Graeme Rupert Oddy

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiff should have amended a stayed counterclaim in a prior construction lien action instead of commencing a new proceeding.

The plaintiff cross-moved for leave under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) to continue the action on behalf of the bankrupt corporation's creditors.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding no abuse of process as the counterclaim was stayed due to bankruptcy and there was no multiplicity of proceedings.

The court also held that the plaintiff did not require s. 38 authorization because the claims sought to pierce the corporate veil against the bankrupt's alter egos, which were personal claims not belonging to the bankrupt's estate.

This decision concerns a failed real estate transaction between Brighton Breeze Ltd. and Noel Property Management Ltd. for a waterfront property in Brighton, Ontario.

The dispute centered on a notice registered on title by a neighbouring condominium corporation, which led to the collapse of the sale.

The court found that Noel was entitled to rely on the annulment clause in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) after Brighton failed to waive its objection to title.

The court dismissed Brighton’s claim for specific performance, ordered the discharge of the Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL), and granted summary judgment in favour of Noel.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to add a $50,000 claim for aggravated and punitive damages, alleging the defendants breached an oral agreement by commencing eviction applications at the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing delay, limitation periods, lack of an independent actionable wrong, and that the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LTB.

The court granted the motion, finding that the delay could be compensated by costs and a tight discovery timetable, and that the underlying factual determinations regarding the alleged oral agreement were within the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The appellant corporation appealed a partial summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against its property.

The appellant argued the mortgage was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act because the individual who executed it had fraudulently assumed control of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the mortgage was not a forgery, the corporation was not a 'fictitious person', and the individual did not falsely hold herself out as the registered owner.

The doctrine of deferred indefeasibility did not invalidate the mortgage, and partial summary judgment was appropriate.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend a Mareva injunction related to an alleged $1.4 million renovation fraud.

A defendant brought a cross-motion to discharge the order against him, and a non-party sought relief from an order compelling his examination under oath.

The court extended the Mareva order, dismissed the defendant's cross-motion as premature due to missing financial disclosure, and suspended the examination order against the non-party due to lack of service and reliance on implausible hearsay evidence.

The court also provided strict directions regarding the proper use of CaseLines and hyperlinking for future attendances.

The applicants, co-owners of a property, brought an application to discharge a 1961 mortgage registered against the property.

The original mortgagees could not be located despite extensive searches.

The court was satisfied that the mortgage had likely been paid in full and that there was no reasonable prospect of obtaining a discharge from the mortgagees.

The court ordered the mortgage discharged pursuant to section 12(8) of the Mortgages Act.

The plaintiff in a solicitors' negligence action brought a motion to remove the defendants' counsel, alleging a conflict of interest.

The plaintiff claimed the defendants' lawyer obtained confidential information about him during a prior, allegedly related action where the lawyer represented a different party.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding no factual nexus between the prior action and the current negligence claim, and concluding that a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would not find removal necessary for the proper administration of justice.

The defendants moved to set aside ex parte orders that granted the plaintiffs certificates of pending litigation against certain properties and appointed a monitor over two furniture store franchises.

The dispute arose from an intra-family sale of the franchises, where the plaintiffs alleged the defendants made misrepresentations about the transaction's proceeds and the inclusion of additional properties.

The defendants argued the ex parte orders should be set aside for failure to make full and fair disclosure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no material non-disclosure, and maintained the certificates of pending litigation and the monitor, concluding that a triable issue remained and the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs.

The defendant brought a motion to compel production of documents referenced in an affidavit sworn by the plaintiff's solicitor.

The affidavit was filed in response to a motion to quash the plaintiff's late appeal and referenced communications between the plaintiff and its counsel regarding the intent to appeal.

The court found that the affidavit 'entered the fray' and constituted an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

However, because the waiver had not yet become final, the court permitted the plaintiff to withdraw the impugned affidavit and replace it with one from a corporate representative to avoid the production order.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

The defendant brought a motion seeking production of solicitor-client privileged communications and documents related to the plaintiff's decision to appeal a prior Master's decision.

The Master, however, determined that the motion was "in an appeal" and therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear it under Rule 37.02(2)(g) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Master rejected arguments that parties could confer jurisdiction by consent or that a motion to quash an appeal was separate from the appeal itself.

The motion was adjourned to be heard by a judge.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend a court-ordered deadline for serving an amended statement of claim to add a winter maintenance contractor as a defendant.

The presumptive limitation period had expired, but a previous order allowed the addition based on discoverability, setting a service deadline of March 31, 2016.

The plaintiff failed to meet this deadline and delayed over two years before bringing this motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the delay, show inadvertence, or prove that the proposed defendant would not suffer prejudice.