Michael J. Pretsell

Three Indigenous sisters sued their former foster mother and the Attorney General of Canada for abuse and loss of culture.

The plaintiffs were placed with their non-Indigenous aunt and uncle in the 1960s.

The court found that the foster mother physically and emotionally abused the plaintiffs, treating them as servants and disparaging their Indigenous heritage.

The court also found that Canada breached its fiduciary duty by shelving plans to return the children to their First Nation in Saskatchewan, resulting in a profound loss of culture, language, and identity.

The plaintiffs were awarded $100,000 each in general damages (joint and several), $10,000 each in punitive damages against the foster mother, and $150,000 each against Canada for loss of culture.

This application concerned an oppression remedy claim brought by Rene Ziegelmaier against his former business partner, Casey Fisher, and several corporations involved in a microbrewery venture, as well as Frontenac Community Futures Development Corporation.

The applicant alleged oppressive conduct by Fisher, including being locked out of the business premises and bank accounts.

The court found numerous material factual disputes and credibility issues that could not be resolved on the application record.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application against Frontenac Community Futures Development Corporation and converted the remainder of the application into an action, directing the parties to exchange pleadings and proceed with discoveries.

The municipality sought a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning by-law against industrial uses occurring within setback areas adjacent to residential zoning.

The respondent resisted the application by relying on legal non-conforming use protection under s. 34(9) of the Planning Act for storage trailer boxes and a driveway that pre-dated the relevant zoning amendments.

The court found the evidence established continuous prior lawful use of both the storage area and driveway, and further found that any increased use did not amount to a change in kind or create undue additional impacts.

The application for injunctive relief was dismissed.

The plaintiff was severely injured after falling from a railway trestle on lands owned by Canadian National Railway (CN) while taking a short cut.

The plaintiff sued both CN and the City of Quinte West.

The City brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against it.

The plaintiff argued the City was an occupier because it cut the grass on an adjacent parcel of land, and that it owed a duty to prevent access to the railway hazard.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the City's motion, finding that the City was not an occupier of the hazard location and that its maintenance of adjacent lands did not create the danger.

The court further held that the City owed no general duty of care to prevent pedestrians from accessing third-party railway lands.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual interference arising from allegations that he touched a thirteen-year-old household member's breasts and vagina during apparent horseplay.

The appeal alleged misapprehension of the evidence, improper use of blanket-lifting evidence, and error in concluding the conduct met the elements of sexual interference and sexual assault.

The court held the trial judge's inference about visibility during the touching was supported by the evidence, the blanket-lifting incident was admissible and relevant to sexual purpose, and the touching was properly found to be sexual in nature.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the custodial sentence was ordered into effect.

The plaintiffs, three sisters, brought an action against their aunt and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging that they were physically abused by their aunt while living in her home as children over fifty years ago.

They claimed damages for assault and battery, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court reviewed extensive testimony from the plaintiffs, the aunt, and other family members.

Applying the balance of probabilities standard and considering the frailties of memory regarding distant events, the court found the plaintiffs' evidence to be unreliable due to inconsistencies and lack of detail.

The action was dismissed against both defendants.

The applicants, minority shareholders in a family-owned wholesale grocery business, brought an oppression application against the majority shareholders and the company.

The dispute arose over succession planning, with the majority seeking to sell the company's assets to a third-generation family member, which the applicants opposed.

The court found that while the applicants did not have a reasonable expectation of passing their shares to their sons, the proposed asset sale and certain workplace actions were oppressive.

The court ordered the sale of the applicants' shares at fair market value to the proposed purchaser or the company.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's professional negligence claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants, its accountants, should have detected an employee fraud earlier.

The court applied the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002, considering the professional relationship and the defendants' ameliorative efforts.

It found the limitation period did not begin until the plaintiff received independent accounting advice in January 2016, making the July 2017 action timely.

The motion was dismissed.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for judgment, finalizing damage assessments and costs following a prior trial decision (K.M. v. Marson, 2018 ONSC 3493).

The court determined the plaintiff's past and future income loss, future loss of interdependent relationship, and management fees based on agreed-upon expert calculations and applied a 15% negative contingency.

Prejudgment interest was calculated, and a $50,000 advance payment by one defendant was credited against the total liability of both defendants, including associated prejudgment interest.

The total damages and prejudgment interest awarded to the plaintiff amounted to $2,748,513.09, with an additional $400,000 in costs.

A cross-claim for contribution and indemnity by the School Board against the individual defendant was also granted.

The plaintiff brought an action in negligence against his former teacher and the school board for childhood sexual abuse.

The school board admitted liability in negligence for failing to monitor the teacher, and the trial proceeded as a contested assessment of damages.

The court found that the sexual abuse was a major cause of the plaintiff's severe psychiatric injuries, including major depression with dysthymia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorders.

The court rejected the school board's argument that the 'crumbling skull' principle should reduce damages by 50%, finding no measurable risk that the plaintiff's pre-existing learning disability would have caused his mental disorders.

