Sandra Antoniani

In this contract interpretation dispute, the plaintiff developer (Losani) sought payment from the defendant developer (Tobyn Park Homes) for the defendant's share of infrastructure costs under a Construction and Cost Sharing Agreement.

The central issue was whether interim payments were due upon issuance of Progress Certificates by the consulting engineer, or whether payment could be deferred until the City of Hamilton formally accepted the works as complete.

The court found that the CSA clearly required interim payments within 20 days of each Progress Certificate, and that the External Works Agreement (annexed to the CSA) addressed only the standard for final completion, not the timing of interim payments.

All of Tobyn's payments were late, and interest at 15% per annum, compounded monthly, accrued on all amounts owing.

The applicants sought approval of a settlement agreement regarding the validity and distribution of the deceased's estate.

The parties agreed that the 2017 will was valid but proposed a distribution that deviated from its terms.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer filed a rejection of settlement on behalf of a minor grandchild who had a potential interest under an earlier will.

The court approved the settlement despite the rejection, finding that Rule 75.07.1 does not grant a non-party absolute veto power over settlement approval, but rather requires the court to consider the non-party's rights when assessing whether the settlement is fair and reasonable.

The applicant, Berardi Construction, sought to rescind an order to comply issued by the County of Norfolk requiring a building permit for a retaining wall.

The court found that the retaining wall was not a "building" for the purposes of the Building Code Act and that no building permit was required.

The order to comply was rescinded, and the issue of damages was directed to proceed to trial.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment brought by Allstate Insurance Company of Canada to determine whether William Bezemer was at least 1% liable for a motor vehicle accident involving the plaintiff, Charmaine Farrugia.

The accident involved an unidentified third driver, John Doe.

The court found that a third vehicle was involved and that Mr. Bezemer was not negligent, applying the "agony of the moment" doctrine.

The action was dismissed as against Mr. Bezemer, and costs were awarded.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment in a civil action arising from a criminal prosecution for fraud against Anthony Falasca.

The plaintiffs alleged malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance, failure to withdraw the charge, and abuse of process.

The court found that the claims relating to the criminal prosecution, including abuse of process, were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the action was commenced after the expiry of the limitation period.

The court declined to consider the separate abuse of process claim relating to a bankruptcy proceeding, as it was not properly before the court on this motion.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of discoverability and the application of limitation periods in prosecutorial torts.

This decision addresses whether compelled statements made by a correctional officer during a disciplinary investigation can be used in a subsequent criminal trial.

The court held that the statements, made under statutory compulsion and in an adversarial context, are excluded from use for any purpose in the criminal proceedings, including for cross-examination on credibility.

The ruling applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. White and R. v. Nedelcu, emphasizing the protection against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The decision addresses whether intercepted telephone communications of a complainant, disclosed to the accused in a sexual assault prosecution, constitute "records" under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code and, if so, whether they are admissible under section 278.92.

The court finds that the intercepted calls are "records" and that limited cross-examination on certain topics (money, parole, and civil action) is permitted, as the probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The ruling clarifies the application of the s. 278 regime to institutional records and the balancing of privacy and fair trial rights.

This decision addresses two pretrial motions: the Crown’s application to admit prior consistent statements of the complainant, and the admissibility of statements from both the complainant and Mr. Burnette as res gestae and, for Mr. Burnette, as after-the-fact conduct.

The court reviews the legal framework for prior consistent statements, the narrative exception, and the admissibility of after-the-fact conduct, ultimately allowing certain narrative evidence and after-the-fact conduct to be admitted, but excluding the audio recording of a prior consistent statement as evidence.

The decision addresses a pretrial motion regarding the admissibility of bad character evidence about the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The Applicant sought to introduce evidence from Brittany Crozier regarding the complainant’s alleged drug use and trafficking while incarcerated, arguing it was relevant to credibility and reliability.

The court found the evidence to be collateral, of low probative value, and likely to distract and confuse the jury, and excluded it.

The ruling reviews the collateral fact rule and its exceptions, and applies the balancing of probative value versus prejudicial effect.

The plaintiff, Fady Dawood, brought a motion for summary judgment against Popes Property Holdings Inc. (PPH) and Nicholas John Pope, alleging breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The defendants agreed the matter should be resolved by summary judgment and did not oppose judgment against PPH, but Pope sought reverse summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him personally.

The court found PPH liable for the plaintiff’s losses but dismissed the action against Pope, holding that PPH had properly adopted the contract after incorporation and that there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil or impose personal liability on Pope.

