Robert J. Reynolds

The appellant appealed summary judgment dismissing the claim against a homeowner arising from a serious dog bite injury at the property.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent, who owned the house but lived abroad and did not know her brother was residing there with the dogs, was neither an owner for purposes of the Dog Owners' Liability Act nor vicariously liable through agency principles.

The court found no evidence that the respondent consented to her brother acting on her behalf or represented that he had authority to do so.

The appeal was dismissed and costs of $10,000 all inclusive were awarded to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeals of both the Attorney General of Canada and Katherine Cannon from a trial judgment finding them liable for abuse and loss of Indigenous culture suffered by the respondents, three sisters.

The court held that Canada owed an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the respondents as de facto wards in a unique interprovincial context, and that Canada breached this duty by shelving a plan to return the children to their Indigenous maternal family.

The court also upheld findings of negligence and joint and several liability for damages.

The court clarified the limits of sui generis fiduciary duty, the requirements for ad hoc fiduciary duty, and the application of proximity and foreseeability in negligence.

The court dismissed the Defendants’ motion to adjourn the pretrial and trial, finding that the issues before the Divisional Court and those to be resolved at trial were not the same.

The trial would resolve the equitable ownership issue, and proceeding as scheduled would be fair and just.

The court also awarded costs to the Plaintiffs on a partial indemnity basis, finding the motion unnecessary and not required to be decided before trial.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment that found an insurer liable for underpaid contents claim following a fire.

The insurer (appellant) argued that the insured's failure to submit a sworn proof of loss was fatal, that an appraisal process under the Insurance Act was mandatory, and that the trial judge erred in assessing the actual cash value (ACV) of the lost property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the insurer had waived the sworn proof of loss requirement and that relief from forfeiture was appropriate.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretion to decline an appraisal under s. 128 of the Insurance Act, noting that the court was in a position to assess the ACV and that an appraisal would cause further delay and expense.

The assessment of ACV by the trial judge was also found to be free of palpable and overriding error.

The applicant sought to enforce a 1979 consent judgment regarding the sale and division of proceeds from a property.

The respondent argued the application was barred by a statutory limitation period or the doctrine of laches.

The court found that the 20-year limitation period for "an action upon a judgment" under the Limitations Act, 1970, did not apply to this specific type of judgment, which was incomplete and did not create a fixed money debt.

The court also held that the doctrine of laches was inapplicable as the applicant sought legal, not equitable, relief.

Consequently, the application was not barred and could proceed.

The plaintiff's home was destroyed by fire.

The insurer paid the policy limits for the building and an advance for the contents.

The plaintiff sued the insurer in negligence, claiming the property was underinsured and seeking additional damages for both the building and contents.

The court dismissed the negligence claim, finding the insurer owed no duty of care regarding the replacement cost calculation, as the plaintiff relied solely on his broker.

The court also found the plaintiff was not entitled to replacement cost value for the building because he chose not to rebuild.

However, the court granted relief from forfeiture regarding the plaintiff's failure to submit a sworn proof of loss for the contents claim, finding the insurer had waived the requirement.

The court assessed the actual cash value of the contents and awarded the plaintiff an additional $51,000.

Following the settlement of a motor vehicle accident tort claim for $100,000, the parties disputed the plaintiff's entitlement to costs.

The plaintiff sought costs of the action as well as 'Cadieux costs'—the costs incurred in recovering collateral benefits from her disability insurer, automobile insurer, and the Canada Pension Plan, which reduced her tort claim.

The defendant argued that legislative changes giving the Licence Appeal Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction over benefit disputes precluded the court from awarding such costs, and that Cadieux costs could not be awarded where an action settles before trial.

The court rejected these arguments, finding it retained jurisdiction to award costs incidental to the recovery of benefits that benefitted the tortfeasor.

The court awarded the plaintiff $90,000 in total costs, including $30,000 in Cadieux costs.

The plaintiff contractor brought a motion under Rule 49 to enforce a settlement agreement reached with the defendants regarding a dispute over the construction of a house.

The defendants' solicitor had accepted an offer to settle for $80,000, but the defendants subsequently refused to sign the release because they did not want to release their Tarion new home warranty claims.

The court found that a binding agreement was reached by solicitors with apparent authority and declined to exercise its discretion to set aside the agreement based on a mistake between the defendants and their solicitor.

The motion was granted, and judgment was issued for $80,000 plus costs.

The defendants sought an order to cross-examine the plaintiff's counsel's assistant, Laurel Saunders, on an affidavit filed in an upcoming motion to enforce a settlement.

The plaintiff's counsel argued the affidavit only attached uncontentious correspondence and that Ms. Saunders had nothing relevant to add, citing privilege.

