Robert John Potts

The Algonquins appealed a motion judge's decision to strike most of their claims against Ontario and the Métis Nation of Ontario regarding harvesting rights.

The core issue was Ontario's duty to consult and accommodate Algonquin interests before recognizing Métis communities and extending unlimited harvesting rights, which allegedly impacted Algonquin resources.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in striking claims for declaratory relief based on standing and in compelling the Algonquins to pursue judicial review instead of an action.

The court emphasized a generous approach to pleadings in Indigenous cases and that the duty to consult provides standing for consequential relief.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating most of the Algonquins' claims, while the cross-appeals by Ontario and the Métis Nation were dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 18, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding plaintiffs in the amount of $4,625.00 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a representation order under Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to appoint Chief Kirby Whiteduck to represent the 'Algonquins' in an action challenging Ontario's decision to grant harvesting rights to two Métis communities in a settlement area currently under treaty negotiation.

The Métis Nation opposed the motion, arguing the class was insufficiently defined and the proposed representative lacked authority.

The court found that the class of collective rights holders was sufficiently defined, the claim was collective in nature, and the balance of convenience favoured appointing the proposed representative.

The motion was granted.

In a class proceeding arising from a major propane facility explosion, the plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim and certify claims against additional defendants associated with the ownership and leasing of the facility property.

The court considered whether the proposed amended pleading satisfied the s. 5(1)(a) requirement of the Class Proceedings Act by disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

Claims in strict liability and nuisance against the property-owning defendants were struck because the pleadings failed to meet the legal prerequisites and improperly characterized the alleged nuisance.

Negligence claims under the Occupiers’ Liability Act were also dismissed because the alleged damages occurred off the premises and the statute only applies to persons entering the premises.

However, the court held that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded a viable common law negligence claim based on the defendants’ alleged rights of control and failure to intervene in unsafe operations.

Certification against the remaining defendants proceeded solely on the basis of the common law negligence cause of action.

In a certified class proceeding arising from explosions at a propane facility, class counsel moved for an order restraining an insurer and its counsel from communicating directly with class members during the court‑approved opt‑out period.

The insurer’s counsel had sent letters stating the insurer would opt insured class members out of the class action and pursue their claims through a subrogated action.

The court held the communications were misleading, interfered with the solicitor‑client relationship between class counsel and class members, and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court reaffirmed that insureds retain control of litigation until fully indemnified for both insured and uninsured losses.

An order was made prohibiting the insurer and its counsel from communicating with affected class members without court approval or consent of class counsel during the opt‑out period.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed class action arising from explosions at a propane facility in Toronto that allegedly caused personal injury, property damage, and evacuation of nearby residents.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

It held that the pleadings against certain landlord defendants failed to disclose a viable cause of action because the allegations relying on agency, single‑group enterprise, and alter‑ego theories lacked material facts capable of piercing the corporate veil.

Those pleadings were struck with leave to amend and the certification motion against those defendants was adjourned.

The proceeding was otherwise certified as a class action against the remaining defendants, with common issues approved and representative plaintiffs appointed.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision declaring that it unreasonably withheld consent for the respondent tenant, Loblaws, to change its supermarket banner to 'No Frills' and temporarily close for renovations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the lease's use and continuous operation provisions.

The court applied a deferential standard of review to the factual findings and upheld the refusal to admit new evidence.

In a securities-related class proceeding arising from alleged fraudulent statements about Indonesian gold reserves, the appellants challenged the refusal to certify negligent misrepresentation while conspiracy, fraudulent misrepresentation, and Competition Act claims had been certified.

The court held that there was no principled basis to distinguish fraudulent from negligent misrepresentation at the certification stage, given the overlap in common factual and legal issues and the low threshold for common issues under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court further held that, where three related claims were already proceeding as a class action, it was sensible and efficient to include negligent misrepresentation on the same litigation track.

The appeal was allowed and the certification order amended accordingly.