Charles Wagman

The applicant brought a motion seeking further production of documents from the respondent's real estate lawyer's file related to a mortgage refinancing, arguing that previous productions were incomplete despite two prior motions.

The respondent claimed all documents had been produced and asserted solicitor-client privilege.

The court, noting the high conflict and lack of trust between the parties, ordered the respondent to instruct the lawyer to provide the applicant's counsel with a complete and unredacted copy of the entire file by a specified date, with provisions for extension due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

This motion concerned the production of documents from a former solicitor's file, where the applicant, T.O.E., sought disclosure of emails related to the respondent, I.S.'s, attempt to refinance a mortgage.

The respondent claimed solicitor-client privilege over certain communications, including those with her family law counsel.

The court found that the respondent had implicitly waived privilege by selectively disclosing some privileged documents ("cherry-picking") and by intending to call the solicitor as a witness on matters of substance related to the refinancing.

Consequently, the court ordered the production of the remaining undisclosed documents and awarded costs to the applicant.

The applicant brought a motion to compel the respondent to answer undertakings and produce documents, including unredacted files from third-party lenders and a real estate file over which solicitor-client privilege was claimed.

The court found the respondent had not made sufficient efforts to comply with her undertakings and ordered her to write directly to the third parties for unredacted files.

The court also ordered the allegedly privileged emails to be produced for a privilege review process.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the applicant.

An appeal from a Superior Court judgment dated August 1, 2018.

The appellants failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for April 2, 2019.

One appellant declared bankruptcy, though the stay was lifted as it relates to the appeal.

The other appellant left the jurisdiction.

The court scheduled the appeal for May 16, 2019, allowing the respondents to move to dismiss for non-compliance with procedural orders.

The appellants were warned that any adjournment request without prior conference call would likely fail.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment to recognize and enforce a U.S. default judgment in Ontario against the defendants for copyright and trademark infringement and unfair competition.

The defendants challenged the U.S. court's jurisdiction, alleged fraud, and claimed a denial of natural justice due to improper service.

The Ontario Superior Court found that the U.S. court properly exercised jurisdiction based on a 'real and substantial connection' to Virginia, dismissed the fraud defense, and confirmed proper service.

The court granted summary judgment, enforcing both the monetary damages and the permanent injunction from the U.S. judgment.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking possession of the individual defendant's residential home to satisfy a mortgage shortfall of approximately $978,000 following the sale of a commercial investment property.

The defendants opposed the motion, counterclaiming that the plaintiff sold the investment property improvidently for $4.8 million despite earlier appraisals valuing it much higher, and challenging nearly $500,000 in renewal fees and penalties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the conflicting property appraisals, the plaintiff's efforts to sell the property, and the legal effect and comprehension of the additional fees.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application challenging delay in the proceedings.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown and defendant proceeded to trial on January 15-17, 2018, approximately 18.5 months after the charges were laid on July 2, 2016.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

After deducting approximately three months of defence delay, the net delay was approximately 15.5 months, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to establish meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The Crown abandoned the over 80 charge due to inability to establish the two-hour presumption of identity.

The defence challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, alleging section 8 and 9 violations based on lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge found the arresting officer had ample reasonable and probable grounds based on the serious collision, witness identification, vehicle registration, and observable signs of impairment.

The court convicted on the impaired charge based on the totality of evidence including poor driving, admissions on the breath room video, breath readings, and observations of impairment.

The defendant real estate brokerage brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction requiring the plaintiff to vacate a jointly operated branch office, or alternatively, preventing the plaintiff from posting notices at the premises.

The parties were engaged in an acrimonious dispute over a joint venture agreement.

The court refused to grant the mandatory injunction requiring the plaintiff to vacate, finding the defendant failed to establish a strong prima facie case.

However, the court granted a limited injunction preventing the plaintiff from papering the front window with copies of a previous court order, as this conduct risked damaging the defendant's reputation and causing a default under the lease.

The plaintiff brought a motion to continue an interim interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from shutting down its website pending trial over a software license fee dispute.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm because damages would be an adequate remedy.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the defendants, as an injunction would be akin to ordering specific performance of a contract for personal services.

The motion was dismissed, but the court extended the interim injunction for six months on terms to allow the plaintiff time to find replacement software.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 operation) following a roadside stop on the Don Valley Parkway.

The Crown relied on breath test results from both an Approved Screening Device (ASD) administered at the roadside and an approved instrument administered at Traffic Services.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the stop and the timing of both breath tests, alleging Charter violations under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant had consumed alcohol, that the ASD test was administered "forthwith" despite a nine-minute delay in obtaining the device, and that the approved instrument test was administered "as soon as practicable" in compliance with the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found guilty.

