Nina Bombier

In a common issues trial arising from a certified class proceeding, the court held that a cosmetic surgery clinic and its physician-owner were negligent, breached fiduciary duties, and committed intrusion upon seclusion by operating surveillance cameras in consultation rooms, treatment rooms, pre- and post-operative areas, and the operating room without patient knowledge or consent.

The court rejected the submission that the cameras were justified as security measures, finding instead that they served the defendants’ self-protective interests and recorded highly private medical interactions for no medical purpose.

The court held that no trust relationship over the footage was established, but found vicarious liability and concluded that the intrusion upon seclusion claim could be determined on a class-wide basis using an objective standard.

Aggregate damages of $21,500,000 were awarded for intrusion upon seclusion, together with $1,000,000 in punitive damages, while negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims requiring proof of individual harm were left for further process.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a $200 million action against the provincial Crown, the Secretary of the Cabinet, a hospital, and various physicians, alleging medical malpractice and abuse of power.

The Crown requested a dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim against the government defendants lacked any legal basis or material facts, and the claim against the other defendants was an abuse of process as it duplicated an existing action.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

During a class action trial involving cosmetic surgery patients and allegations related to social media consent forms, the defendants called a witness and sought to qualify him as an expert in eDiscovery document collection and retention.

The plaintiffs objected on the basis that the witness lacked independence and impartiality, having blindly followed counsel's instructions and failed to ensure compliance with PHIPA.

The court ruled that the proposed evidence was factual in nature rather than expert opinion, as the witness was simply explaining the steps he took and the data he extracted from electronic medical records.

Since the evidence was factual and not presumptively inadmissible opinion evidence, the court did not need to address the impartiality objections, but noted that cross-examination on those issues could be relevant to the weight of the evidence.

The plaintiff, Xuan Wu, underwent a Brazilian Butt Lift at the Toronto Cosmetic Surgery Institute and subsequently developed a significant infection.

She sued Dr. Martin Jugenburg and his clinic, alleging that she did not provide informed consent because she was not made aware of the risk of infection.

The court found that informed consent was properly obtained through a series of consultations and written materials, and that the process met the legal standard.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

The Insurers brought a motion for a declaration that the "Prior Acts Exclusion" in their Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance policies barred coverage for a claim asserted against Just Energy's D&Os.

The claim, filed by a representative plaintiff in a class action, sought unpaid wages and benefits from a period prior to Just Energy's Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) filing.

The court found the Prior Acts Exclusion to be clear and unambiguous.

It determined that the exclusion applied to acts or omissions committed by anyone prior to the CCAA filing date, and that this interpretation was consistent with the commercial context of the policies, which were intended to cover post-filing D&O liability during insolvency.

The court concluded that applying the exclusion did not nullify the policy's main purpose or contradict the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The Insurers' motion was granted, and the representative plaintiff's request for relief against the Insurers was denied.

The plaintiff in a complex family trust dispute brought motions on the eve of trial for further documentary production, further examinations for discovery, and leave to amend her Statement of Claim.

The motions sought to introduce new allegations that the defendants covered up and settled claims of sexual misconduct against the family patriarch, Frank Stronach.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no evidence that the requested documents existed, that the new allegations were irrelevant to the pleaded claims of corporate mismanagement, and that amending the pleadings three weeks before a scheduled seven-week trial would cause non-compensable prejudice and delay.

Ontario appealed from the Court of Appeal's decision concerning the Robinson Treaties of 1850, which contained an Augmentation Clause providing for periodic increases to annual payments to the Anishinaabe of Lake Huron and Lake Superior contingent on economic conditions.

The annuities had been frozen at $4 per person since 1875.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that treaty interpretation is reviewable on a correctness standard, and adopted the fourth interpretation of the Augmentation Clause: the annuity is a single payment to the 'Chiefs and their Tribes', with mandatory increases to $4 per person where economic conditions permit, and discretionary increases beyond $4.

The Crown's discretion is not unfettered; it must be exercised diligently, honourably, liberally, and justly, consistently with the honour of the Crown.

No specific fiduciary duties arose in respect of the Augmentation Clause, but the duty of diligent implementation did.

The breach of treaty claims were not statute-barred.

The appeals were allowed in part, cross-appeals dismissed, and a declaration issued directing the Crown to engage in time-bound negotiations with the Superior plaintiffs regarding compensation for past breaches.

