Daniel Morris Richter

On competing civil motions in a mortgage enforcement action, the court addressed whether a retired lawyer and beneficiary could represent a corporate trustee plaintiff under rr. 15.01 and 2.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted relief on consent to amend the corporate defendant name, validate service, and direct that this action and a related action be tried together or consecutively as directed by the trial judge.

Applying discretionary access-to-justice principles and considering the trustee's bare trustee role, beneficiary alignment, inability to fund counsel, and litigation competence of the proposed representative, the court dispensed with strict compliance and granted leave for non-lawyer representation.

The defendants' cross-motion relief, including dismissal requests, conditions, security for costs, and adjournment for further service steps, was dismissed.

The appellants challenged dismissal of their action as an abuse of process.

The court agreed the claim repeated issues from prior mortgage litigation and also dismissed the fresh-evidence motion.

The plaintiffs sought to pursue claims against the defendants in relation to a mortgage enforcement action that had already been decided in favour of the defendants.

The court found that all claims in the current action were either previously adjudicated or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.

The action was dismissed on the basis of issue estoppel, action estoppel, and abuse of process.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that ordered payment on a mortgage and granted a writ of possession.

They argued the motion judge erred in rejecting their defence of unconscionability and in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis.

The court affirmed that the mortgage renewal was discretionary, no agreement to renew on original terms existed, and the doctrine of unconscionability was inapplicable as there was no new contract to set aside.

The court also found summary judgment appropriate as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, seeking payment on a Charge/Mortgage of Land and a writ of possession.

The defendants alleged a credit balance and argued that the plaintiff's actions regarding mortgage renewal were unconscionable.

The court found no merit in the defendants' arguments, concluding that the Charge had expired without renewal and was in default.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff, along with an order for a writ of possession.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted by the motion judge in a mortgage default case.

The appellants (mortgagors and guarantor) argued that an agreement existed with the respondent mortgagees to forebear payment until the mortgaged properties were "construction ready." The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's determination that no such oral or written agreement existed, and that the parties' conduct and documentation were inconsistent with such an assertion.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondents were awarded partial indemnity costs.

Zamir Simas-Mamani was convicted of choking to render the complainant incapable of resistance and sexual assault.

The court considered fundamental sentencing principles, including proportionality, gravity of the offence, offender responsibility, and the totality principle.

The assault involved repeated choking into unconsciousness, removal of clothing, and various sexual acts without a condom, lasting over an hour.

The court emphasized the brutality and inherent dangerousness of choking as a means to facilitate sexual assault, citing R. v. Lemmon and R. v. Finney.

Aggravating factors included the lack of condom use, the offender's criminal record, the victim's ongoing psychological and physical repercussions, the significant size and strength discrepancy, and the duration of the attack.

The court imposed a sentence of eight years for sexual assault and eight years concurrently for choking, with a two-year credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a net sentence of six years.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration, a lifetime weapon prohibition, and a no-contact order with the victim during custody.