Peter H. Griffin

The moving parties brought motions to quash appeals from an order authorizing a court-appointed Sales Officer to enter into agreements to separate joint venture interests in real estate projects as part of a corporate wind-up.

The Court of Appeal granted the motions to quash, finding that the order was interlocutory because it was a step in implementing the wind-up and sale process, not a final determination of substantive rights.

Furthermore, the Court held that the order was made pursuant to the Business Corporations Act, meaning any appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

The Ontario Securities Commission appealed the acquittal of Stephan Katmarian on four counts of securities violations related to the promotion of Peblik Inc., a cryptocurrency token purportedly backed by the Thierry Mine.

The trial judge acquitted Katmarian on all counts.

On appeal, the Superior Court allowed the appeal on Count 1 (fraud), finding the trial judge erred in law regarding the element of deprivation by requiring proof of detrimental reliance rather than risk of deprivation.

The Court dismissed the appeals on Counts 2 (misleading statements to the Commission), 3 (unregistered trading in securities), and 4 (distribution without prospectus).

The Court entered a conviction on Count 1 and remanded for sentencing.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal a decision of Conway J. dated April 4, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $10,000 to each of the responding parties, Sheldon Libfeld and Jay Libfeld.

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision awarding a former executive unpaid vacation pay, deferred bonuses, and the value of lost stock options.

The employer argued the motion judge erred in granting the relief, in finding that issue estoppel barred its just cause defence, and in determining the matter via summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the evidence or his conclusion that the just cause defence was barred by issue estoppel following the earlier dismissal of the employer's counterclaim under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

This appeal concerned a dispute over the exercise of options to purchase commercial properties.

The purchase price was to be the midpoint of two appraisals, which were widely divergent.

The Tenant (purchaser) tendered only the amount of its own appraisal, holding the disputed balance in trust with its solicitor, which the Landlord (vendor) refused to accept.

The application judge found the tender sufficient and ordered specific performance.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the Tenant's partial tender constituted a material breach of the purchase and sale contract.

The court found that a purchaser cannot unilaterally withhold a portion of the purchase price, even if disputed, and that the "abatement cases" relied upon by the lower court were distinguishable.

The Tenant's cross-appeal regarding the validity of the Landlord's appraisal was dismissed.

The options were declared null and void, and vacant possession was ordered for the Landlord.

This endorsement addresses the respondent's attempt to file a factum in an appeal that exceeded the prescribed length and included unauthorized schedules, leading to its refusal by court registry staff.

The judge, while affirming the registry's decision for non-compliance, granted the respondent leave to file the factum (after a minor reduction) due to the imminent appeal hearing.

To ensure procedural fairness, the appellant was also granted leave to file a reply factum of a specified length.

The judge also used the opportunity to advocate for a rule change to permit reply factums as of right in appeals.

Ontario appealed from the Court of Appeal's decision concerning the Robinson Treaties of 1850, which contained an Augmentation Clause providing for periodic increases to annual payments to the Anishinaabe of Lake Huron and Lake Superior contingent on economic conditions.

The annuities had been frozen at $4 per person since 1875.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that treaty interpretation is reviewable on a correctness standard, and adopted the fourth interpretation of the Augmentation Clause: the annuity is a single payment to the 'Chiefs and their Tribes', with mandatory increases to $4 per person where economic conditions permit, and discretionary increases beyond $4.

The Crown's discretion is not unfettered; it must be exercised diligently, honourably, liberally, and justly, consistently with the honour of the Crown.

No specific fiduciary duties arose in respect of the Augmentation Clause, but the duty of diligent implementation did.

The breach of treaty claims were not statute-barred.

The appeals were allowed in part, cross-appeals dismissed, and a declaration issued directing the Crown to engage in time-bound negotiations with the Superior plaintiffs regarding compensation for past breaches.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

The plaintiff, a former employee, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for unpaid vacation, deferred bonuses, and stock options.

The court found that the plaintiff was not constructively dismissed but had retired.

However, the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the claims for unused vacation pay, deferred bonuses, and the value of lost stock options, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial for these claims.

The defendant's counterclaim for just cause dismissal had been previously dismissed by the Court of Appeal, and the current court found issue estoppel applied to prevent its re-litigation as a defense.