The plaintiff sought an interim injunction to prevent the defendants from shutting down its website pending an interlocutory injunction hearing.

The parties had a software licensing agreement and disputed the monthly fees owed.

The court applied the RJR-McDonald test, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the agreement's terms, irreparable harm to the plaintiff's business if the website was shut down, and the balance of convenience favouring the plaintiff.

The court granted the interim injunction but ordered the plaintiff to continue paying the disputed higher monthly fee to maintain the status quo until the interlocutory hearing.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to Lixo Investments Limited and Granite Claims Solutions LP against AACR Inc. o/a Winmar Toronto/Brampton, following a set of three summary judgment motions.

Winmar's motion for summary judgment against all defendants was dismissed, while Granite's and Intact's motions to dismiss Winmar's claim against them were granted.

The court found Winmar acted unreasonably in bringing its summary judgment motion and in responding to Granite's motion.

The request for a Bullock Order and deferral of costs was denied, as these were deemed matters for the trial judge.

All cross-claims were dismissed without costs.

The plaintiff, Winmar, a contractor, brought a motion for summary judgment against the property owner (Lixo), the insurer (Intact), and the insurance adjuster (Granite) for unpaid work following a fire and subsequent flood.

Intact and Granite also brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss Winmar's claims against them.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding Winmar's claim against Lixo, particularly concerning the scope of work, the timing of the lien, and the quantum owed, as much of the work was related to a separate flood incident for a tenant (Club V) and not clearly authorized by Lixo.

Winmar's motion against Lixo was dismissed, but the action against Lixo was not dismissed.

The court granted Intact and Granite's motions for summary judgment, dismissing Winmar's claims against them, finding no direct contractual relationship, no benefit gained by them, and no jurisdiction under the Construction Lien Act for claims against non-owners or for quantum meruit/unjust enrichment against them.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal regarding the impaired driving conviction, finding the trial judge applied the correct legal test and the verdict was reasonable based on the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the refusal conviction because the trial judge failed to address the defence argument that the breath demand became invalid due to police delay in conducting the test 'as soon as practicable'.

A new trial was ordered for the refusal charge.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, brought a motion for an interlocutory mandatory injunction against the defendants, a real estate brokerage and its owner, with whom he had entered into a joint venture agreement to open a new branch office.

The plaintiff sought orders directing the release of withheld commissions, appointing him as office manager, and prohibiting the defendants from incurring expenses over $1,000 without his approval.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case for the release of commissions and failed to demonstrate irreparable harm regarding the alleged breach of the joint venture agreement's expense approval clause.

The defendant home inspector brought a motion to set aside a default judgment granted to the plaintiffs four years prior.

The plaintiffs had sued the defendant for professional negligence and breach of contract regarding a home inspection that failed to disclose severe water damage and rot.

The defendant failed to defend the action, citing severe health issues including a heart attack and rheumatoid arthritis.

Despite the significant delay and procedural non-compliance, the court found an arguable defence on the merits and no genuine prejudice to the plaintiffs' ability to prove their case.

The court exercised its discretion to set aside the default judgment, but imposed strict terms including payment of costs thrown away and payment into court as security.

A commercial tenant sought declarations that a landlord’s distraint against its goods for alleged rent arrears was unlawful and that the landlord had forfeited the lease.

The landlord had changed the locks to the premises while simultaneously posting a distress notice demanding payment of a substantially inflated sum that included amounts not payable under the lease.

The court held that a landlord must choose between the mutually exclusive remedies of forfeiture and distress and that the landlord’s conduct effectively excluded the tenant from the premises.

By locking the tenant out and conditioning re-entry on payment of improper charges, the landlord forfeited the lease and the subsequent distress was unlawful.

Declarations were granted and a trial of damages was directed.

The defendant brought a motion to strike portions of a statement of claim as an abuse of process after an oppression application under the Ontario Business Corporations Act was converted into an action.

The moving party argued that the plaintiff improperly added allegations and prayers for relief against her that were not contained in the original notice of application and did so without leave of the court.

The court held that the conversion order authorized delivery of a statement of claim and imposed no requirement that it mirror the originating application.

The court found the moving party had long been aware of the nature of the claims against her and that no new cause of action was asserted.

The motion was dismissed and the plaintiff was awarded costs.

A vehicle leasing company sued lessees for arrears arising from three motor vehicle leases after the leases were assigned from the original lessor.

The defendants denied liability, asserting the vehicles had been returned and that no arrears were outstanding.

The court found the assignment of the leases valid and concluded the defendants had notice of the assignment.

After assessing credibility and business records, the court rejected the defendants’ claim that two of the vehicles had been returned and accepted the plaintiff’s evidence regarding outstanding arrears.

Judgment was granted requiring payment of arrears under the respective leases by the responsible defendants.