Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act, 1998 regarding investigations into alleged lobbyist wrongdoing.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that Democracy Watch lacked public interest standing because the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue and were not a reasonable and effective way to bring the issues before the courts, as they conflicted with the private interests and statutory privacy protections of the investigated lobbyists.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action against the defendant regarding Twitter posts that highlighted the plaintiff's past involvement with white supremacist organizations and criticized the City of Hamilton for employing him in its IT department.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had no valid defences of fair comment and justification.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that the harm he suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expressions regarding municipal accountability and public safety.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision determining he was not entitled to severance pay under s. 64 of the Employment Standards Act.

The Board had concluded that the employer's payroll calculation for the $2.5 million threshold was restricted to its Ontario payroll, excluding its global payroll.

The Divisional Court found the Board's interpretation unreasonable, holding that the calculation of payroll under s. 64 is not restricted to Ontario employment and must include global payroll.

The application was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding his employer breached its procedural duty to accommodate his disability but awarding only $5,000 in general damages.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred by considering seniority rights and a WSIB incentive program in its accommodation analysis, and by failing to award lost wages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's findings on the duty to accommodate and its remedial order were reasonable given the evidentiary record.