Robert F. Scott

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving following a trial where he was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of dangerous driving and sentenced to a one-year driving prohibition and a fine.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning post‑accident alcohol consumption and improperly relied on Intoxilyzer readings to infer alcohol consumption before the accident.

The appellate court held that where there is intervening or "bolus" alcohol consumption, it is generally unsafe to infer pre‑incident drinking without expert evidence or other strong proof establishing the amount consumed.

The trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to post‑accident alcohol consumption.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered because there remained evidence capable of supporting a dangerous driving conviction even without the alcohol inference.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of sexual assault and indecent act arising from an incident in a grocery store.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused after concluding that the Crown had not proven the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, but did so without allowing the Crown to make submissions on the sexual assault charge.

On appeal, both parties agreed this constituted an error in law.

Applying the standard from Graveline, the court considered whether the error might reasonably have had a material bearing on the acquittal.

After reviewing the transcript and witness evidence, the court concluded that the evidence was capable of supporting a conviction and that the verdict could have been different.

The defendant neurologist brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a medical negligence claim as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence arising from emergency room treatment preceding a stroke, asserting that the neurologist consulted during the visit may have contributed to the failure to diagnose and treat.

The defendant argued the claim was commenced more than two years after the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known the material facts supporting the claim.

The court held that discoverability was complex in the circumstances due to conflicting expert opinions and uncertainty regarding the neurologist’s role, and concluded that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

The motion for summary judgment was therefore premature.

The moving parties sought an order discharging or limiting a Certificate of Pending Litigation registered by the responding parties in relation to a recreational time‑share cottage development.

The responding parties alleged entitlement to interval ownership in one of the cottages pursuant to contractual arrangements connected to the sale and redevelopment of their former property.

Applying the equitable factors governing discharge of a certificate under s. 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court found that the claims raised a triable issue regarding an interest in land and that damages alone would not adequately compensate the responding parties.

The court concluded that the moving parties had not established sufficient grounds to discharge the certificate.

The certificate remained registered, though the court indicated it could potentially be confined to the specific intervals in dispute.

Following competing summary judgment motions in a civil commercial dispute, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff’s summary judgment motion had previously been dismissed, while the defendant’s cross‑motion was found premature and allowed to be brought again after discoveries.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant should not receive costs because it withdrew one cross‑motion and the remaining motion was premature.

The court found that misleading and contradictory evidence advanced by the plaintiff undermined the litigation process and forced the defendant to bring the cross‑motions.

Considering the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim as statute-barred under both the former and current Limitations Act regimes.

The moving party argued that, even accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at its highest, the limitation period had expired.

The court acknowledged that the limitation argument had merit but found that credibility issues and the incomplete evidentiary record made summary determination inappropriate.

The court held that a full trial and discoveries were necessary for the trier of fact to properly assess the evidence and refine the issues.

The motion was adjourned sine die with leave to renew the limitation argument on notice.