The court awarded $250,000 in general and aggravated damages, $1,955,000 for past and future income loss, $135,587 for future loss of interdependent relationship, and other special damages, for a total of $2,413,442.11.

The applicant estate trustee sought the court's opinion on which of two promissory notes executed by the respondent to her late mother was valid.

The first note required repayment of a $142,000 loan, while the second note, produced by the respondent after her mother's death, stated the loan was forgiven upon death.

The court found that the deceased did not change her mind to forgive the loan, relying on the evidence of two lawyers and rejecting the respondent's evidence, including a purportedly forged email.

The court concluded that only the first promissory note was valid and enforceable.

The defendant moved to set aside a noting in default, which occurred after the plaintiffs obtained a partial default judgment.

The default arose from the defendant's failure to deliver a restored Corvette chassis by an agreed deadline, compounded by his former lawyer's failure to inform the plaintiffs of the defendant's serious accident.

The court granted the motion to set aside the noting in default, allowing the defendant to defend the outstanding balance of the claim, but affirmed the partial default judgment.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat, arguing insufficient reasons from the trial judge and an improper application of the reasonable doubt standard.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, while not explicitly referencing *R. v. W.(D.)*, demonstrated a correct application of credibility assessment principles and the reasonable doubt standard by accepting the complainant's evidence and finding it substantiated by the appellant's own statements.

Following a successful summary judgment dismissing a $7,000,000 civil action alleging numerous torts including conspiracy, defamation, fraud, and malicious prosecution, the defendants sought costs.

The plaintiff, self-represented, filed no responding costs submissions.

The court found the litigation was particularly acrimonious and that the plaintiff’s conduct throughout was unreasonable, including scandalous allegations against the defendants, police, and Crown counsel.

The defendants’ offer to settle for dismissal without costs triggered Rule 49 consequences as they were entirely successful.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml.

At trial, the accused argued that breath samples should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) arising from a police officer’s mistaken belief that a 15‑minute waiting period was required before administering a roadside screening test after the accused had been smoking.

The trial judge found Charter breaches but admitted the breath samples after applying the three-part test from R. v. Grant, concluding the officer acted in good faith and society’s interest in adjudicating impaired driving offences supported admission.

On appeal, the appellant argued the officer’s conduct constituted negligence rather than good faith and that the trial judge misapplied the Grant analysis.

The court held the trial judge considered the proper factors and was not clearly wrong in characterizing the conduct as a good faith mistake.

Deference was owed to the trial judge’s balancing under s. 24(2), and the conviction was upheld.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a civil action alleging numerous torts including malicious prosecution, defamation, invasion of privacy, trespass, assault, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court applied the summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin and concluded that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff failed to establish essential elements of malicious prosecution, including termination of the criminal proceedings in his favour, lack of reasonable and probable cause, and malice.

The remaining claims were either unsupported by evidence, barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, or not viable in law.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the entire action.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 mg per 100 mL, contrary to the Criminal Code.

The conviction arose after police responded to an anonymous tip, observed the appellant returning from a beer store to his truck with the keys in his possession, and later obtained breath samples well above the legal limit.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding care and control and that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were violated.

The appeal court held that the trial judge reasonably inferred an intentional course of conduct creating a realistic risk the vehicle would be put in motion and that no unlawful detention or improper grounds for the breath demand were established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties sought an order discharging or limiting a Certificate of Pending Litigation registered by the responding parties in relation to a recreational time‑share cottage development.

The responding parties alleged entitlement to interval ownership in one of the cottages pursuant to contractual arrangements connected to the sale and redevelopment of their former property.

Applying the equitable factors governing discharge of a certificate under s. 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court found that the claims raised a triable issue regarding an interest in land and that damages alone would not adequately compensate the responding parties.

The court concluded that the moving parties had not established sufficient grounds to discharge the certificate.

The certificate remained registered, though the court indicated it could potentially be confined to the specific intervals in dispute.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence in a jury trial involving multiple sexual offence charges against a foster father relating to three complainants who had lived in the accused’s foster home.

The defence argued that the evidence of one complainant was so unreliable as to be incapable of belief and therefore should not be considered as similar fact evidence.

The court reviewed the governing principles from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the admissibility of similar fact evidence and assessed the probative value of the evidence in relation to its prejudicial effect.

Given the pattern of conduct alleged within the foster home context and the similarities in the surrounding circumstances, the court concluded that the evidence was reasonably capable of belief and possessed significant probative value.

The probative value outweighed the potential prejudice and the evidence was admitted with appropriate jury instructions.

The accused, charged with sexual offences against three foster children, brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine one of the complainants about prior sexual abuse by her mother's partner.

The defence sought to adduce this evidence to provide context for the complainant's statements, explore her credibility regarding her relationship with her foster mother, and establish a possible motive to fabricate related to a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board award.

The Crown consented to the limited cross-examination.

The court found the evidence relevant and its probative value significant, not outweighed by the danger of prejudice, and granted the application for limited cross-examination.