Timothy D. Ray

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent, Mayor of Belleville, breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by participating in a council debate and voting on a highway improvement project in which he had a pecuniary interest.

The court found that the respondent did breach the Act by voting on the project, which involved the acquisition of property owned by a company in which he held shares.

However, the court applied the saving provision under section 10(2) of the Act, finding that the contravention was committed through an honest error in judgment, and therefore declined to remove the respondent from office.

These supplementary reasons address procedural matters following a prior decision (2017 ONSC 3134).

The court was asked for written submissions regarding the form of judgment.

Following the respondent's death, the applicant requested an extension of time for submissions to allow the respondent's estate to become involved and for an order to continue the proceeding against the estate.

The court granted a 45-day extension for submissions and clarified that it was not seized of the matter for settling the final judgment, allowing another judge or the Registrar to complete it if the reconstituted parties agree.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the defendant, A.A.G., who was convicted of multiple sexual assaults and other violent offences against his stepchildren and their mother.

The defence argued for a long-term supervision order.

The court, after considering expert psychiatric opinions and the defendant's extensive criminal history, found that the defendant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to a pattern of repetitive violent and sexual behaviour, high risk of recidivism, and lack of genuine willingness for treatment.

The court declined to impose a long-term offender designation, concluding that there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

This decision addresses costs following an application where the applicant was granted a prescriptive easement, though in narrower terms than initially sought.

The applicant requested substantial indemnity costs of over $72,000, while the respondents sought partial indemnity costs of over $21,000, each claiming to be the successful party.

The court found the applicant's costs claim "breath-taking" and disproportionate to the modest value of the property and the limited scope of the argument.

Considering that the applicant sought an unlimited right-of-way but received an order reflecting only occasional use, and the respondents had not offered to formalize this occasional use, the court determined that neither party was entirely successful in their costs positions.

The applicant sought spousal support, equalization of net family property (NFP), security for NFP, transfer of a life insurance policy, and a restraining order.

The respondent disputed spousal support liability and asset valuations.

The court granted a divorce, cancelled spousal support arrears and found an overpayment by the respondent, continued a restraining order against the respondent, and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant $60,688.10 for NFP equalization after adjustments.

The parties were directed to provide submissions on the form of the final order for asset division.

The applicant sought a prescriptive easement over the respondents' property to access her landlocked property.

The court found that the applicant established the necessary elements for a prescriptive easement, specifically for pedestrian use, limited to a maximum of twice per year, for a 20-year period commencing in 1979.

The respondents were ordered to provide the applicant with a key or other means to open the gate to enjoy her access.

The defendant, facing drug trafficking and criminal organization charges, brought a mid-trial application for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of wiretap evidence, alleging a breach of Crown disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe and ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The issue concerned whether Monitor Post Reports (MPRs) alone constituted sufficient disclosure of wiretap intercepts, or if all audio recordings were required, and whether the disclosure method was misleading.

The court found that while the Crown did not wilfully breach its obligations, the disclosure method was insufficient due to a lack of clear explanation regarding the relationship between the MPRs and the disclosed audio recordings.

Despite some lack of diligence by defence counsel, the court determined that the defendant's trial fairness rights were compromised.

Given the extensive time required for the defence to review the newly disclosed audio recordings and the judge's impending compulsory retirement, an adjournment was deemed impractical.

The court granted a mistrial, allowing for a new trial where previous pretrial decisions and admitted evidence could be incorporated.

The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence under the Lobbying Act, challenging the legislation on grounds related to the English Bill of Rights, freedom of expression under the Charter, and the interpretation of sections 5 and 7 of the Act.

He also appealed the $20,000 fine as unfit.

The Superior Court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the Lobbying Act did not infringe the right to petition or freedom of expression, that section 5 correctly applied to the defendant as a consultant lobbyist, and that the sentence was fit.

The defendants moved to quash the plaintiffs' appeal from a Master's decision, arguing that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction and that the appeal should be heard by the Divisional Court.

The plaintiffs contended that the Courts of Justice Act was inapplicable due to their Indigenous status and sought an adjournment, which was denied.

The court granted the defendants' motion, quashing the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and awarded full indemnity costs to the successful defendants due to the unmeritorious nature of the appeal route chosen by the plaintiffs.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to strike portions of the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim.

The plaintiff's action was a product liability claim for damages following a vehicle crash.

The defendants argued that the amended portions, which introduced a defective ETCS-1 throttle control system module as the cause of the crash, constituted a new cause of action asserted after the two-year limitation period.

The court found that the module defect was indeed a new cause of action, not merely a particular of the original claim.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she could not have discovered the module defect through due diligence prior to the expiry of the limitation period, especially given her membership in a class proceeding where such issues were discussed.

Consequently, the motion was granted, and all portions of the Amended Statement of Claim referencing the module defect were struck.

This is a costs decision following the dismissal of a motion brought by the defendant Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company.

