Susan E. Lang

An elderly man married his much younger housekeeper, who subsequently pressured him into transferring his home to her son while retaining a life interest.

The plaintiff sought to set aside the transfer, while the defendants claimed a $120,000 loan, equalization of net family property, and quantum meruit for services rendered.

The court set aside the transfer, finding it was procured through undue influence and unconscionability.

The court dismissed the defendants' claims for the loan, equalization, and quantum meruit, finding the property was never a matrimonial home and the housekeeper's unclean hands barred equitable relief.

A divorce was granted.

Following reasons for judgment in three related proceedings involving family and civil claims concerning transfers of funds and marital issues, the court addressed costs.

The successful party sought recovery of substantial legal fees incurred across the proceedings.

The court considered proportionality, reasonableness, the complexity of the litigation, and conduct of the parties during the proceedings, including disclosure issues.

Exercising its discretion, the court fixed a global costs award inclusive of disbursements and taxes for all three proceedings.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching arising from allegations made by a child complainant who, at trial, had no recollection of the alleged abuse or of making prior complaints.

The appeal turned on whether out-of-court statements to foster parents and police satisfied the reliability branch of the principled hearsay exception.

The court held that the trial judge misapprehended key reliability indicators, failed to grapple with leading questions, inconsistencies, delay in disclosure, and the absence of oath or meaningful truth-lie understanding, and wrongly denied the defence an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant before the jury.

The convictions were set aside and, given the long procedural history, prior successful appeal, substantial sentence served, and difficulty of a third prosecution, a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application seeking to compel the respondents to consent to severing a one-acre parcel of land pursuant to a memorandum of agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the relevant clause lacked sufficient certainty on essential terms, such as location, dimensions, title, and price, to be legally enforceable.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the motions judge's reasons were inadequate to determine the Limitations Act issue.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that the action was misconceived, as it had to be brought as a derivative action and no leave was obtained.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a motion to certify a class action on behalf of CIBC customer service employees for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge and Divisional Court had found it plain and obvious that CIBC's policy requiring pre-approval for overtime complied with the Canada Labour Code, and that individual issues predominated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was arguable the pre-approval requirement violated the Code's mandate to pay for overtime 'required or permitted' by the employer.

The Court also found some basis in fact that CIBC's systemic practices breached employment contracts, satisfying the common issues requirement for certification.

The appellant succeeded on appeal in obtaining a new trial on damages for one of its breach of contract claims against the respondent.

In this costs endorsement, the Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $50,000 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal.

For the trial costs, the court found that despite the appellant's limited success on appeal, the respondent remained the overwhelmingly successful party at trial, having defeated five of six claims totaling $121 million.

The court reduced the trial judge's costs award to the respondent to reflect the appellant's partial success and the removal of a Rule 49 substantial indemnity consequence, awarding the respondent $753,076.37 in trial costs.

The appellants succeeded on a limitation issue in a class action appeal and sought costs for the appeal and the motion below.

The Court of Appeal declined to alter the motion judge's order that costs of the motion remain in the cause.

For the appeal, the court recognized the appellants' success but modified the costs award because the appeal raised a novel issue of law and involved access to justice considerations in a class action.

The court awarded costs of the appeal in the cause, fixing them at $20,000 for the Timminco appellants, $20,000 for the Photon Consulting appellants, and $10,000 for the Walsh appellant.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for damages against the respondent municipality.

The appellant and a friend had driven down a dead-end rural road, got stuck on a hydro right-of-way, and abandoned their vehicle in extreme cold, resulting in severe frostbite injuries.

The appellants argued the municipality breached its standard of care by failing to post 'No Exit' and checkerboard signs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the road conditions were not potentially dangerous to reasonable drivers and that the appellants would have ignored the signs regardless.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants' farm property was expropriated by the respondent, and the parties settled compensation at $1.3 million, with costs to be assessed under s. 32 of the Expropriations Act.

An assessment officer awarded costs, but a Superior Court Justice reduced the amounts on appeal, finding them unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court Justice erred by conducting a rehearing and substituting her own view of what was reasonable instead of applying the proper deferential standard of review.

