William Percy Halliday Procter

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a previous decision where the applicant's costs were directed to be payable from the Estate.

The applicant, the Estate Trustee, sought full indemnity costs under the Trustee Act, arguing the litigation was necessary for estate administration.

The respondent opposed, claiming the dispute was personal.

The court found the costs claimed by the applicant to be reasonable and ordered full indemnity costs of $10,814.50 to be paid out of the Estate, affirming the estate trustee's right to indemnification for reasonably incurred legal expenses.

This application concerned the administration of the Estate of Gary Frederick Sheffield.

The Estate Trustee, Katherine Markolefas, sought to sell the deceased's property, which was occupied by the respondent, Bradley Frederick Sheffield, a beneficiary.

The respondent argued he had a vested right to possession of the property.

The court ruled that the Estate Trustee had the discretion to sell the property to give effect to the gift, and ordered the respondent to vacate within 60 days and return any removed estate assets.

The Estate Trustee brought a motion for directions seeking payment declarations and orders for beneficiaries to provide documents and funds to pay estate debts.

The beneficiaries opposed, arguing lack of jurisdiction and seeking the Estate Trustee's removal due to alleged mismanagement.

The court dismissed both the Estate Trustee's motion, finding it an improper procedural mechanism for substantive relief, and the beneficiaries' application for removal, determining there was insufficient evidence to meet the high threshold for removing an estate trustee.

The defendant, Beverly MacPherson, held a second mortgage on a property.

The plaintiff, L-Jalco Holdings Inc., advanced funds to the mortgagor, Joseph Murano's company, which were used to pay out the first mortgage.

Prior to this refinancing, MacPherson had explicitly refused to postpone her mortgage.

L-Jalco's mortgage was subsequently registered in second priority.

L-Jalco initiated power of sale proceedings without notice to MacPherson, and the property was sold.

MacPherson signed a discharge believing the sale was in the ordinary course of business and she would be paid.

L-Jalco then sought equitable subrogation to assert first priority for the funds it advanced to pay out the original first mortgage and tax arrears.

MacPherson moved for summary judgment, arguing L-Jalco was aware of her prior charge and would be severely prejudiced.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing L-Jalco's action and allowing MacPherson's counterclaim, finding that L-Jalco knowingly took the risk of not addressing MacPherson's prior charge and that granting equitable subrogation would severely prejudice MacPherson.