James Murray Butson

The applicant mortgagee sought an order setting aside tenancy agreements entered into by the mortgagor with tenants at a residential property and sought leave to issue a writ of possession.

The court dismissed the application against two respondents (upstairs tenants) who had established a legitimate tenancy predating the mortgagor's default.

With respect to unnamed basement tenants, the court found insufficient evidence to satisfy the three-part test under section 52 of the Mortgages Act for setting aside a tenancy agreement.

The court declined to grant a writ of possession as section 48 of the Mortgages Act prohibits possession of rental units except in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act.

Instead, the court issued an order requiring the mortgagor and basement tenants to provide full particulars of the tenancy agreement by October 31, 2025, allowing the applicant to renew its application if appropriate.

The court awarded costs to the upstairs tenants.

The plaintiff bank moved for summary judgment against an individual defendant to recover approximately $58,000 outstanding on a corporate line of credit and credit card.

The individual defendant, who was the sole shareholder of the corporate defendant, raised the defence of non est factum, asserting that he was not fluent in English and did not understand he was signing personal guarantees.

The court found that the loan and guarantee documents were ambiguous and that the defendant's unchallenged affidavit evidence raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff, Extend Financial Ltd., sought summary judgment against the defendant, Saeid Naeimi-Manesh, for default on a Home Equity Line of Credit and associated mortgage.

The defendant denied entering the mortgage, alleging fraud and collusion by his former employer and solicitor.

The court found no credible defense, confirming the mortgage was duly signed, funds advanced, and default occurred.

The defendant's claims were determined to be against third parties, not the plaintiff.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff, along with costs.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD) brought an application for immediate possession of a condominium due to default on a charge.

The registered owner, Sandra Andrade, and an occupant, Sesanarine Singh, are involved in a separate fraud dispute over the property.

Singh claims beneficial ownership via a trust agreement and argues TD had actual notice of his interest, which would affect TD's priority.

The court found triable issues regarding Singh's beneficial interest and, crucially, whether TD had actual notice of it.

The application for immediate possession was not granted; instead, the court directed a trial of an issue solely on the question of TD's actual notice.

Interim orders were made for Singh to make ongoing mortgage and condo fee payments, and case conferences were directed for both the TD-Singh dispute and the Andrade-Singh dispute.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Akazaki J., along with motions to extend time and for a stay/injunction pending appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal based on the materials filed, rendering the other motions moot.

The court noted, however, that it did not agree with the lower court's finding that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear an urgent motion before a proceeding is commenced, citing Rule 37.17 and the court's inherent jurisdiction.

This was a default application by a mortgagee seeking to set aside an unauthorized tenancy agreement and obtain possession of a condominium unit due to the unit owner's mortgage default and breach of a mortgage term prohibiting leasing without lender approval.

The unit owner had leased the property for five years to a respondent who then sublet it for short-term rentals.

The respondents did not contest the application.

The court granted the application under Section 52 of the Mortgages Act, finding that the tenancy impeded the mortgagee's remedies and that setting it aside would not prejudice any party, as the unit was not a permanent residence.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The Plaintiff sought summary judgment for an outstanding debt secured by a charge.

The Defendant did not attend the motion or file any materials in response.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the Defendant's prior admissions in her Statement of Defence regarding the charge, payment terms, standard charge terms, default, and maturity.

The Defendant's allegations of the charge being paid out by a third mortgagee were unsubstantiated by evidence.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the Plaintiff.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for an outstanding debt secured by a charge/mortgage.

The defendant did not attend the motion or file responding materials, despite having filed a Statement of Defence and having had previous counsel.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the defendant's admissions in her Statement of Defence and her failure to provide evidence to support her claim that the charge had been paid out by a third mortgagee.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that ordered payment on a mortgage and granted a writ of possession.

They argued the motion judge erred in rejecting their defence of unconscionability and in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis.

The court affirmed that the mortgage renewal was discretionary, no agreement to renew on original terms existed, and the doctrine of unconscionability was inapplicable as there was no new contract to set aside.

The court also found summary judgment appropriate as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendant, Karen Patino-Ramirez, brought an urgent motion to set aside four default judgments and stay their enforcement, primarily focusing on one judgment concerning two Oakville properties.

