Jeffrey Michael Claydon

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion brought by the respondents to dismiss the appellants' (Bouragbas') appeal for delay, primarily due to the appellants' inability to obtain transcripts from lower court proceedings.

The underlying appeal concerned a motion to amend a statement of claim and lift a stay.

The court determined that transcripts were not necessary for the appeal, as it was essentially an appeal on a paper record concerning pleadings.

While not dismissing the appeal outright, the court ordered the appellants to perfect their appeal within 30 days, failing which it would be administratively dismissed.

The Algonquins appealed a motion judge's decision to strike most of their claims against Ontario and the Métis Nation of Ontario regarding harvesting rights.

The core issue was Ontario's duty to consult and accommodate Algonquin interests before recognizing Métis communities and extending unlimited harvesting rights, which allegedly impacted Algonquin resources.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in striking claims for declaratory relief based on standing and in compelling the Algonquins to pursue judicial review instead of an action.

The court emphasized a generous approach to pleadings in Indigenous cases and that the duty to consult provides standing for consequential relief.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating most of the Algonquins' claims, while the cross-appeals by Ontario and the Métis Nation were dismissed.

This is an appeal from summary judgment dismissing the appellant’s action claiming damages for malicious prosecution.

The underlying criminal prosecution rested on allegations that the appellant fraudulently received social assistance.

The appellant raised several grounds of appeal, including errors regarding partial summary judgment, the determinative nature of prior judicial determinations on reasonable cause, sufficiency of reasons, and failure to infer malice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the motion judge's approach and upholding the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss a malicious prosecution claim initiated by Anthony Okafor.

Okafor's claim arose from a prolonged criminal prosecution for fraud related to Workers' Compensation Board benefits, which concluded with a permanent stay of proceedings after 17 years.

The Attorney General argued that the prosecution was conducted with reasonable and probable cause and without malice.

The court granted the motion, finding that Okafor failed to establish the absence of reasonable and probable cause or the presence of malice, both essential elements for a malicious prosecution claim against Crown prosecutors.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against the Crown for failure to hold timely bail hearings, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter rights violations.

The motion judge dismissed certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cause of action in negligence (claims attacked core policy decisions), the fiduciary duty claim abandoned, and the Charter claims lacking common issues and not being a preferable procedure due to the need for individualized assessments.

The moving parties (appellants) brought a motion seeking an order for the release of transcripts from Superior Court hearings, an extension of time to perfect their appeal, and costs.

The responding parties did not oppose the release of transcripts or the extension but opposed the request for costs.

The court granted the release of the transcripts and the extension of time, directing the Superior Court to expedite its review and release.

However, the court denied the moving parties' request for costs, finding that their essential problem was with the Superior Court, not the responding parties.

The court also clarified it had no jurisdiction over the settling of the Superior Court order.

The plaintiff's class action for systemic negligence in bail hearings was denied certification.

On appeal, the Crown raised the new Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (CLPA) as a bar to the negligence claim.

The Divisional Court remitted this specific issue to the motion judge.

The judge found that the CLPA did not substantially change the common law on Crown immunity and that the plaintiff's claim, which challenged high-level policy decisions regarding resource allocation and management of the criminal justice system, remained non-justiciable as a core policy matter, both under the CLPA and pre-CLPA common law.

Consequently, the negligence claim was deemed dismissed without costs under s. 11(8) of the CLPA.

The Crown and co-defendants moved to strike a crossclaim filed by a former correctional officer, John Barbro, which included claims for malicious prosecution, defamation, and bad faith wrongful dismissal.

The moving parties argued that the essential character of these claims arose from a collective agreement and thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement Board (GSB).

The court applied the Weber framework, finding that the dispute's essential character was workplace-related, stemming from an incident, subsequent investigation, and disciplinary process governed by the collective agreement.

The court rejected arguments for concurrent jurisdiction based on the MCSA and PACA, and declined to exercise residual discretion.

The motion to strike the crossclaim (except for contribution and indemnity) was granted, with leave for Mr. Barbro to file an amended statement of defence and crossclaim.

The applicants, Dr. Bernstein's corporations, moved for judgment against Norma Walton, Ronauld Walton, and their companies for $66.9 million, alleging civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, and sought a declaration that the debt would survive bankruptcy.

The Waltons brought a counter-application for damages and a cross-motion for a trial on the fraud issue.

Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corporation and Gideon and Irene Levytam also sought relief regarding their investments.

The court found the Waltons liable for civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, awarding the applicants $66.9 million plus interest, and declared the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) and (e) of the BIA.

The Waltons' counter-application was struck as frivolous and vexatious.

The applicants' claims against Schedule C Companies for knowing assistance and knowing receipt were dismissed.

DeJong was granted constructive trusts over specific Schedule C properties for their investments due to the Waltons' breach of fiduciary duties.

This decision addresses costs following the dismissal of the applicants' motion for an interlocutory injunction.

The respondents, including EACOM Timber Corporation, Northshore Forest Inc., Vermilion Forest Management Company Ltd., and two government Ministries, did not seek costs.

The applicants requested that no costs be ordered against them.

The court, noting the lack of costs requests from the respondents and the applicants' position, ordered that all parties bear their own costs for the interlocutory injunction motion.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to halt logging, road building, and aerial spraying in the Benny area, asserting a lack of meaningful consultation and consent regarding their Aboriginal and Treaty rights.

The court applied the three-part test for an interlocutory injunction, finding that the Crown's duty to consult with the Atikameksheng Anishnawbek First Nation (AAFN) had been met through extensive engagement, which led to the approval of remedial measures by the AAFN Chief and Council.

The applicants failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm, as their claims were general and the Crown's protective measures were deemed ample.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents, given the significant economic impact and job losses that an injunction would cause.

The court also clarified that the duty to consult is owed to the collective Aboriginal group, not individual members, and rejected claims of additional hereditary clan leader reserves under the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.