Graeme Rupert Oddy

This decision concerns a failed real estate transaction between Brighton Breeze Ltd. and Noel Property Management Ltd. for a waterfront property in Brighton, Ontario.

The dispute centered on a notice registered on title by a neighbouring condominium corporation, which led to the collapse of the sale.

The court found that Noel was entitled to rely on the annulment clause in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) after Brighton failed to waive its objection to title.

The court dismissed Brighton’s claim for specific performance, ordered the discharge of the Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL), and granted summary judgment in favour of Noel.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to add a $50,000 claim for aggravated and punitive damages, alleging the defendants breached an oral agreement by commencing eviction applications at the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing delay, limitation periods, lack of an independent actionable wrong, and that the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LTB.

The court granted the motion, finding that the delay could be compensated by costs and a tight discovery timetable, and that the underlying factual determinations regarding the alleged oral agreement were within the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The appellant corporation appealed a partial summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against its property.

The appellant argued the mortgage was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act because the individual who executed it had fraudulently assumed control of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the mortgage was not a forgery, the corporation was not a 'fictitious person', and the individual did not falsely hold herself out as the registered owner.

The doctrine of deferred indefeasibility did not invalidate the mortgage, and partial summary judgment was appropriate.

The applicants, co-owners of a property, brought an application to discharge a 1961 mortgage registered against the property.

The original mortgagees could not be located despite extensive searches.

The court was satisfied that the mortgage had likely been paid in full and that there was no reasonable prospect of obtaining a discharge from the mortgagees.

The court ordered the mortgage discharged pursuant to section 12(8) of the Mortgages Act.

The defendant brought a motion seeking production of solicitor-client privileged communications and documents related to the plaintiff's decision to appeal a prior Master's decision.

The Master, however, determined that the motion was "in an appeal" and therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear it under Rule 37.02(2)(g) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Master rejected arguments that parties could confer jurisdiction by consent or that a motion to quash an appeal was separate from the appeal itself.

The motion was adjourned to be heard by a judge.