Jeffrey Michael Claydon

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion brought by the respondents to dismiss the appellants' (Bouragbas') appeal for delay, primarily due to the appellants' inability to obtain transcripts from lower court proceedings.

The underlying appeal concerned a motion to amend a statement of claim and lift a stay.

The court determined that transcripts were not necessary for the appeal, as it was essentially an appeal on a paper record concerning pleadings.

While not dismissing the appeal outright, the court ordered the appellants to perfect their appeal within 30 days, failing which it would be administratively dismissed.

The Algonquins appealed a motion judge's decision to strike most of their claims against Ontario and the Métis Nation of Ontario regarding harvesting rights.

The core issue was Ontario's duty to consult and accommodate Algonquin interests before recognizing Métis communities and extending unlimited harvesting rights, which allegedly impacted Algonquin resources.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in striking claims for declaratory relief based on standing and in compelling the Algonquins to pursue judicial review instead of an action.

The court emphasized a generous approach to pleadings in Indigenous cases and that the duty to consult provides standing for consequential relief.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating most of the Algonquins' claims, while the cross-appeals by Ontario and the Métis Nation were dismissed.

The appellant corporation appealed a partial summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against its property.

The appellant argued the mortgage was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act because the individual who executed it had fraudulently assumed control of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the mortgage was not a forgery, the corporation was not a 'fictitious person', and the individual did not falsely hold herself out as the registered owner.

The doctrine of deferred indefeasibility did not invalidate the mortgage, and partial summary judgment was appropriate.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Belobaba J. dated December 20, 2022, regarding a certification motion.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and noted that the parties could apply to the Court of Appeal to have this appeal heard together with the pending appeal of the dismissal of the balance of the certification motion.

No costs were awarded as costs outlines were not filed.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action against the Government of Ontario for its response to the COVID-19 pandemic in long-term care (LTC) homes.

The plaintiffs alleged gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The court certified the class action solely on the negligence/gross negligence claim against the Minister of Long-Term Care, finding it arguable that the Long-Term Care Homes Act imposes a private law duty of care on the Minister to protect LTC residents.

The fiduciary duty and Charter claims were struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The class was limited to LTC residents and their families, excluding visitors.

This is an appeal from summary judgment dismissing the appellant’s action claiming damages for malicious prosecution.

The underlying criminal prosecution rested on allegations that the appellant fraudulently received social assistance.

The appellant raised several grounds of appeal, including errors regarding partial summary judgment, the determinative nature of prior judicial determinations on reasonable cause, sufficiency of reasons, and failure to infer malice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the motion judge's approach and upholding the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss a malicious prosecution claim initiated by Anthony Okafor.

Okafor's claim arose from a prolonged criminal prosecution for fraud related to Workers' Compensation Board benefits, which concluded with a permanent stay of proceedings after 17 years.

The Attorney General argued that the prosecution was conducted with reasonable and probable cause and without malice.

The court granted the motion, finding that Okafor failed to establish the absence of reasonable and probable cause or the presence of malice, both essential elements for a malicious prosecution claim against Crown prosecutors.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against the Crown for failure to hold timely bail hearings, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter rights violations.

The motion judge dismissed certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cause of action in negligence (claims attacked core policy decisions), the fiduciary duty claim abandoned, and the Charter claims lacking common issues and not being a preferable procedure due to the need for individualized assessments.

Two competing class counsel groups sought carriage of a proposed class action against the Province of Ontario regarding COVID-19 outbreaks in long-term care homes.

The Nisbet Action proposed suing Ontario solely for its several liability to avoid third-party claims and expedite certification.

The Robertson Action proposed a conventional joint and several liability approach, expecting third-party claims between Ontario and long-term care operators.

The court granted carriage to the Robertson Action, finding that the several liability approach offered no early-stage advantage and would create significant disadvantages in later-stage litigation, including potential unfairness to the defendant and risks of unrecovered losses for class members.

The moving parties (appellants) brought a motion seeking an order for the release of transcripts from Superior Court hearings, an extension of time to perfect their appeal, and costs.

The responding parties did not oppose the release of transcripts or the extension but opposed the request for costs.

The court granted the release of the transcripts and the extension of time, directing the Superior Court to expedite its review and release.

However, the court denied the moving parties' request for costs, finding that their essential problem was with the Superior Court, not the responding parties.

The court also clarified it had no jurisdiction over the settling of the Superior Court order.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal, the respondents sought costs.

The appellants, who were self-represented, argued that costs should be awarded against the respondents for refusing to settle, or alternatively, postponed until the end of the action.

