Alex Smith

The court addressed two pretrial motions: one seeking to stay a counterclaim based on abuse of process due to delayed disclosure of a cooperation agreement, and another seeking leave for third-party discovery.

The motion to stay was dismissed, as the immediate disclosure rule for settlement agreements was found not to apply to agreements with non-parties.

The motion for third-party discovery was granted, with the court finding the non-party's evidence critical and that the cooperation agreement constituted a constructive refusal to provide information, making a pretrial examination necessary for trial fairness.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce an "Outline of Terms of Settlement" reached during mediation, arguing it constituted a binding agreement.

The defendants contended that the Outline was not intended to be enforceable and lacked essential terms.

The court found that the Outline did not objectively reflect a mutual intention to create a binding agreement and that numerous material issues, including debt reallocation, minority shareholder rights, and tax implications of asset transfers, remained unresolved.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing that it cannot create a contract for parties where essential terms are missing.

The defendants in two related actions sought orders to compel the plaintiffs, Andrew Stronach and Selena Stronach, to undergo medical examinations to assess their mental capacities for the purpose of determining if litigation guardians were required.

The court dismissed the motion against Selena Stronach, finding insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity.

The motion against Andrew Stronach was dismissed without prejudice, as the court found it premature and suggested other discovery avenues should be pursued first.

The court also declined to order production of video recordings of Andrew's examination for discovery.

The plaintiffs, Andrew and Selena Stronach, brought motions to strike out portions of the defendants' Fresh as Amended Statements of Defence under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs argued that the impugned pleadings improperly referenced documents and communications that were subject to settlement privilege arising from a confidential judicial mediation.

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had waived privilege or that an exception applied based on the justice of the case.

The court found that the mediation was subject to settlement privilege, the plaintiffs had not waived the privilege, and no exception applied.

The court granted the motions to strike the pleadings relating to the mediation.

The court also struck out portions of one defendant's pleading as scandalous, but dismissed a motion to require another defendant to reinstate a withdrawn admission.

The plaintiffs, Andrew and Selena Stronach, sought leave to amend their respective statements of claim in two related actions concerning the management of the Stronach family business and trusts.

The defendants, including Belinda Stronach, opposed the amendments on several grounds, primarily arguing that references to a May 2020 Agreement were barred by settlement privilege.

The court found that the defendants failed to prove the May 2020 Agreement was intended to be kept confidential, and alternatively, that any privilege had been waived or an exception applied.

The court also rejected arguments that the amendments improperly withdrew admissions or were scandalous and vexatious.

Leave to amend the pleadings was granted.

The applicants sought declaratory relief to prevent the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) from terminating their Feed-in Tariff (FIT) Contracts for failing to achieve commercial operation by the required milestone date.

The applicants argued that estoppel by convention applied based on a shared assumption that the IESO would grant an 18-month extension.

The court dismissed the application, finding no manifest representation by the IESO to establish a shared assumption, and noted that the entire agreement and waiver clauses in the contracts precluded reliance on past practices.

The applicants, solar power project developers, sought a declaration that the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) did not have the right to terminate their Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) contracts for failing to achieve commercial operation by the Milestone Date for Commercial Operation (MCOD).

The IESO had previously waived this right but issued a warning letter revoking past waivers following a government directive to wind down pre-construction energy contracts.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation and found that the FIT contracts, which included a 'time is of the essence' clause, unambiguously granted the IESO the right to terminate for failure to meet the MCOD.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought motions to discontinue the action against an individual defendant, to certify the action as a class proceeding, and for partial summary judgment.

The court approved the discontinuance as it did not prejudice the class and secured the corporate defendant's consent to certification.

The court certified the class action against the remaining defendants, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action under the Consumer Protection Act and Competition Act, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the nature of the relationship between the defendants and the interpretation of the statutory provisions raised genuine issues requiring a full trial.

A lawyer and human rights advocate sued for defamation after a charitable organization published articles accusing him of supporting terrorists.

The plaintiff had met with the father of an alleged Palestinian terrorist, expressed sympathy for the father whose home was demolished, and posted about the matter on social media.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action as a SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the defendant had valid defences of fair comment, justification, and qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in applying the wrong legal standard and that the plaintiff had met his burden under section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) by showing a reasonable trier could conclude none of the defences would succeed.

The court also found the balancing test under section 137.1(4)(b) favoured the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to extend the time for service of their statement of claim and to validate service, after serving the claim approximately six months past the deadline.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the delay was tactical and prejudiced their ability to defend the action.

The court applied the test from Rowland v. Wright Medical Technology Canada Ltd., finding that the plaintiffs met their onus to demonstrate no prejudice resulted from the brief delay, as relevant documents were preserved and witnesses remained available.

The motion was granted, service was validated, and the plaintiffs were awarded costs of $10,000.

Kristine Jill Hill was found in contempt of a June 28, 2017 order.

This endorsement addresses the sentencing, which included a joint submission, and the quantum of full indemnity costs to be paid by Ms. Hill as part of her sentence.

The court considered principles of reasonableness, indemnity, and factors under Rule 57.01 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found the matter complex, noted unnecessary steps taken by the defendants, and ultimately awarded the plaintiffs the requested costs of $320,899.64.

The applicant political party brought an application and motion for an interlocutory injunction against the respondent member and his campaigns, alleging unauthorized use of the party's confidential membership list to send emails criticizing the party leader.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to dismiss the application under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the proceeding arose from expression on a matter of public interest (political debate), the applicant failed to show its claims had substantial merit and no valid defence existed, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former associate lawyer, brought a motion to consolidate her wrongful dismissal action against her former employer with a subsequent libel action against the employer and their legal counsel.

The libel action arose from comments made by the employer's counsel to a legal publication regarding the wrongful dismissal pleadings.

The court dismissed the motion to consolidate, finding that doing so would likely force the defendants' counsel to step down due to conflicts of interest and risk breaching solicitor-client privilege.

Instead, the court ordered a stay of the libel action pending the resolution of the wrongful dismissal action.

The defendant tobacco companies brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' proposed class actions as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached their contracts by participating in smuggling duty-free tobacco back into Canada, avoiding higher domestic prices.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the alleged smuggling long before commencing the actions in 2009 and 2010.

The court dismissed the motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiffs discovered the constituent elements of their claims, particularly given the defendants' consistent denials of involvement in smuggling.

The Crown applied for a mistrial after the trial judge engaged in an off‑the‑record conversation with the officer‑in‑charge about matters related to the case following the release of guilty verdicts but before sentencing.

The judge acknowledged the conversation occurred in chambers without counsel present and related to a website mentioned in the evidence, though no information about the complainant had been obtained.

While the judge maintained the ability to disregard any information received, the court concluded that the conversation created a reasonable apprehension of bias affecting the perceived fairness of the process.

Given that the court was not functus officio regarding counts awaiting sentence, the judge exercised the authority to vacate the adjudications of guilt prior to sentencing.

A mistrial was ordered and the guilty findings were set aside.

In complex estate and commercial litigation arising from estate planning transactions and a will that effectively disinherited family members, the plaintiffs sought leave to further amend their statement of claim to add allegations of knowing assistance in breach of trust and fiduciary duty against an accountant and additional particulars against other defendants.

Several defendants opposed the amendment on the basis of prejudice and limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure leave to amend should be granted unless non-compensable prejudice would result, and that disputes about discoverability and limitation periods should be determined by the trial judge on a full evidentiary record.

As discoveries were ongoing and trial remained more than a year away, any prejudice could be addressed through costs.

Leave to amend was granted with costs awarded to certain defendants for prejudice arising from the amendments.