Paul F. Monahan

The defendant, a commercial truck driver, pleaded guilty to three counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after rear-ending a stationary vehicle on Highway 401 without braking.

The collision caused devastating, life-altering injuries to the three occupants of the other vehicle.

The court found the defendant's conduct was a marked departure from the standard of care, aggravated by his operation of a large commercial vehicle for remuneration.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed consecutive 9-month sentences for each victim, totaling 27 months of institutional custody, along with a 3-year driving prohibition.

The 20-year-old first-time offender pled guilty to possession of a restricted firearm and possession of 117 kg of cocaine and 3.8 kg of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court balanced the paramount sentencing objectives of rehabilitation and individual deterrence for youthful offenders against the need for denunciation and general deterrence given the enormous quantity of drugs and the presence of a loaded handgun.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 10 years, comprising 8 years for the drug offence and 2 years consecutive for the firearm offence, less credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with a breath demand under section 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial involved a directed verdict application and a Charter application alleging violations under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that while the directed verdict application was dismissed, the defendant's refusal to provide a breath sample was provisional only, pending access to counsel.

The police failed to meet the reasonable diligence standard by denying the defendant's repeated requests for access to the internet to find private counsel.

The court found no actus reus for the refusal offence and acquitted the defendant.

The appellant, David Kawal, appealed his convictions for attempt murder, robbery with a restricted or prohibited weapon, and kidnapping with a restricted or prohibited weapon.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the jury verdicts reasonable and the trial judge’s instructions proper.

The court found no merit in arguments regarding the reasonableness of the verdicts, the instructions on circumstantial evidence, eyewitness identification, or the elements of the offences.

The sentence appeal was previously abandoned.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Gerrard De Souza’s appeal from convictions for indecent assault and sexual assault.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal, all relating to the trial judge’s assessment of credibility and reliability.

The Court found no error in the trial judge’s approach, holding that her findings were grounded in the evidence and not in stereotypes or improper reasoning.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge’s handling of inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence or in her rejection of the defence theory of motive to fabricate.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered whether a section 10(b) Charter breach occurred when police allowed the accused to speak to a paralegal instead of a lawyer after arrest for impaired driving and over 80 mg alcohol in blood.

The court found a breach because a paralegal is not authorized to provide legal advice in impaired driving cases, and police should have known this.

Despite the breach, applying the three-part Grant test, the court declined to exclude the breath sample evidence, finding the breach was of moderate seriousness, the impact on the accused’s rights was moderate, and society’s interest in reliable evidence favored inclusion.

The accused was found guilty on the over 80 mg charge.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a section 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to delay in the trial of A.H., charged with multiple offences including sexual assault.

The court analyzed the total delay from charge to trial, the defence delay, and the impact of multiple earlier trial dates offered and declined by the defence at the Backlog Reduction Court.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s Jordan framework and recent case law on defence delay apportionment, the court apportioned delay fairly between the Crown and defence, ultimately finding the net delay just under the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

Despite this, the court granted a stay, finding the defence had taken meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the defendant Robert Montet’s Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in relation to breath sample evidence obtained following a roadside Approved Screening Device (ASD) failure.

The Court found no breach of section 7 regarding alleged failure to provide fresh clothing, no section 8 violation as the warrantless breath demands were reasonable, no section 9 violation for alleged arbitrary detention despite a 6.5-hour hold post-breath sample, and no section 10(b) violation for delays in providing rights to counsel.

The breath sample evidence was admitted, resulting in a finding of guilt for driving with blood alcohol content over 80 mg per 100 mL under section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to comply with an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand under the Criminal Code.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed or refused to provide the required breath sample.

The court found that the 37-second period given to the defendant to provide a sample, under challenging conditions (rain, night, highway, recent accident, language barrier, new officer), was insufficient.

Furthermore, the lack of audio on police dash cam video and inadequate officer notes created a vacuum of evidence regarding the defendant's statements during the critical period.

The court was not satisfied that the defendant explicitly refused or failed to comply.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant, Ghassan Kullab, a Lyft driver, was found guilty of sexual assault.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability and the breach of trust by Kullab as a ride-share driver.

Mitigating factors included his lack of criminal record and mental health issues.

The court also addressed potential collateral immigration consequences, noting that a sentence of six months or more would remove his appeal rights for deportation.

After reviewing similar cases, the court imposed a sentence of six months less a day in institutional custody, followed by two years probation and other ancillary orders, concluding that a conditional sentence was not appropriate given the breach of trust.