The court granted the defendants' motion, affirming the prima facie right to cross-examine under Rule 39.02(1) and finding no sufficient reason to prevent it, especially given potential future evidentiary developments from non-party lawyer examinations.

Costs were awarded to the successful defendants.

Following the dismissal of an application for a declaration of a duty to defend, the successful respondent insurer sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no malicious or unreasonable conduct and noting ambiguity in the respondent's offer to settle.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity scale but reduced the award by 25% due to divided success, as the applicants had to unnecessarily address an exclusion that the respondent had implicitly abandoned.

Costs were fixed at $7,482.62.

The applicants, R.C. and J.M., sought a declaration that their insurer, Western Assurance Company, had a duty to defend them in an underlying action.

They were sued for alleged negligence in failing to prevent their son's schoolyard assault on a classmate.

Western denied coverage, citing policy exclusions for intentional acts and failure to prevent abuse.

The court found that while the intentional act exclusion did not apply to the parents' negligence claims (as per Unifund and Durham), the "failure to prevent abuse" exclusion did apply.

The court determined that "assault" was synonymous with "physical abuse" in the context of the policy, and the substance of the allegations fell within this exclusion.

Consequently, the application for a duty to defend was dismissed.

The appellant, Andrew Clifford Miracle, appealed an order appointing a receiver over his assets, which was granted to the respondent, Glenn Bogue, to satisfy a debt arising from an arbitration award.

The arbitration concerned the joint ownership of a store on Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory.

Andrew alleged the application judge erred by lacking authority for a final receiver order, miscalculating contingency fees, and, crucially, that the order contravened sections 29 and 89 of the Indian Act, which prohibit enforcement by a non-status Indian against assets situated on a reserve.

The Court of Appeal identified the Indian Act issue as a threshold matter, noting it was not fully litigated or determined in the lower court.

Consequently, the court remitted the matter to the application judge for a determination on the effect of the Indian Act, adhering to the principle that new issues are generally not decided on appeal.

No costs were awarded.

The court-appointed receiver sought approval of a vesting order, ancillary orders, and a distribution order for the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers Inc. A creditor of a related company in receivership, Banwell Development Corporation, objected to the payment of post-receivership interest to Royal Timbers' creditors, arguing the interest should instead be paid pro rata to Banwell's creditors due to a potential shortfall in the Banwell estate.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the two receivership estates were separate and the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers were entitled to post-receivership interest from the surplus generated by the sale of Royal Timbers' assets.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The respondents were awarded their costs of the appeal in the sum of $60,000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

This decision followed an appeal from a Superior Court judgment and a prior costs order.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision setting aside the accused's conviction for sexual assault of a complainant with an intellectual and developmental disability, on the basis that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal majority found that the trial judge had failed to address the reliability of the complainant's evidence in light of expert evidence regarding her suggestibility, and had failed to provide reasons for rejecting the defence evidence.

The dissenting judge of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reasons permitted meaningful appellate review.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the conviction, and cautioned that courts should focus on the individual's actual capacities rather than over-relying on expert evidence attributing general characteristics to persons with disabilities, as such over-reliance can perpetuate harmful myths and stereotypes and create barriers to access to justice.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that found their professional negligence action was not statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the respondent neither knew nor ought to have known that its loss was caused by the appellants' acts or omissions.

The plaintiff, a land developer, sued the City of Belleville for breach of a 1999 Development Agreement and unjust enrichment.

The agreement stipulated that owners of "benefiting properties" would share the cost of sewer and water infrastructure constructed by the plaintiff.

The dispute arose when the City installed its own sewer and water lines on Cloverleaf Drive, connecting to the plaintiff's infrastructure, but did not require homeowners connecting to these services to enter into cost-sharing agreements with the plaintiff.

The court interpreted clause 22 of the Development Agreement, considering the factual matrix and the Public Utilities Act, concluding that the clause applied only to land developers of undeveloped adjoining properties, not individual homeowners.

The action was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to deliver a further and better affidavit of documents, arguing that the plaintiff's Schedule A failed to individually list and uniquely number documents within collections.

The court granted the motion, holding that listing files or bundles of documents under a single item, even if page-numbered, is insufficient under Rule 30.03(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court emphasized that individual documents must be uniquely identified to facilitate discovery and trial processes, and that the burden of proper identification rests with the producing party.

Examinations for discovery were postponed.

The appellant insurance company appealed from a motion judge's order declaring that it had a duty to defend claims against the respondents arising from an accidental death caused by an all-terrain vehicle operated on the respondents' property containing a private airstrip.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by going beyond the pleadings and speculating about coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the pleadings rule and gave the widest latitude to the allegations in determining whether they raised a claim within the policy.

The court affirmed that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, requiring only the mere possibility that a claim falls within the insurance policy.