The court rejected the appellants' arguments and awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, finding that the appellants' conduct, while unreasonable at times, did not warrant elevated costs.

The court also reduced the costs claimed by one counsel representing multiple defendants to account for economies of scale.

Costs were ordered payable within 90 days.

The self-represented appellants appealed a Master's decision denying them leave to amend their statement of claim and prohibiting the father from acting as agent for his adult son.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master correctly concluded that the proposed amendments lacked material facts, failed to properly plead conspiracy, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The Court also upheld the Master's rulings on the respondents' cross-motions and her refusal to address an unpleaded conflict of interest allegation against opposing counsel.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 18, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding plaintiffs in the amount of $4,625.00 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Attorney General for Ontario brought an application seeking a declaration that the six-month temporary suspension of limitation periods due to the COVID-19 pandemic should not be counted in limitation period calculations going forward.

The application was brought against 'Persons Unknown' with no live dispute or adversarial parties.

The court dismissed the application, holding that it is constitutionally inappropriate for the court to render an abstract legal opinion to endorse the executive branch's view of its regulatory efforts without a real dispute between interested parties.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a representation order under Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to appoint Chief Kirby Whiteduck to represent the 'Algonquins' in an action challenging Ontario's decision to grant harvesting rights to two Métis communities in a settlement area currently under treaty negotiation.

The Métis Nation opposed the motion, arguing the class was insufficiently defined and the proposed representative lacked authority.

The court found that the class of collective rights holders was sufficiently defined, the claim was collective in nature, and the balance of convenience favoured appointing the proposed representative.

The motion was granted.

The plaintiff's class action for systemic negligence in bail hearings was denied certification.

On appeal, the Crown raised the new Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (CLPA) as a bar to the negligence claim.

The Divisional Court remitted this specific issue to the motion judge.

The judge found that the CLPA did not substantially change the common law on Crown immunity and that the plaintiff's claim, which challenged high-level policy decisions regarding resource allocation and management of the criminal justice system, remained non-justiciable as a core policy matter, both under the CLPA and pre-CLPA common law.

Consequently, the negligence claim was deemed dismissed without costs under s. 11(8) of the CLPA.

The plaintiff, Tarik Bouragba, brought a motion seeking leave to amend his Statement of Claim and lift a stay of proceedings previously ordered.

The defendants opposed the motion and brought cross-motions to prohibit the plaintiff's father, a non-lawyer, from representing him, and to stay the proceeding due to unpaid costs orders.

The court granted the cross-motion prohibiting the father from acting as legal representative.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings, finding the proposed amendments lacked material facts, were incomprehensible, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court ordered that all outstanding costs awards must be paid before the plaintiffs can bring any further motions.

The plaintiffs were beneficial owners of a property held in trust by the defendant Bertrand, who was the registered owner.

Bertrand sold the property to 670 without the plaintiffs' consent and signed a false affidavit to clear executions against his name.

The trial judge found the transfer was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act, declared it void, and ordered rectification of the register.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the trial judge erred in law.

Bertrand was not a 'fictitious person' and did not forge the transfer, as he was the true registered owner with legal authority to convey the property.

Furthermore, 670 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, protected by s. 62(2) of the Act, which states that describing an owner as a trustee does not constitute notice of a trust.

The appeals by 670 and the Director of Titles were allowed, confirming 670's ownership, while Bertrand's appeal against the findings of fact was dismissed.

The matter was remitted to the trial court to assess damages against Bertrand.

The applicant, charged with impaired operation by drug and taking a motor vehicle without consent, brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel.

The court applied the three-part test for a Rowbotham order.

While the applicant had been refused Legal Aid, the court found he failed to establish impecuniosity, as he had the ability to work and earn funds before trial.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant's right to a fair trial would not be materially compromised without counsel, given the straightforward nature of the case, his cognitive abilities, and the trial judge's duty to assist an unrepresented accused.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown and co-defendants moved to strike a crossclaim filed by a former correctional officer, John Barbro, which included claims for malicious prosecution, defamation, and bad faith wrongful dismissal.

The moving parties argued that the essential character of these claims arose from a collective agreement and thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement Board (GSB).

The court applied the Weber framework, finding that the dispute's essential character was workplace-related, stemming from an incident, subsequent investigation, and disciplinary process governed by the collective agreement.

The court rejected arguments for concurrent jurisdiction based on the MCSA and PACA, and declined to exercise residual discretion.

The motion to strike the crossclaim (except for contribution and indemnity) was granted, with leave for Mr. Barbro to file an amended statement of defence and crossclaim.