Helen MacLeod-Beliveau

The applicant, Gary Little, brought an application for habeas corpus which was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the respondent's request for costs.

The court found the habeas corpus application to be civil in nature, allowing for a costs award.

Considering it was Little's fourth failed habeas corpus application on related grounds and he had previously been warned about costs, the court exercised its discretion to award costs.

The respondent's claim for $11,101.87 was reduced to a nominal amount of $750.00, which the court found reasonable and proportionate, and ordered Little to pay this amount to the Attorney General of Canada.

This costs endorsement followed an application heard on November 25, 2019.

Counsel for both parties advised the court that they had reached an agreement regarding costs, stipulating that each party would bear their own costs of the Application.

The court issued an order reflecting this agreement.

The applicant sought a declaration that he held 100% interest in the matrimonial home by right of survivorship after his wife's death, arguing that her lawyer's failure to register a joint tenancy severance before her death rendered the severance ineffective.

The wife had instructed her lawyer to prepare a new will leaving her estate to her adult children and to sever the joint tenancy.

The lawyer prepared the necessary documents, including an Acknowledgment and Direction to sever, which the wife signed.

However, due to an oversight, the severance was not registered until after her death.

The court dismissed the application, declaring that the applicant and the wife's estate each held a 50% interest as tenants in common.

The court found that the joint tenancy was effectively severed when the wife signed the transfer documents and gave immediate, unconditional instructions for registration, as delivery, not registration, determines severance.

The court criticized the lawyer's improper registration of the "zombie" deed after death using false statements, noting that a court application for a vesting order was the correct procedure.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion where the plaintiffs were entirely successful in determining the order of examination for discovery.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs, condemning the defendant Aviva's tactical delay and deficient affidavit of documents.

The judge emphasized the importance of proper document disclosure in civil litigation and allowed for counsel's travel time and reasonable disbursements, noting that a litigant's choice of counsel should not be limited by geographical proximity.

The plaintiffs were awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis for two motions heard on January 23, 2020.

The defendants' motion to discharge a Mareva injunction was largely unsuccessful, while the plaintiffs' contempt motion was adjourned but found reasonable.

The court considered the importance of the matter to the plaintiffs, the defendants' deficient materials, and the principle of proportionality, fixing costs at $5,610.71.

The applicant, serving an indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, brought an application for habeas corpus seeking unconditional release.

He argued his continued detention was unlawful due to administrative assessments by correctional staff that led the Parole Board to deny him parole.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, declining jurisdiction on the basis that the Corrections and Conditional Release Act provides a complete, comprehensive, and expert procedure for reviewing Parole Board decisions.

The court found the application was an impermissible collateral attack on previous decisions and that the applicant's continued detention was lawful.

The applicant brought a private prosecution against his wife's employer and her superiors, alleging criminal harassment, obstruction of justice, intimidation, and retaliation.

Following a pre-enquete hearing, the Justice of the Peace refused to issue process on six counts due to insufficient evidence, and the Crown Attorney stayed the remaining count.

The applicant sought certiorari and mandamus to quash the refusal and review the stay.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error by the Justice of the Peace and confirming the Crown Attorney's absolute discretion to stay the charge.

The plaintiffs obtained a Mareva injunction after advancing $139,000 to the defendants to rebuild their fire-destroyed home.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants misappropriated the funds, performed no work, and submitted forged engineering plans to the municipality.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge the injunction, while the plaintiffs brought a motion for contempt.

The court dismissed the motion to discharge, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud and risk of dissipation of assets, but varied the order to allow the defendants to receive deposits and post security.

The contempt motion was adjourned pending cross-examinations.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to deliver a further and better affidavit of documents, arguing that the plaintiff's Schedule A failed to individually list and uniquely number documents within collections.

The court granted the motion, holding that listing files or bundles of documents under a single item, even if page-numbered, is insufficient under Rule 30.03(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court emphasized that individual documents must be uniquely identified to facilitate discovery and trial processes, and that the burden of proper identification rests with the producing party.

Examinations for discovery were postponed.

The defendant sought costs following its successful motion for summary judgment which dismissed the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred.

The defendant claimed $37,691.87 in total costs, while the plaintiffs argued for $22,575.67.

The court reduced the defendant's fees due to duplication of work by senior and junior counsel and disallowed certain disbursements, including computer research charges.

Costs were fixed at $32,802.35 on a partial indemnity basis, payable by the plaintiffs within 60 days.

The plaintiff, 2099042 Ontario Limited (AWD), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the counterclaim of the defendant, Varcon Construction Corporation (Varcon).

Varcon's counterclaim sought damages for alleged deficient work, failure to warn, and failure to rectify deficiencies by AWD, which Varcon claimed led to a sewage system failure due to soil consolidation.

The court found that AWD's work was performed in a workmanlike manner, met all required standards, and was not deficient.