The respondents, facing multiple class actions related to the manufacture and distribution of opioids over a 20-year period, sought coverage for defence costs from their successive primary and excess liability insurers.

The application judge allowed the respondents to select a single primary insurer to fund the entire defence, permitted the exhaustion of self-insured retentions (SIRs) using payments from other insurers, granted relief from forfeiture for pre-tender defence costs, and required insurers to sign a Defence Reporting Agreement (DRA) to receive privileged defence information.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurers' appeals in part, holding that defence costs must be allocated on a pro rata time-on-risk basis, that the insureds must exhaust each applicable SIR before an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, and that relief from forfeiture was unavailable for pre-tender costs.

The Court upheld the DRA requirement for insurers seeking to associate in the defence to mitigate reasonable apprehensions of conflict of interest.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

The court addressed two pretrial motions: one seeking to stay a counterclaim based on abuse of process due to delayed disclosure of a cooperation agreement, and another seeking leave for third-party discovery.

The motion to stay was dismissed, as the immediate disclosure rule for settlement agreements was found not to apply to agreements with non-parties.

The motion for third-party discovery was granted, with the court finding the non-party's evidence critical and that the cooperation agreement constituted a constructive refusal to provide information, making a pretrial examination necessary for trial fairness.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce an "Outline of Terms of Settlement" reached during mediation, arguing it constituted a binding agreement.

The defendants contended that the Outline was not intended to be enforceable and lacked essential terms.

The court found that the Outline did not objectively reflect a mutual intention to create a binding agreement and that numerous material issues, including debt reallocation, minority shareholder rights, and tax implications of asset transfers, remained unresolved.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing that it cannot create a contract for parties where essential terms are missing.

The plaintiff, Zorida Chrysostom, brought a medical negligence action against the defendant physicians and health system, alleging failure to diagnose cauda equina syndrome during her emergency department visit.

The court found that two defendant physicians, Dr. Mann and Dr. Kempenaar, fell below the standard of care by failing to adequately inquire about and document saddle anaesthesia, a cardinal symptom of cauda equina syndrome.

The court also concluded, on a balance of probabilities, that the plaintiff did suffer from cauda equina syndrome at the time of the initial visit, which would have necessitated earlier emergency surgery and improved her outcome.

Damages were agreed upon, and the judgment focused on liability.

The Applicants sought costs following a partial success in an application concerning insurance coverage, specifically the duty to defend and equitable allocation among insurers.

The court awarded full indemnity costs to the Applicants against AIG and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada (RSA) for the duty to defend issue, finding the Applicants overwhelmingly successful on that point.

Costs related to the exhaustion of self-insured retentions (SIRs)/deductibles were deferred to a future trial of the issue, as neither party fully succeeded.

Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. was ordered to pay reduced costs due to its partial success on a specific "Single Retention Endorsement" interpretation.

The defendants in two related actions sought orders to compel the plaintiffs, Andrew Stronach and Selena Stronach, to undergo medical examinations to assess their mental capacities for the purpose of determining if litigation guardians were required.

The court dismissed the motion against Selena Stronach, finding insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity.

The motion against Andrew Stronach was dismissed without prejudice, as the court found it premature and suggested other discovery avenues should be pursued first.

The court also declined to order production of video recordings of Andrew's examination for discovery.

The applicants sought declarations concerning insurers’ duty to defend multiple opioid class actions, the insureds’ right to select a single defending policy, allocation of defence costs, exhaustion of SIRs and deductibles, and the terms on which insurers could receive defence-side reporting.

The court held that, subject to exhaustion of the relevant SIRs or deductibles, each applicant could select any single policy under which there was a duty to defend, and the selected insurer was required to pay all reasonable defence costs associated with covered claims even if those costs also furthered uncovered claims.

Time-on-risk allocation was accepted only as an equitable mechanism among insurers with concurrent obligations, not as a basis to reduce contractual defence obligations owed to the insureds.

The court further held that pre-tender defence costs could attract relief from forfeiture, that disputed SIR exhaustion issues required a trial, and that insurers seeking privileged defence-side reporting had to maintain robust ethical screens through a defence reporting agreement because both party-based and coverage-based conflicts were present.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking out portions of their statements of defence.

The impugned pleadings referred to documents and communications from a judicial mediation, which the motion judge found were prima facie protected by settlement privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly applied Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court affirmed that the respondents had not waived settlement privilege and that the justice of the case did not require an exception to allow the appellants to plead the privileged information to defend against breach of fiduciary duty claims.