George Edward Lloyd

This decision addresses the division of proceeds and adjustments following the partition and sale of jointly owned property at 7 Main Street, Odessa, Ontario.

The court considers the parties’ respective claims for adjustments, including occupation rent, reimbursement for expenses, and capital contributions.

The court orders that the respondent be reimbursed for half of his maintenance and repair costs, and that both parties share equally in increased mortgage interest payments since the mortgage expired.

The respondent is given 30 days to negotiate a buyout of the applicant’s interest, failing which the property will be listed for sale.

The court remains seized of the sale process to resolve any disputes.

The court considered an application under the Partition Act for the sale of a jointly owned property in Odessa, Ontario.

The applicant, Caralee Madelyn Paul, sought partition and sale of the property she co-owned with the respondent, Jeffrey Dean Baker.

The court reviewed the parties’ financial contributions, the trust agreement, and the circumstances of the property’s acquisition.

The court found that both parties were 50% beneficial owners and that the applicant was entitled to partition and sale, subject to accounting for contributions and adjustments.

The court rejected arguments based on resulting trust, unjust enrichment, and oppression, and set out a process for adjustments, potential buyout, and sale.

This ruling addresses costs arising from two related motions in a family law proceeding: a main motion for partition and sale of properties, and an urgent enforcement motion.

The applicant wife, Susan, was largely successful in both motions, securing orders for the sale of all four properties and the enforcement of a third-party purchase.

The respondent husband, William, resisted the sales and sought to purchase one property himself under complex terms.

The court found Susan's conduct reasonable and her success complete, having achieved a better outcome than her settlement offer.

While Susan sought full recovery, the court discounted her claimed hours for the main motion by 25% due to insufficient detail in her Bill of Costs and excluded time spent on negotiations for the enforcement motion, ultimately awarding her $58,308.00 in total costs.

This is a costs decision following a 5-day family law trial.

The court found the Applicant, Lynne Baribeau, to be the more successful party overall, despite mixed success on various issues including child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The Respondent, Marc Baribeau, had credibility issues regarding asset valuation, while the Applicant's involvement of children was problematic.

Considering factors such as party behavior, offers to settle, and the proportionality of fees, the court awarded the Applicant $25,000 in inclusive costs, rejecting the Respondent's assertion of inability to pay given his higher income.

The plaintiff, Robert Horne Halliday, brought a contested motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) over eleven lots on Wolfe Island, alleging that the defendants, Mike Bromley and The Wolfe Island Trust Inc., held these properties in a secret express, constructive, resulting, or implied trust for him.

Halliday claimed he provided the funds for the "purchase" of the properties and for their expenses, and that Bromley agreed to transfer them back.

The defendants denied any trust, asserting outright ownership and arguing Halliday's claims were fabricated and unsupported by written evidence or financial resources.

The court found that Halliday had established a triable issue of a reasonable claim to an interest in land, supported by affidavit evidence of cash transactions, witness testimony, and email correspondence from Bromley that appeared to acknowledge a trust.

The motion for a CPL was granted, and the defendants were ordered to pay costs.

The defendant, Beverly MacPherson, held a second mortgage on a property.

The plaintiff, L-Jalco Holdings Inc., advanced funds to the mortgagor, Joseph Murano's company, which were used to pay out the first mortgage.

Prior to this refinancing, MacPherson had explicitly refused to postpone her mortgage.

L-Jalco's mortgage was subsequently registered in second priority.

L-Jalco initiated power of sale proceedings without notice to MacPherson, and the property was sold.

MacPherson signed a discharge believing the sale was in the ordinary course of business and she would be paid.

L-Jalco then sought equitable subrogation to assert first priority for the funds it advanced to pay out the original first mortgage and tax arrears.

MacPherson moved for summary judgment, arguing L-Jalco was aware of her prior charge and would be severely prejudiced.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing L-Jalco's action and allowing MacPherson's counterclaim, finding that L-Jalco knowingly took the risk of not addressing MacPherson's prior charge and that granting equitable subrogation would severely prejudice MacPherson.

The plaintiff, Arnold Hennessy Holdings Inc., moved for summary judgment against Flapperless Inc. and Philip Hennessy for unpaid royalties under licensing agreements for "tip-tank" toilet technology.

The defendants argued the claim should be brought by Arnold Hennessy's estate, was statute-barred, and that an oral agreement amended the written contracts.

They also raised procedural issues regarding disclosure and counsel.

The court dismissed the defendants' preliminary objections and found Hennessy Holdings to be the proper plaintiff.

The action was deemed not statute-barred, as the plaintiff discovered the breach within the limitation period.

The court rejected the existence of an oral agreement to vary the written terms, finding Philip Hennessy's uncorroborated evidence insufficient.

While Philip Hennessy was a proper party, the court found no basis to pierce the corporate veil to hold him personally liable for Flapperless's financial obligations.

The plaintiff was granted judgment for unpaid royalties against Flapperless Inc. but denied a declaration seeking to enjoin the transfer of intellectual property to Philip Hennessy, as the transfer had already occurred upon Arnold Hennessy's death and damages were an adequate remedy.

The plaintiff brought a motion to establish a timetable for its summary judgment motion.

The defendants opposed, insisting on receiving the plaintiff's Affidavit of Documents first, citing Rule 30.03.

The court, referencing amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court guidance on summary judgment, ruled that an Affidavit of Documents is not a prerequisite in the absence of a discovery plan or when a summary judgment motion is pending.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, setting a timetable for the summary judgment proceedings and dismissing the defendants' objection.

The applicant sought leave under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to institute proceedings challenging prior family law orders and seeking damages for alleged fraud, abuse of process, and misconduct by the opposing party and counsel.

The applicant was subject to a vexatious proceedings order requiring leave of the court before commencing further proceedings.

The court held that the proposed motion lacked reasonable grounds and consisted largely of conclusory allegations of fraud unsupported by factual particulars.

The court also found that the applicant sought relief beyond what is permitted on a leave application under s. 140(4), including damages claims.

Leave to institute the proceeding was therefore refused and costs were awarded to the respondent.

Following an eight‑day family law trial involving a claim for unjust enrichment and claims for retroactive and ongoing child support, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant had served a written offer to settle before trial that was more favourable to the respondent than the ultimate result.

Applying rule 18.14 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that a strong presumption arises in favour of awarding full recovery of legal costs incurred after the offer where the opposing party fails to obtain a better result at trial.

The court found the hourly rate and time claimed by the applicant’s counsel to be reasonable and rejected arguments that the costs should be reduced.

Costs were fixed at $43,163.21 inclusive of fees, HST, and disbursements.