The assessment officer's awards were reinstated.

The appellants were sued by a credit union for monies owed under a credit facility after an employee stole $30 million.

The appellants counterclaimed against the regulators, FSCO and DICO, seeking contribution and indemnity on the basis that they negligently failed to oversee the credit union.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the counterclaim, finding that FSCO is not an entity capable of being sued, DICO is protected by statutory immunity, and the appellants had no tenable claim for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act because they were not tortfeasors.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay the respondents' litigation based on an arbitration clause in their shareholder agreements.

The respondents argued the parties never reached an agreement on the contents of a schedule, meaning no arbitration agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and stayed the litigation, noting that the respondents had not sought a declaration that the agreements were void ab initio, the agreements contained severability clauses making the arbitration clauses separate contracts, and under the Arbitration Act, an arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction.

The litigation was stayed except with respect to three companies that were not parties to any shareholder agreement.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis that it should have been brought in the Divisional Court.

The appellant moved to quash or adjourn the respondent's motion, alleging improper service, and also moved to review an order of a single judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion regarding service, finding she was properly served and prepared.

The Court granted the respondent's motion to quash the appeal, noting that section 171.16(1) of the Cooperative Corporations Act directs appeals to the Divisional Court.

The appellant's motion to review the single judge's order was dismissed as moot.

The appellant bank appealed an order enforcing a settlement under Rule 49.09.

The motion judge had concluded that the parties agreed to a reduced mortgage payout of $357,000 based on two letters between counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made a reversible error by failing to read the correspondence in the context of the entire negotiation history.

An objective reading of the full correspondence demonstrated there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term of the mortgage payout amount, and therefore no settlement was reached.

The appellant commenced a proposed class action asserting a statutory cause of action under s. 130 of the Securities Act for misrepresentations in a prospectus.

The motion judge found the claim was barred by the limitation period in s. 138 of the Securities Act and was not saved by the suspension of limitation periods in s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that a prior class action appeal did not encompass the s. 130 claim, meaning the suspension of the limitation period ended when the time to appeal the dismissal of that specific claim expired.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondent on a guarantee of a second commercial mortgage.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding he waived his right to raise deficiencies in the respondent's prior enforcement attempts and in concluding there were no genuine issues for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant waived any prior deficiencies by signing a forbearance agreement, which was subsequently breached.

The Court also found the appellant's evidence of an alleged oral forbearance agreement with the first mortgagee consisted of bald assertions unsupported by documentary evidence, raising no genuine issue for trial.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding spousal support to the respondent, challenging the trial judge's credibility findings and factual determinations regarding the respondent's immigration status and employment prospects.

The trial judge had found the appellant to be untruthful and accepted the respondent's evidence that she would suffer reduced career opportunities in South Korea due to the cultural stigma of a failed interracial marriage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding that the trial judge fully explained why the severe economic disadvantage suffered by the respondent justified a support award outside the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to add Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. as a defendant after the expiry of the two-year limitation period following a water heater explosion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no evidence that the appellants exercised due diligence to identify Enbridge's potential liability within the limitation period.

However, the court allowed a consent amendment to increase the damages claimed by one of the appellants.

The appellant settled her claims against her insurer in 2003 and signed a final release.

After a 2004 action to set aside the settlement was dismissed on consent, she commenced a second action in 2009 alleging conspiracy to cause economic harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the 2009 action, finding that the six-year limitation period had expired based on the appellant's own pleadings, and that she had led no evidence to support the conspiracy claim.

The appellants purchased a house from the respondents and subsequently discovered electrical, plumbing, and structural defects resulting from the respondents' DIY renovations and previous substandard work.

The appellants, who declined a pre-purchase inspection, sued for the cost of repairs, alleging the respondents concealed latent defects.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the respondents were unaware of the defects and did not actively conceal them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that 'active concealment' requires an intention to hide a known defect, and the principle of caveat emptor applied.