Daniel S. Freudman

The defendant, Balwinderjit Singh, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment issued against him in 2015 by The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank) for an alleged credit card debt.

Singh claimed he was unaware of the judgment until June 2022 and argued the debt arose from unauthorized fraudulent transactions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Singh's explanation for his default implausible given evidence of prior communications and garnishments, and concluding that his proposed defence lacked an "air of reality" due to insufficient particulars.

This is an appeal concerning an insurer's duty to defend.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for an assault due to a psychotic episode, sought coverage under his homeowner's policy.

The insurer denied coverage based on an exclusion for bodily harm arising from intentional or criminal acts.

The application judge found the negligence claim derivative of an intentional tort and that the exclusion applied.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the true nature of the claim was an intentional act, despite the appellant's mental state, thus affirming the applicability of the exclusion clause.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and struck her pleadings as frivolous, scandalous, and vexatious.

The core of her claim concerned how her insurer handled her statutory accident benefits claims, alleging a conspiracy with healthcare practitioners to stage examinations and produce false reports, and breach of privacy.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the Licence Appeal Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes related to statutory accident benefits under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, regardless of how the claims are framed.

The Court also upheld the denial of leave to amend pleadings and dismissed the appeal regarding costs due to procedural non-compliance and lack of error in principle.

The plaintiff, Celia Yang, claimed $150 million in damages against her insurer and various service providers, alleging misconduct in the administration of her statutory accident benefits (SABs) claims.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim, arguing it contravened pleading rules, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction (as SABs disputes fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal), and the claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action (including breach of Charter, PIPEDA, tort of bribery, spoliation, breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and conspiracy).

The court dismissed the action, finding the statement of claim scandalous, the court lacked jurisdiction over SABs-related complaints, and the pleaded causes of action were untenable.

The Crown sought full forfeiture of a $75,000 recognizance against an offender and two sureties following the offender's conviction for breaching bail conditions, including house arrest and a no-contact order with a specific individual.

The sureties argued for a lesser amount.

The court considered factors such as the sureties' diligence, financial means, and the duration of the breach, ultimately ordering partial forfeiture amounts for the offender and each surety.

Following a successful forfeiture application under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, the Attorney General of Ontario sought costs of $15,443.51 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Interested Party, Eric Mahama, did not oppose the costs claim.

The court found the requested costs to be fair and reasonable, considering the four-year duration of the forfeiture application and the contested nature of the original proceeding.

The full amount of costs claimed by the Attorney General was granted.

The Attorney General of Ontario applied for a forfeiture order under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, seeking to forfeit $75,613 in Canadian currency and $1,734 in U.S. currency seized during a police search.

The currency was found in an apartment along with significant quantities of marihuana and crack cocaine, and drug paraphernalia.

The interested party, Eric Mahama, claimed the money was his life savings from lawful activities, stored at the apartment due to his mother's dementia.

The court found, on a balance of probabilities, that the seized currency constituted both proceeds and an instrument of unlawful activity (drug trafficking), rejecting Mahama's explanation as not credible.

The application for forfeiture was granted.

The Crown charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by drugs on March 31, 2015.

The defendant had consumed multiple prescription medications including OxyNEO, Oxycodone, Clonazepam, and Gabapentin.

An off-duty officer observed erratic driving and called for assistance.

At the roadside, officers observed symptoms consistent with drug impairment.

A Drug Recognition Evaluator conducted Standard Field Sobriety Tests and a Drug Recognition Evaluation at the police station.

A urinalysis detected narcotic analgesics and benzodiazepines.

The defendant argued Charter breaches regarding the timing of the demand for field sobriety tests and the delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court found a technical breach of section 10(b) Charter rights but excluded no evidence under section 24(2).

The court convicted the defendant, finding that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by prescription drugs and that he possessed the requisite mens rea.

The applicant sought a conditional stay of proceedings pending the appointment of state-funded counsel, arguing indigence and the necessity of counsel for a fair trial given the serious and complex charges.

The Crown opposed, alleging lack of financial transparency and prudence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to discharge the heavy burden of proving indigence, having not provided sufficient financial documentation, made reasonable sacrifices, or prioritized legal fees over other expenditures.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

She was pulled over after being observed swerving within her lane.

A drug recognition evaluation was conducted, and a urine sample was obtained which tested positive for GHB, 7-Aminoclonazepam, methamphetamine, and amphetamine.

The Crown relied on observations of the accused's driving, her performance on the drug evaluation test, and toxicology evidence to establish impairment.

The court acquitted the accused, finding that while the circumstances were suspicious, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug at the time of driving.