J. Todd Sloan

The court considered two motions for summary judgment in a civil action brought by William Stoddart, a former inmate, against Dr. Diana Silver Wyatt and various Crown defendants.

Stoddart alleged assault and professional negligence against Dr. Wyatt, and negligence, assault, and breach of Charter rights against the Crown defendants, arising from the discontinuation of his prescription for gabapentin following a change in the Correctional Service of Canada’s drug formulary.

The court found that the only evidence on the standard of care was from the defendants, and Stoddart failed to provide any expert evidence in support of his claims.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment, dismissing all of Stoddart’s claims.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his involuntary reclassification from minimum to medium security and subsequent transfer.

The court addressed four issues: jurisdiction, mootness, compliance with procedural protections under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) ss. 27 and 87, and the reasonableness of the transfer decision.

The court found it had jurisdiction, the application was not moot, CSC complied with procedural requirements, and the decision to transfer was reasonable.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Following the applicant's discontinuance of a judicial review proceeding against the respondent, the respondent sought an assessment of costs.

The applicant did not file any responding materials.

The Assessment Officer held that while the respondent could not be awarded costs for its motion to strike under Item 5 as the motion was not decided by the Court or abandoned by the moving party, it was appropriate to allow 2 units under Item 27 for the considerable work performed in preparing the motion.

The respondent's claim for 4 units for the assessment of costs was allowed as claimed.

The respondent's bill of costs was assessed and allowed in the amount of $900.

Following the applicant's discontinuance of a judicial review application shortly before a scheduled hearing, the respondent requested an assessment of costs.

The Assessment Officer assessed costs payable to the respondent in the amount of $900.00.

While the respondent claimed costs under Item 5 for the preparation of a contested motion, the Assessment Officer held that because the motion was not abandoned by the moving party and was not disposed of by the Court, costs could not be awarded under Item 5.

However, exercising positive application of costs provisions, the Assessment Officer allowed 2 units under Item 27, in addition to 4 units for the assessment of costs.

The applicant, a federal inmate with a lengthy history of fraudulent behaviour, sought judicial review of a decision by the Parole Board of Canada Appeal Division affirming the revocation of his statutory release by the Parole Board.

The applicant's release had been suspended three times for various breaches of conditions and lack of transparency with his Case Management Team.

The Federal Court found that the Board's conclusion that the applicant posed an undue risk to society was reasonable, justified, and transparent.

The Court also held that the tribunals reasonably dismissed allegations of bias against the CMT and adequately considered the applicant's vulnerability to COVID-19.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a life sentence, sought habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from minimum to medium security and his involuntary transfer to a medium-security institution.

The transfer was based on his inappropriate interactions with administrative staff, accessing restricted areas, and possession of a contraband cell phone.

The court applied the reasonableness standard of review from Vavilov and found the Warden's decision was justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The court also reviewed a sealed affidavit and concluded the respondent met its procedural fairness and disclosure obligations under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a federal inmate, sought an order in the nature of habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from minimum to medium security and his involuntary transfer.

He argued that the decision was unlawful due to procedural unfairness, specifically regarding the withholding of information.

The court, applying the principles from Mission Institution v. Khela, found that the prison authorities had met their onus to prove that the decision was procedurally fair and reasonable.

The authorities had reasonable grounds to withhold certain information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to protect safety and security, and the disclosed information, along with the sealed affidavit, supported the reliability of sources and the lawfulness of the decision.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought an application for judicial review of a decision by Correctional Service Canada to deduct 100 percent of his inmate income to discharge an outstanding costs order in favour of the Crown.

The Federal Court held that while the Financial Administration Act provided the legal authority to make such deductions to discharge a debt to the Crown, it was unreasonable to withhold 100 percent of the applicant's income without considering the purpose of the correctional system and the impact on the offender's rehabilitation and basic needs.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the decision to withhold the income was declared unlawful.

The applicant, serving a life sentence for first-degree murder, sought judicial review of a decision denying his final-level grievance regarding his offender security level and a transfer request to a minimum-security facility.

The Court held that Charter arguments raised for the first time on judicial review were not properly before it.

The Court further found that the decision-making process was procedurally fair, as there was no obligation to disclose internal recommendations prior to the Warden's decision.

Finally, applying the Vavilov framework, the Court concluded that the decision maintaining a moderate escape risk and public safety risk was reasonable and adequately justified by the inmate's history and continued denial of involvement in the index offences.

The application was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The defendants, having succeeded on their motions for summary judgment, sought costs.

The plaintiff, Andrew Walker, argued for no costs or significantly reduced costs due to his impecuniosity and inability to test medical evidence, or for a suspension of the costs decision pending appeal.

The court considered Walker's financial hardship but balanced it against the objectives of cost awards, including indemnification and deterrence.

The court noted that the action was not diligently pursued and that the defendants had offered to dismiss the action without costs prior to the summary judgment motions.

Ultimately, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $10,000 to the Crown defendants and $15,000 to the physician defendants, finding these amounts fair and reasonable given all relevant factors, including access to justice and hardship considerations.

