Nina Bombier

The appellant insurer issued a comprehensive general liability policy to the respondent insured.

The insured was sued for wrongful dismissal, including allegations of intentional racial and age discrimination.

The insurer sought a declaration that it owed no duty to defend the discrimination claims.

The application judge ruled the insurer was required to provide a defence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the fortuity principle of insurance law dictates that liability policies only cover accidental or fortuitous losses.

Because the underlying claims alleged intentional discrimination, they fell outside the scope of the policy, and the insurer had no duty to defend.

Following the release of the appeal judgment, the appellants requested clarification on the effect of the judgment on two aspects of the trial judge's order for interest.

The Court of Appeal clarified that interest on the respondents' share of Vicbir's RDTOH remains at 6% per annum from January 1, 2001.

The Court also clarified that interest on the share of sums payable to one of the respondents should be calculated on the net amount owing after deducting the sum she owed for reacquired shares.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found oppressive conduct in the management of a family holding company and ordered the corporation to purchase the respondents' shares for cancellation.

The trial judge devised a valuation formula that included an unequal distribution of the corporation's capital dividend account to compensate the respondents for their share of the refundable dividend tax on hand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of oppression or his general valuation approach.

However, the Court allowed the respondents' cross-appeal in part, correcting a mathematical error in the trial judge's tax account formula to ensure the respondents were fully compensated for their pro rata share of the refundable dividend tax on hand.

The appellant physician appealed a disciplinary decision of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

In this partial dissent, Greer J. disagreed with the majority's decision to uphold the Complaints Committee's finding of incompetence.

Greer J. concluded that while the physician may have been negligent or shown a serious lack of judgment regarding record-keeping and boundary issues, his conduct did not meet the statutory definition of incompetence under the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, as there was no evidence he was unfit to continue practicing.

The appellant psychiatrist appealed a finding of incompetence and the subsequent penalty imposed by the discipline committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The committee found the appellant incompetent due to severe deficiencies in record keeping and poor judgment in treating complex psychiatric patients.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of incompetence, noting the committee's specialized expertise and the cumulative effect of the appellant's conduct.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding penalty, finding the 30-month suspension and strict practice restrictions excessive.

The Court substituted a less restrictive penalty involving video monitoring, a full-time secretary, and practice supervision.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the contract regarding liability.

The Court also agreed that cross-examination was not necessary on the issue of mitigation of damages, as the evidence was not solely available to the plaintiff.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

On an appeal in a life insurance coverage dispute, the court considered whether a policy covering death by “accidental means” was narrower than coverage for “accidental death”.

The court held the phrases have essentially the same meaning and both turn on whether death was unexpected, with the central inquiry being whether the insured expected to die.

Where the insured’s actual expectation is unclear, the court may consider whether a reasonable person in the insured’s position would have expected death.

Applying that approach, the court found the overdose resulted from a miscalculation rather than an expected death, and upheld coverage under the accidental death benefit provision.

The applicant physician sought a stay of an order of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario pending his appeal.

The Committee had found him guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence, imposing a 30-month suspension and practice restrictions.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay, finding a serious issue regarding the proportionality of the penalty, irreparable harm due to the ongoing suspension and professional damage, and that the balance of convenience favoured a conditional stay.

The stay was granted on the same terms, conditions, and limitations that the Discipline Committee had ordered for his return to practice.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from a perforated bowel suffered during a colonoscopy and polypectomy.

They argued the trial judge erred by failing to determine the exact cause of the injury before concluding the standard of care was met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly rejected the appellants' theory that the electrocautery machine was set too high, and reasonably concluded the injury resulted from an inherent risk of the procedure.

The appellant challenged a deficiency judgment arising from repossession and sale of a replacement boat delivered after the original financed boat proved deficient.

The Court of Appeal held that the replacement vessel was not "proceeds" within the meaning of the Personal Property Security Act, but concluded that the parties, by their conduct over several years, modified the original conditional sale contract so that it applied to the replacement boat.

As a result, the secured creditor was entitled to repossess the replacement boat after default and sue for the deficiency.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order striking part of its statement of claim that sought a declaration that the respondent airport authority lacked jurisdiction to impose fees and charges on airport users.

The court held it was unnecessary to resolve the pleaded delegation and Crown-operation issues because the respondent's authority arose from its leasehold interest and corporate capacity, as recognized by the applicable federal legislation and regulations.

The court further held Parliament did not intend to create a complete code restricting airport user charges to those set by ministerial regulation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.