Daniel Mauer

The court considered costs following a 13-day trial in which the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed in its entirety.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, relying on their complete success and the plaintiff’s rejection of settlement offers.

The court reviewed the scale and quantum of costs, the parties’ conduct, and the complexity and importance of the case.

Ultimately, the court awarded the defendants $155,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, less a prior set-off, declining to order substantial indemnity or to affect property held in trust in related proceedings.

The plaintiff, Rana Alsous, claimed a beneficial interest in a property (227 Rymal Road) held in the names of the defendants, Bishara and Duaa Hadweh, asserting it was purchased with her funds or gifted to her.

The defendants contended the property was beneficially owned by their father, Ibrahim, who provided the funds for an earlier property (536 Upper Sherman Avenue) which was then used for Rymal Road.

The court found that Ibrahim provided the funds for Upper Sherman, and Rana held it in a resulting trust for him, failing to rebut this presumption.

Consequently, the proceeds from Upper Sherman, used for Rymal Road, also belonged to Ibrahim, and the defendants held Rymal Road in trust for him.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The respondent moved to convert an application into an action, arguing material facts were in dispute regarding a trust agreement for a property.

The applicant opposed, asserting no material facts were in dispute concerning the trust's existence and seeking its enforcement.

The court dismissed the motion to convert, finding sufficient clarity on the trust issue from the record.

The court declared the trust agreement valid and enforceable, ordering 70% of the net proceeds from the property sale to be released to the applicant.

A trial of an issue was ordered to determine any reimbursements owed to the respondent for property expenses incurred from purchase to sale, pursuant to the trust agreement.

The parties were unable to resolve the issue of costs following a motion to consolidate family and civil proceedings brought by the moving parties.

The responding party, who was successful on the motion, sought partial indemnity costs of $12,770.74.

The moving parties argued they should pay no costs due to an outstanding costs order, or alternatively, no more than $1,500.

The court rejected the moving parties' arguments regarding the outstanding costs order and their financial struggles, but found the responding party's claimed hours disproportionate.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court fixed costs payable to the responding party at $8,500 inclusive.

The motion sought to consolidate a family proceeding (divorce, support, equalization) and a civil proceeding (beneficial ownership of property based on trust).

The court applied a two-step test for consolidation, considering Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure by analogy.

The court found no common issue of law and determined that the common factual issue (Rana's beneficial interest in the Rymal Property) was not of sufficient importance to warrant consolidation, as it was a discrete issue in the civil case and only one aspect of the broader family equalization claim, which itself was not ready for trial due to a pending appeal.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience did not favor consolidation, given that the issues were not interwoven, there was no significant risk of inconsistent findings (as the civil finding would be determinative for the family equalization), the civil proceeding was simpler and ready for trial, and the motion was brought at a late stage.

The court distinguished Bledin v Bledin.

The motion to consolidate was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought repayment of approximately $300,000 in alleged loans from the defendant.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and alternatively sought leave to amend his statement of defence to withdraw certain admissions.

The court found that significant factual disputes, including the nature of communications between the parties (complicated by the plaintiff's deafness and English comprehension), created a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the claim was discovered and if a clear and unequivocal demand for repayment was made.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The motion for leave to amend the statement of defence was granted, as no non-compensable prejudice would result.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the successful defendant sought costs of $78,104.24 on a full indemnity basis.

The defendant, a lawyer, claimed costs for his own time spent as a self-represented litigant before retaining counsel.

The court found that full indemnity costs were not appropriate and that the time claimed by the defendant for his own work was excessive and not fully attributable to lost remunerative activity.

The court fixed the defendant's costs at $45,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action against the defendant regarding Twitter posts that highlighted the plaintiff's past involvement with white supremacist organizations and criticized the City of Hamilton for employing him in its IT department.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had no valid defences of fair comment and justification.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that the harm he suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expressions regarding municipal accountability and public safety.

The applicant solicitor brought a motion to set aside an Assessment Officer's decision that reduced his contingency fees and imposed tax liability on him.

The Assessment Officer had reduced fees for accident benefit claims due to the clients' misunderstanding of net settlement proceeds.

The court confirmed the fee reduction, finding the solicitor responsible for ensuring client understanding of settlement terms.

However, the court set aside the Assessment Officer's decision to impose the increased HST amount on the solicitor, deeming it inappropriate as the tax was collected for remittance to the government and the increase was not the solicitor's responsibility.