The court considered whether to rescind an agreement of purchase and sale for farmland and a residence, where the defendant failed to register a severance as required, preventing the plaintiff from regaining title to the house.

The court found the defendant breached a fundamental condition of the agreement and ordered a new severance application, with rescission as an alternative remedy if the severance could not be obtained.

The court also addressed allocation of severance costs, property taxes, and the removal of a fence.

The court struck Daniel Hartman's claim against the Attorney General of Canada and the Minister of Health, which alleged negligence and misfeasance in public office following the death of his son after receiving a COVID-19 vaccine.

The court found that the government’s public health actions and communications were directed to the public at large and did not create a private law duty of care to individuals.

The claim was dismissed as it was plain and obvious that it could not succeed, even with proposed amendments.

The plaintiffs sought to pursue claims against the defendants in relation to a mortgage enforcement action that had already been decided in favour of the defendants.

The court found that all claims in the current action were either previously adjudicated or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.

The action was dismissed on the basis of issue estoppel, action estoppel, and abuse of process.

The court considered costs following a 13-day trial in which the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed in its entirety.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, relying on their complete success and the plaintiff’s rejection of settlement offers.

The court reviewed the scale and quantum of costs, the parties’ conduct, and the complexity and importance of the case.

Ultimately, the court awarded the defendants $155,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, less a prior set-off, declining to order substantial indemnity or to affect property held in trust in related proceedings.

The court considered whether Baketree Inc. validly exercised its option to extend a commercial lease with Nico Properties Inc., or whether alleged defaults precluded the extension.

The court found that Baketree met all preconditions for extension, including payment of rent, compliance with lease terms, and maintenance of financial strength.

Even if there had been a default, the court would have granted relief from forfeiture.

However, Baketree lost its right to negotiate a purchase of the property under Schedule E due to prior defaults, and the court declined to grant relief from forfeiture for that right.

The court considered a failed real estate transaction for a commercial property, where the plaintiff sought rescission and return of a $50,000 deposit after discovering outstanding work orders for a fuel tank.

The defendants counterclaimed for forfeiture of the deposit and damages.

The court found that the defendants repudiated the agreement, the plaintiff accepted the repudiation, and the defendants were unjustly enriched by retaining the deposit.

The court ordered the return of the deposit and dismissed all other claims.

The defendant moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against their property and sought security for costs, arguing the plaintiff, a non-resident, had no Canadian assets.

The plaintiff cross-moved for a Mareva injunction.

The court discharged the CPL, finding no evidentiary support for the plaintiff's claim to an interest in the land.

The Mareva injunction was dismissed as the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case and, even if they had, the "clean hands" doctrine would apply due to the plaintiff's admitted involvement in an illegal lending scheme.

Security for costs was ordered against the plaintiff in the amount of $50,000, as she is a foreign national with no Canadian assets and was not found to be impecunious.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order compelling the respondents, unit owners, to remove alterations made to common elements without consent, in violation of sections 97 and 98 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The respondents argued they had obtained consent or were being treated unfairly compared to other owners.

The court found that no valid consent was given for the expansion of their fenced backyard into common elements and rejected the argument of unfair treatment due to lack of evidence.

The application was granted, ordering the respondents to restore the common elements at their own expense.

The plaintiff, Rana Alsous, claimed a beneficial interest in a property (227 Rymal Road) held in the names of the defendants, Bishara and Duaa Hadweh, asserting it was purchased with her funds or gifted to her.

The defendants contended the property was beneficially owned by their father, Ibrahim, who provided the funds for an earlier property (536 Upper Sherman Avenue) which was then used for Rymal Road.

The court found that Ibrahim provided the funds for Upper Sherman, and Rana held it in a resulting trust for him, failing to rebut this presumption.

Consequently, the proceeds from Upper Sherman, used for Rymal Road, also belonged to Ibrahim, and the defendants held Rymal Road in trust for him.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a motion to appoint a litigation guardian for an incapable party in family proceedings.

The court found that the motion itself was largely unnecessary, as the proposed litigation guardian already held a power of attorney with express authority.

Both parties engaged in unreasonable and irrelevant litigation conduct, focusing on personal allegations rather than the core issue, which significantly inflated the costs.

The court awarded a substantially reduced amount of costs to the applicant, reflecting only the necessary portion of the litigation, and directed the litigation guardian to seek court approval for legal accounts before recovering from the incapable person's estate.