The plaintiff, an inmate, brought an action against the Crown and two physicians alleging negligence and medical malpractice resulting in the amputation of his leg.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff failed to adduce expert medical evidence to support the malpractice claims against the physicians.

The claims against the Crown were dismissed as there was no evidence of the alleged workplace injury, the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and the Crown was not vicariously liable for the independent contractor physicians.

The appellant appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his habeas corpus application challenging the revocation of his day parole by the Parole Board of Canada.

The appellant had been released on day parole in April 2016 after serving a sentence for robbery and firearm offences, but his parole was revoked in April 2017 on the basis that he presented an undue risk to society.

The appellant contended he was detained during a parole disciplinary meeting without being informed of his right to counsel, contrary to section 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had been released on statutory release while the appeal was pending.

The court also set aside the costs order, finding that the habeas corpus application challenging parole revocation was criminal in nature rather than civil, and therefore costs could not be awarded.

The applicant, an inmate serving a life sentence, was granted three unescorted temporary absences (UTAs) by the Parole Board of Canada.

After completing two, his third UTA was cancelled because the designated halfway house withdrew its support.

The applicant sought a writ of habeas corpus to compel the third UTA.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not suffered a deprivation of liberty because the prerequisite condition for his release was never fulfilled.

Furthermore, the court declined jurisdiction because the Corrections and Conditional Release Act provides a complete and comprehensive statutory regime for reviewing such administrative decisions.

The applicant, an inmate, sought a writ of habeas corpus to be transferred from Warkworth Institution back to Beaver Creek Institution or a similar open-concept medium-security facility.

He argued that his involuntary transfer from Beaver Creek to Warkworth, based on alleged improper conclusions about an "inappropriate relationship" and lack of specific documentation, constituted an unlawful restriction of his liberty.

The court found that the transfer between two medium-security institutions, despite differences in their living environments (open-concept vs. structured), did not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty, but rather a loss of privileges.

The application for habeas corpus was dismissed.

The applicant, an inmate, sought a writ of habeas corpus to be transferred from Warkworth Institution to Bath Institution, both medium security facilities.

He argued that his involuntary transfer from Bath to Warkworth constituted an unlawful restriction of his liberty due to differences in the living environments and supervision levels between the two institutions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the transfer between two medium-security institutions, despite differences in privileges and layout, did not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty sufficient to invoke habeas corpus jurisdiction.

The court emphasized that a loss of privileges is not equivalent to a deprivation of liberty.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's habeas corpus application, the respondent Attorney General sought costs of $15,951.78.

The court noted that while costs can be awarded in habeas corpus applications relating to the administration of a lawful sentence, they must not become a roadblock to accessing the writ.

Given that the application required additional work due to the applicant's request for an adjournment to file further materials, the court fixed costs at $6,000 all inclusive.

The applicant, an inmate, sought an order for habeas corpus to challenge his administrative segregation at Millhaven Institution and his impending involuntary transfer to Atlantic Institution.

He argued that his initial segregation was unlawful and that the subsequent transfer decision, based on the same facts, was also illegal, constituting a deprivation of liberty and breaching the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The respondent contended that the court lacked habeas corpus jurisdiction because the applicant's segregation had become voluntary pending the court's decision, and a lateral transfer between maximum security institutions does not amount to a deprivation of liberty.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's current segregation was voluntary, thus not engaging habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a lateral transfer between maximum security institutions does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.

Mr. Samuel sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, alleging a Charter s. 10 violation when his day parole was suspended and he was detained without being advised of his rights or given counsel.

The Attorney General of Canada challenged the Superior Court's jurisdiction, arguing that the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) provides a complete, comprehensive, and expert procedure for parole review, including judicial review by the Federal Court.

The court, bound by prior Ontario Court of Appeal decisions, found that the CCRA scheme, including Federal Court judicial review, constitutes such a procedure, falling within the exception articulated in May v. Ferndale Institution.

Consequently, the court exercised its discretion to decline habeas corpus jurisdiction, dismissing the application.

The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge the legality of his detention, specifically his transfer from a minimum security institution to a maximum security prison.

The court found no relief available for his former placement issues, as habeas corpus addresses occurring deprivations of liberty, not denials of additional privileges or past concerns.

However, regarding his current placement, the court determined that the transfer to maximum security was procedurally unfair because Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) failed to provide the applicant with the Security Reclassification Scale Functional Specification (scoring matrix), as required by Commissioner's Directive 710-6 and Section 27(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations.

This failure deprived the applicant of the ability to meaningfully challenge the reclassification, even though the SRS score was overridden.

The court granted the writ, setting aside the Warden's decision and approving the applicant's transfer back to minimum security.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge a correctional decision to transfer him from Millhaven Institution (maximum security, segregation) to Stony Mountain Institution (maximum security, general population).

The applicant argued that the proposed transfer would significantly reduce his residual liberty by impacting family contact, access to support organizations, and likely leading to renewed segregation.

The court found no factual basis for these claims, noting a lack of evidence regarding family visits, the speculative nature of lost support, and mere speculation concerning future segregation.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate a deprivation of residual liberty required for habeas corpus relief, as the transfer was considered a lateral move not amounting to a substantial change in incarceration conditions.

The application was dismissed.