The plaintiff, Reggie Babcock, was found to be the successful party regarding costs, as the court's order for a defence medical and dismissal of the balance of Wawanesa's relief equalled or beat the plaintiff's offer to settle costs.

The court deemed Wawanesa's motion entirely unnecessary and attributed its necessity to Wawanesa's conduct.

The plaintiff was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $27,810.16, payable by Wawanesa.

The court assessed costs following successful summary judgment motions by Hydro One Network and Sarah McMillan and Andrew Cauty against the Datta and Khan plaintiffs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs for each of the two combined actions.

The court found the claims not excessive in principle but reduced the total amount to account for duplication of services across the two actions, which were treated as one.

Costs were assessed at $9,000 for Hydro One and $9,000 for McMillan and Cauty, to be split equally between the Datta and Khan plaintiffs.

The court noted that a complete indemnity award might have been considered had the plaintiffs' motives been argued, given the claims were entirely devoid of merit.

The offender, N.F., was found guilty of five counts of sexual offences against his granddaughter.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's young age, the breach of trust by the grandfather, and the long-term impact on the victim and family.

Mitigating factors such as the offender's age, health, and language difficulties were noted but not considered mitigating for the sentence itself.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, imposing a global sentence of three years imprisonment for the sexual offences, with concurrent terms for related counts and a conditional stay for others under the Kienapple principle.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, SOIRA order for life, weapons prohibition, and non-contact/prohibition orders.

The defendant Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company brought a motion seeking orders for the plaintiff to undergo several independent medical examinations (IMEs) in a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing delay and the need for leave under Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found Wawanesa did not require leave under Rule 48.04 as it had not set the action down for trial or consented to its placement on the trial list.

However, the court criticized Wawanesa's significant delay in seeking IMEs, noting its failure to list expert witnesses in pretrial briefs.

The motion for a neurological examination was granted with strict deadlines for report service, while requests for occupational therapy, otolaryngology, and psychiatric examinations were dismissed due to lack of evidence regarding their necessity or the plaintiff not relying on such evidence.

The Crown sought an extension of time to appeal the respondent's acquittal on a fraud charge.

The respondent moved to dismiss the Crown's application for non-compliance with appeal timelines.

The court applied the three-factor test for extending time: bona fide intention, explanation for delay, and merit of the appeal.

While the Crown demonstrated an intention to appeal, it failed to provide adequate explanations for significant delays in serving the notice of appeal, transcripts, and prosecuting the application.

The Crown also did not sufficiently establish the merit of the appeal.

The court found a lack of diligence from the Crown.

Consequently, the respondent's application to dismiss was granted, and the Crown's application for an extension of time was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with five counts related to theft, breaking and entering, and possession of stolen property for trafficking.

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence, including cell phone records, financial difficulties of the defendant, and inconsistencies in his statements to police.

The defendant denied the charges, claiming the coins sold were his own and that he was unaware of the theft at the time of initial sales.

The court found the defendant's evidence not credible and concluded that the only rational conclusion was his guilt based on the totality of circumstantial evidence.

Following a trial that determined the validity of a separation agreement, the court addressed costs.

The self-represented applicant sought full indemnity for all action costs, totaling $14,684.00.

The respondent argued for costs limited to the trial of the issue, suggesting $2,582.00.

The court awarded the applicant $3,000.00, inclusive of HST, for the costs related specifically to the trial of the issue, payable by the respondent within 90 days, noting that other costs could be sought in the overall resolution of the proceeding.

This trial determined the validity of a separation agreement signed by the parties on July 30, 2012.

The respondent sought to set aside the agreement, alleging lack of signature, improper witnessing, unfairness due to non-disclosure and overvaluation of assets, and undue influence.

The applicant relied on the agreement, asserting full financial disclosure and a fair process.

The court found the agreement valid, signed, and properly witnessed, noting the respondent's admission of signature and the witness's confirmation.

The respondent failed to establish non-disclosure, unfairness, or undue influence.

The court emphasized the policy of enforcing fairly negotiated "kitchen table" agreements where parties have openly exchanged information, even without legal counsel, unless there is clear evidence of improvidence or power imbalance.

The separation agreement was declared valid, and the parties were directed to resume their settlement conference for remaining issues.

The applicant sought an interim injunction and judicial review to overturn his disqualification from the position of Vice-President, Student Services for the Carleton University Students’ Association (CUSA) following an election.

The applicant had received the most votes but was disqualified due to alleged electoral offences by another student on his slate.

The court found that the Constitutional Board exceeded its jurisdiction by defining a new electoral offence that was not in force at the time of the election and by disqualifying the entire slate based on this expanded interpretation.

The court concluded that the electoral decisions were subject to judicial review and set aside the disqualification.

The defendant brought a motion seeking an order for the plaintiff to return jewellery upon payment of a Quebec default judgment, which had been recognized and ordered enforceable in Ontario.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it constituted a collateral attack on prior final judgments and an abuse of process, as the defendant had failed to appeal or vary any of the previous orders.