Anthony Francis Dale

This costs endorsement follows the granting of an interlocutory injunction to restrain a blockade at the applicant’s premises.

The court considered written submissions on costs and, applying the relevant legal principles and factors, ordered the respondents to pay the applicant $14,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The decision reviews the purposes of costs, proportionality, and the appropriateness of awarding costs forthwith after an interlocutory injunction, referencing relevant case law and statutory provisions.

The court granted an interlocutory injunction to Titan Tool & Die Limited, restraining Unifor, its Local 195, and named individuals from blockading the applicant’s premises and obstructing the removal of customer-owned tooling.

The decision addresses whether the dispute was a “labour dispute” under the Courts of Justice Act, the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised, and the application of the RJR-MacDonald test for interlocutory injunctions.

The court found the protest was not a labour dispute, that the requirements for an injunction were met even if it were, and that the balance of convenience, irreparable harm, and serious issue to be tried all favoured granting the injunction.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

Premier Implementation Solutions Canada Inc. sought an urgent interim injunction against Unifor, Local 222, to prevent obstruction of ingress and egress at Del Monte Fresh Produce (Canada) Corp. premises during a lawful strike.

Premier argued that Unifor's actions constituted unlawful picketing and nuisance, causing irreparable harm due to spoilage of fresh produce and potential loss of clients.

Unifor challenged the motion on grounds of union suability, failure to name individuals, and Premier's standing.

The court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to Premier and Del Monte, and that the balance of convenience favored Premier, as the injunction only prevented unlawful obstruction, not lawful picketing.

Yellow Corporation, as Foreign Representative for itself and its Canadian affiliates (the Canadian Debtors), brought a motion under section 49 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) to recognize and enforce various orders (U.S. Orders) issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in their Chapter 11 proceedings.

The motion, which was unopposed, sought to preserve the value of the Canadian Debtors and business during the wind-down and sale efforts.

The court granted the motion, finding it necessary for the protection of the debtors' property and creditors' interests, and consistent with principles of comity and public policy.

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

The applicant union sought an extension of time to bring an application for judicial review of an arbitral award that dismissed grievances regarding the discharge of employees who could not complete a new job rotation due to disabilities.

The application was brought more than eight months after the award, well beyond the 30-day time limit in section 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court denied the extension of time under section 5(2), holding that the court retains discretion to consider the length of and explanation for the delay, and found the applicant's delay was lengthy and unexplained, and the grounds for relief were weak.

The appellant union appealed an injunction granted during a labour dispute that had enjoined a blockade of the employer's premises.

The union had admitted the illegality of their actions and irreparable harm.

The appeal argued that the injunction's terms unnecessarily restrained lawful strike activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the underlying dispute had been settled.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding the motion judge's decision was fact-specific and did not raise questions of public importance beyond the resolved dispute.

The plaintiff, Metro Ontario Inc., sought an interim injunction against the defendants, Unifor and its Local 414, and individual picketers, to restrain unlawful interference with its operations during a labour dispute.

The court granted an interim order, setting specific conditions for picketing, including limitations on vehicle delays at premises entrances and prohibitions on impeding emergency vehicles, security personnel, pedestrians, and access to a specific Food Basics store.

The motion was adjourned for further hearing.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award finding it had violated a collective agreement by ceasing to produce engine blocks at its Windsor plant.

The arbitrator had interpreted a 'sole source' clause in a Memorandum of Settlement, concluding the employer could not move the work simply because production volumes fell below projections.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's interpretation was reasonable, properly considered the context of the negotiations, and did not violate the parol evidence rule.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed its grievance regarding the respondent employer's decision to close its Windsor plant.

The union argued that the plant closure violated a 'sole sourcing' promise made by the employer in exchange for wage concessions.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable because it relied on an improper inference drawn from rejected proposed contract language, failing to consider the overall context of the negotiations.

The application was granted, the arbitrator's decision was quashed, and the grievance was remitted back to the arbitrator for a fresh determination.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of the Ontario Labour Relations Board's decision dismissing its objection to the certification of a union.

The employer argued the union discriminated on the basis of age in its constitution and other collective agreements, violating s. 15 of the Labour Relations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's interpretation of s. 15 was reasonable and that procedural fairness was not breached when the Board dismissed the objection without an oral hearing.

The applicant employee was terminated for theft of time.

His union grieved the termination, but the arbitrator upheld the discharge.

The union did not seek judicial review.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review on his own behalf.

The employer brought a motion to dismiss the application for lack of standing.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the general rule of union exclusivity applied.

Although the collective agreement gave the employee the right to pursue arbitration independently, he did not exercise that right, and therefore could not claim standing under the exceptional circumstances doctrine.

The plaintiff, General Motors of Canada Company, sought an injunction to restrain the defendants, including Unifor Canada and several individuals, from obstructing access to its headquarters.

The defendants had established a blockade following GM's announcement of a plant closure.

The court applied the three-part test for injunctive relief in labour disputes, finding that while GM established a prima facie case of nuisance, it failed to demonstrate irreparable harm not compensable by damages.

The court also considered the balance of convenience, acknowledging the significant impact of GM's decisions on autoworkers' livelihoods.

Ultimately, the court declined to exercise its discretion to grant the injunction.

The applicant requested an adjournment of a summary hearing scheduled for December 16, 2015, to seek adequate representation.

The request was filed one week prior to the hearing, outside the 14-day period required by the Tribunal's Practice Direction.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that seeking additional time to retain a new representative late in the process did not constitute exceptional circumstances justifying an adjournment.

The applicant, who retired early due to a workplace injury, alleged that General Motors discriminated against him on the basis of disability by deducting his WSIB loss of earnings benefits from his early retirement pension benefits.

The applicant argued this was discriminatory because other early retirees who worked post-retirement were permitted to keep significant earned income without deduction.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the appropriate comparator group was other early retirees who do not work post-retirement.

Since both groups received the same bridging income amount, there was no adverse treatment and therefore no discrimination.

The applicant filed a human rights application against her union, alleging discrimination based on disability and age regarding the union's handling of her grievance and benefits appeal.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's complaints related to the quality of union representation and there was no evidence linking the union's actions to a prohibited ground under the Code.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant, an employee with permanent and temporary medical restrictions, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the employer's modified work program.

The Tribunal found that the 'four weeks on, eight weeks off' cycle and the refusal to allow the applicant to bump a more senior employee did not constitute discrimination.

However, the Tribunal found that the applicant experienced discrimination when he was unable to access income replacement benefits while sent home under the cycle, as well as from the operation of a '90 day rule' that caused him to lose ownership of his standard job, and a rule preventing him from bidding on temporary positions.

The employer was ordered to pay compensation for lost income, and both respondents were ordered jointly and severally to pay $7,500 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The appellants appealed from an order dismissing claims arising from the alleged creation of individual employment contracts after expiry of a collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal substantially agreed with the motion judge's reasons and held that the Employment Standards Act claim, advanced on the same contractual premise as the other claims, was no more tenable on the pleaded facts or in law.

The court noted that the motion judge had not determined any specific statutory entitlement under the Act.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondent.

The applicant sought to amend his human rights application regarding a modified work program to include allegations about events prior to October 2008 and after October 2009.

The Tribunal permitted the applicant to raise allegations from February 2008 onwards, finding they constituted a series of events under section 34 of the Code.

The Tribunal also allowed the amendment for the period from October 2009 to September 2011, as the new allegations were factually connected to the original application.