Following the settlement of the main class proceeding, the defendant and third party plaintiff brought a consent motion to dismiss the third party claims against the remaining third parties.

The court granted the order dismissing the third party action with prejudice and without costs.

The appellants sought to appeal the dismissal of their motion to stay the action and, for one appellant, the trial judgment finding conspiracy, joint and several liability, disgorgement of profits, and punitive damages.

The trial judge had found that a former supervisory employee breached his fiduciary duty by securing construction work for his own companies, accruing over $10 million in profits, and that his common-law wife was deeply involved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no basis for appellate intervention.

The court held that the appeal of the stay motion dismissal was not properly before it due to a failure to appeal the original order within the prescribed deadline.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the conspiracy and disgorgement.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following a successful Rule 137.1 motion.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs of $273,111.22, which the respondent argued was excessive.

The court affirmed the statutory presumption under Rule 137.1(7) for full indemnity costs for a successful moving party, finding the award appropriate given the respondent's unsubstantiated $150 million counterclaim.

The court fixed costs at the amount claimed by the appellant.

The appellant, an employee, sued for wrongful dismissal.

The respondent counterclaimed for $150 million alleging breach of fiduciary duties.

The appellant moved to dismiss the counterclaim under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP), to dismiss it under r. 21 as frivolous/vexatious, for leave to amend his Statement of Claim for deferred bonuses, and for summary judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion and the leave to amend, and deferred the other motions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in interpreting "arises from" too narrowly for the anti-SLAPP motion, and that the counterclaim lacked substantial merit and valid defences.

The Court also found the motion judge erred in deferring the r. 21 and summary judgment motions, and in refusing leave to amend the Statement of Claim, as the bonus claim was an additional head of damages, not a new cause of action.

The counterclaim was dismissed, the amendment allowed, and the summary judgment motion returned to the lower court.

This costs endorsement followed grouped appeals concerning a wind-up order.

The appeals brought by Mark Libfeld and Corey Libfeld regarding the exclusion of the Shanontown transaction were unsuccessful.

The appeals brought by Jay Libfeld and Sheldon Libfeld concerning a procedural provision in the wind-up order were successful.

Consequently, Jay Libfeld and Sheldon Libfeld were entitled to costs from Mark Libfeld and Corey Libfeld.

The court found the amounts sought by Jay and Sheldon to be excessive due to duplication of materials and disproportionality to the necessary work for the appeals, and ordered a reduced costs schedule.

Four brothers who equally owned a complex real estate development partnership experienced a complete breakdown in their business relationship, leading to a court-ordered wind-up and sale of the business.

Two brothers appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude a specific real estate transaction from the wind-up order, arguing breach of fiduciary duty.

The other two brothers appealed a provision in the judgment requiring them to certify compliance with the wind-up and disclosure orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding the excluded transaction, deferring to the trial judge's factual findings that it was conducted outside the partnership.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the certification provision, striking it on the basis that requiring certification of vague obligations in a highly hostile environment would unfairly expose the parties to unwarranted contempt proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Glustein J. dated August 8, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The moving parties were ordered to pay $5,000 in all-inclusive costs to the responding parties.

The appellant landlord appealed a judgment that declared its lease termination invalid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the landlord's notice of termination was invalid because it failed to specify the precise amount of arrears and did not warn the tenant of the intention to terminate, which was required due to prior communications only mentioning interest accrual.

The court also upheld the costs award from the lower court and awarded costs for the appeal to the respondent.

The appellant landowner sued a municipality alleging constructive taking of approximately 965 acres of vacant land, claiming the municipality's refusal to initiate a secondary planning process — combined with alleged encouragement of public use of the lands as a park — amounted to a de facto expropriation without compensation.

The majority (5-4) held that the CPR test for constructive taking requires only that a public authority acquire a 'beneficial interest' understood broadly as an 'advantage' (not necessarily a proprietary interest), and that the municipality's intention may be a relevant material fact.

The majority restored the motion judge's order allowing the constructive taking claim to proceed to trial, finding genuine issues of material fact.

The four dissenting justices would have dismissed the appeal, holding that CPR requires acquisition of a proprietary interest and that intention is irrelevant to the de facto taking analysis.