Consequently, the court granted partial summary judgment in favour of AWD, dismissing Varcon's claims related to deficiencies, failure to warn, and failure to rectify.

However, the court determined that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding AWD's liability under the warranty provisions of the subcontract, even in the absence of deficient workmanship.

A trial was ordered to resolve these warranty issues and, if liability was established, to assess damages on a quantum meruit basis.

The plaintiff, Robert Horne Halliday, brought a contested motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) over eleven lots on Wolfe Island, alleging that the defendants, Mike Bromley and The Wolfe Island Trust Inc., held these properties in a secret express, constructive, resulting, or implied trust for him.

Halliday claimed he provided the funds for the "purchase" of the properties and for their expenses, and that Bromley agreed to transfer them back.

The defendants denied any trust, asserting outright ownership and arguing Halliday's claims were fabricated and unsupported by written evidence or financial resources.

The court found that Halliday had established a triable issue of a reasonable claim to an interest in land, supported by affidavit evidence of cash transactions, witness testimony, and email correspondence from Bromley that appeared to acknowledge a trust.

The motion for a CPL was granted, and the defendants were ordered to pay costs.

The defendant MacEwen Petroleum Inc. brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' wrongful dismissal claim as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs argued the limitation period should run from the date of their criminal acquittals, not the date of termination, citing exceptions for claims against state agents.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claim was discoverable on the date of termination (November 9, 2009) and did not fall within the narrow exceptions for tolling the limitation period, which are typically reserved for cases involving police misconduct where civil and criminal claims are "mirror images." The motion was granted, and the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed as statute-barred.

The applicant, a self-represented litigant, sought costs against the respondent for motions concerning post-trial security for spousal support and a recusal motion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the applicant for both sets of motions, totaling $3,037.80, to be enforced as spousal support.

The respondent had failed to provide costs submissions.

The respondent, Mr. McMurter, brought a motion for the recusal of the trial judge, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias based on adverse credibility findings made in the original trial judgment.

The applicant, Mrs. McMurter, brought a cross-motion to dismiss the recusal motion.

Concurrently, both parties brought motions concerning the security ordered over four properties for future spousal support payments.

The court dismissed Mr. McMurter's recusal motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, and allowed Mrs. McMurter's cross-motion.

The court also dismissed Mrs. McMurter's motion to prevent the sale of a property and for the transfer of all secured properties, as well as Mr. McMurter's motion for the removal of security, thereby maintaining the existing security arrangements.

Costs were reserved.

The plaintiff mother sought summary judgment for a declaration that her daughter held title to a property in trust for her, a vesting order, and an accounting.

The property was purchased solely with the mother's funds, and the daughter had signed a Declaration of Trust.

The daughter later mortgaged the property without the mother's knowledge.

The court found a valid trust based on the three certainties (intention, subject matter, objects) and granted summary judgment, vesting the property in the mother's name and ordering a full accounting.

The daughter was also ordered to vacate the property.

The applicant, a self-represented inmate, brought five applications for habeas corpus challenging various aspects of his detention, including access to justice, historic transfers, segregation, grievance processes, and security classification.

The respondents moved for summary dismissal, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction.

The court dismissed all applications, finding no deprivation of liberty and that the matters were frivolous and vexatious, falling outside the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction.

The applicant, an inmate, sought an order for habeas corpus to challenge his administrative segregation at Millhaven Institution and his impending involuntary transfer to Atlantic Institution.

He argued that his initial segregation was unlawful and that the subsequent transfer decision, based on the same facts, was also illegal, constituting a deprivation of liberty and breaching the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The respondent contended that the court lacked habeas corpus jurisdiction because the applicant's segregation had become voluntary pending the court's decision, and a lateral transfer between maximum security institutions does not amount to a deprivation of liberty.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's current segregation was voluntary, thus not engaging habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a lateral transfer between maximum security institutions does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for judgment, finalizing damage assessments and costs following a prior trial decision (K.M. v. Marson, 2018 ONSC 3493).

The court determined the plaintiff's past and future income loss, future loss of interdependent relationship, and management fees based on agreed-upon expert calculations and applied a 15% negative contingency.

Prejudgment interest was calculated, and a $50,000 advance payment by one defendant was credited against the total liability of both defendants, including associated prejudgment interest.

The total damages and prejudgment interest awarded to the plaintiff amounted to $2,748,513.09, with an additional $400,000 in costs.

A cross-claim for contribution and indemnity by the School Board against the individual defendant was also granted.

The respondent brought a motion to adjourn a hearing regarding his compliance with a previous order requiring him to make support and costs payments before selling a secured property.

The respondent requested the adjournment to obtain a transcript of a prior hearing.

The court granted the adjournment, noting there was no prejudice to the applicant as the respondent remained bound by a final order prohibiting the sale of the secured properties without court approval.