The respondent, Meththa Fernando, appealed her conviction for failing to comply with an order under Section 58 of the Quarantine Act, specifically for refusing a random COVID-19 nasal swab test upon arrival at Pearson Airport.

The court found that Section 14(1) of the Quarantine Act prohibits screening technology that involves the entry of an instrument or foreign body into a traveller's body.

The nasal swab was deemed an "instrument" or "foreign body" and its insertion into the nasal cavity was considered an entry into the body.

Therefore, the screening officer's demand for the test was unlawful, rendering Ms. Fernando's refusal lawful.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was reversed, and a finding of not guilty was entered.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 (unreasonable search/seizure) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, dismissing the section 8 claim.

Regarding section 10(b), the court determined there were no special circumstances requiring an interpreter, as the defendant demonstrated sufficient English comprehension and understood his rights.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the defendant was found guilty of both impaired driving and over 80 charges.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 26 months and 8 days (800 days).

The court analyzed periods of delay, attributing 161 days to defence delay due to failure to promptly set a trial date and incorrect availability advice.

An additional 193 days of delay were equally apportioned between the defence and the court due to defence counsel's unavailability and the court's inability to offer earlier dates.

After deductions, the net delay was 446 days (approximately 14.6 months), which is well below the Jordan ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed as the defence could not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings, nor did the case take markedly longer than it should have.

The defendant, Dwight Dube, was charged with impaired driving and over 80.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) due to excessive force during arrest and improper implementation of the right to counsel.

The court found that police used excessive force, violating section 7 of the Charter, but found no violation of sections 8, 9, or 10(b).

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath sample evidence and police observations of potential impairment, leading to an acquittal on both charges.

The defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn (October 10, 2021) to the anticipated end of trial (April 18, 2024) was 922 days.

The court deducted 43 days for defence delay in scheduling a JPT and 14 days as an exceptional circumstance for trial scheduling due to the pandemic.

The court found no further defence delay for failing to proactively assert s. 11(b) rights, as the Crown had twice declined to prioritize the case.

Despite potential Covid-19 deductions, the net delay of 807 days (26.5 months) remained well above the 18-month Jordan ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused, M.W., charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to alleged unreasonable delay.

The total delay from information sworn to anticipated trial end was 1334 days.

The court analyzed various periods of delay, attributing portions to defence conduct (e.g., change of counsel, failure to attend court, late notice of s. 11(b) concerns) and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic).

After deducting defence and pandemic-related delays, the net delay was calculated to be 514 days (approximately 16.9 months), which falls below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, and therefore dismissed the application for a stay.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The anticipated total delay was approximately 17.6 months, which fell under the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court deducted 48 days of defence delay because the defence declined earlier trial dates offered by the Crown.

The net delay was calculated at 16 months.

The court found that the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, and the defence failed to take meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, such as scheduling a judicial pre-trial to address late disclosure.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault.

The total delay was 778 days.

The court found that the defence failed to raise s. 11(b) concerns in a timely manner after trial dates were set outside the Jordan ceiling, attributing 243 days as defence delay.

With an additional 65 days of conceded defence delay, the net delay was calculated at 470 days (15.5 months), which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

This is a sentencing decision for Chandramattie Dave and Ravindra Dave, who pleaded guilty to trading in securities while prohibited by an Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) order, contrary to s. 122(1)(c) of the Securities Act.

Both defendants were subject to market bans.

The OSC sought a fine and probation, while the defendants sought a suspended sentence and probation.

The court considered the defendants' impecunious state, poor health, diminished moral blameworthiness due to reliance on incorrect legal advice, lack of investor loss, and guilty pleas.

Applying regulatory sentencing principles, the court imposed a suspended sentence with two years probation for each defendant, including the forfeiture of $2,250 to the OSC, but declined to impose a fine due to the defendants' inability to pay.

The accused, Wilton Williams, pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the quantity of fentanyl and cocaine, and numerous mitigating factors, such as the offender's lack of criminal record, youthfulness, remorse, significant rehabilitative efforts (obtaining welding qualifications), strong family support, and the impact of anti-Black racism on his life choices.

The court emphasized that deterrence and denunciation are primary objectives in fentanyl trafficking cases, but rehabilitation remains important, especially when social context evidence is presented.

The court found that a conditional sentence would be consistent with sentencing principles, promoting rehabilitation without endangering community safety, and would be more effective than institutional custody in ensuring the offender remains on a positive path.