The plaintiff, CMI High Yield Opportunity Fund, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the default judgment, finding no arguable defence on the merits regarding the mortgage default or the validity of a forbearance agreement.

However, the court acknowledged an arguable defence concerning certain administrative fees charged by the plaintiff and ordered a mechanism to resolve this issue, staying enforcement of the judgment and writ of possession on the matrimonial home until the fee dispute is resolved.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, seeking payment on a Charge/Mortgage of Land and a writ of possession.

The defendants alleged a credit balance and argued that the plaintiff's actions regarding mortgage renewal were unconscionable.

The court found no merit in the defendants' arguments, concluding that the Charge had expired without renewal and was in default.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff, along with an order for a writ of possession.

The appellant corporation appealed a partial summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against its property.

The appellant argued the mortgage was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act because the individual who executed it had fraudulently assumed control of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the mortgage was not a forgery, the corporation was not a 'fictitious person', and the individual did not falsely hold herself out as the registered owner.

The doctrine of deferred indefeasibility did not invalidate the mortgage, and partial summary judgment was appropriate.

The Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) brought an application to reinstate a charge/mortgage on title to lands, which had been erroneously discharged during incomplete refinancing negotiations.

The respondents, the homeowner and a second mortgagee, did not challenge the error or the outstanding debt, though the homeowner raised concerns about increased interest rates.

The court, applying sections 159 and 160 of the Land Titles Act and its equitable jurisdiction, found it unjust for BNS to lose its priority due to an error that caused no prejudice to the respondents.

The application to reinstate the mortgage was granted.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful summary judgment motion brought by Robin Seligman in a mortgage enforcement action.

Seligman sought costs, as did Sonia Lafontaine and Arthur Froom.

The court awarded costs of $43,196.60, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, to Robin Seligman, to be paid solely by 1285310 Ontario Limited.

The claims for costs by Sonia Lafontaine and Arthur Froom were dismissed, as neither was successful in the underlying motion.

The applicant mortgagee sought possession of a residential property after the respondent mortgagor defaulted on his loans.

Unbeknownst to the mortgagee, the mortgagor had fraudulently leased the property to innocent tenants who paid $30,000 in advance rent.

The court balanced the equities between the innocent mortgagee and the innocent tenants under section 52 of the Mortgages Act.

Finding the tenants to be bona fide purchasers for value without notice, the court ordered that the tenants could remain in possession until the end of their lease, after which the mortgagee would obtain full possession.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a mortgage enforcement action against the defendant company and its alleged director.

The company opposed the motion, arguing the mortgage was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act because the director fraudulently held herself out as an officer of the company to obtain the mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that even if the allegations of fraud were true, the director was not a 'fictitious person' and did not hold herself out to be the registered owner of the property, meaning the mortgage did not meet the statutory definition of a fraudulent instrument.

The applicant bank sold a property under a power of sale following the mortgagor's default and death.

After satisfying its mortgage and a second mortgage, the bank held surplus funds.

As the deceased's estate had not yet been constituted and multiple parties had potential interests, the bank brought an unopposed application to pay the surplus funds into court.

The court granted the application pursuant to the Trustee Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing the bank to pay the funds into court, less its costs, and extinguishing its liability.

The respondents brought a motion in writing on consent to disburse surplus proceeds from a mortgage sale.

The applicant bank had failed to comply with a previous order requiring the proceeds to be paid into court, instead holding them in its counsel's trust account.

To avoid further delay and expense, the court applied the Rules of Civil Procedure liberally, varied the previous order to reflect the funds being held in trust, and ordered the disbursement of the funds to the parties and their counsel as agreed.

This supplementary endorsement addresses an applicant's request to vary a previous order for the discharge of a charge, which was deemed deficient in form by the Land Registry Office.

Due to an initial filing error, a supporting affidavit was not considered in the prior endorsement.

Upon review of the complete record, the court found no prejudice to any party and granted the variance, ordering the immediate deletion of the specified charge from the property title.

The applicant sought a court order to discharge a mortgage that had been paid but not formally discharged due to an inadvertent error and the applicant's subsequent corporate changes.

The application was brought without notice to the respondent.

The court declined to sign the submitted order because it purported to vary a prior judgment by another judge which was not referenced or explained in the application record.

The applicant was granted leave to submit a supplementary record.