Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The sentencing judge had imposed a $1,500 fine but declined to impose the mandatory minimum 12-month driving prohibition under s. 320.24 of the Criminal Code, citing the respondent's personal circumstances and an administrative suspension.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge cannot ignore the statutory mandatory minimum absent a constitutional challenge.

A 12-month driving prohibition was imposed.

The Crown appealed two conditional sentences imposed for possession of child pornography, arguing that each sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appeal judge agreed that both sentencing judges overemphasized mitigating factors and failed to give sufficient weight to denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and the aggravating features identified in recent appellate guidance, including the size and nature of the collections and, in one case, the erroneous treatment of anime material as a mitigating factor.

The court held that custodial sentences should have been imposed in both cases.

However, because both respondents had already served substantial portions of their conditional sentences, the court concluded that incarcerating them was not in the interests of justice and dismissed the Crown's appeals.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder following an unprovoked stabbing of an unarmed man at a homeless shelter.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 18 to 20 years, while the defence argued for 12 years.

The court considered the offender's extensive criminal record involving violence, the element of planning, and the profound impact on the victim's family, balanced against the offender's mental health struggles and difficult background.

The court imposed a life sentence with a 15-year parole ineligibility period, along with mandatory weapons prohibition and DNA orders.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge imposed on the respondent, an employee at an illegal psilocybin storefront, who pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

Police seized over 126 kg of psilocybin.

The Superior Court of Justice found the sentencing judge erred in principle by suggesting the respondent might not have known the enterprise was illegal, which contradicted the essence of his guilty pleas.

The appeal court also found the conditional discharge demonstrably unfit given the large quantity of drugs and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to a suspended sentence.

The accused was found slumped on a trail by police, exhibiting signs of a drug overdose.

While attempting to assist him and locate identification for paramedics, police discovered a large quantity of cash and drugs in his pockets and knapsack.

The accused argued the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights and sought exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court assumed a breach but admitted the evidence, finding the police were acting in a caretaking capacity during a medical emergency.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he stole the drugs to commit suicide, finding it uncredible, and convicted him of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for an impaired driving offence involving operation with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The sentencing judge reduced the statutory one‑year driving prohibition to account for pre‑sentence bail conditions that prevented the respondent from driving.

The court held that amendments to s. 320.24 of the Criminal Code make driving prohibitions prospective only and require them to take effect on the date the order is made.

As a result, sentencing judges have no authority to reduce the mandatory minimum prohibition to reflect pre‑sentence conditions or administrative suspensions.

Although the appeal was allowed, the mandatory 12‑month prohibition had already expired, rendering the practical effect of the ruling moot.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder for his role in a contract killing, brought a faint hope application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code seeking to reduce his 25-year parole ineligibility period.

The court conducted a judicial screening to determine if there was a reasonable prospect of success before a jury.

Despite some recent positive behaviour in custody, the court dismissed the application, citing the heinous nature of the contract killing, the applicant's failure to fully accept responsibility, and his extensive history of institutional misconduct.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter following a group attack on a TTC bus passenger.

The offender punched the victim to the ground twice, preventing his escape, while fully aware that a co-accused possessed and was using a knife to stab the victim.

The court weighed significant mitigating factors, including the offender's troubled upbringing, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, against the gravity of the unprovoked group attack.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding it would not adequately reflect denunciation and deterrence, and imposed a sentence of 2 years plus one day in a federal penitentiary, in addition to 30 months of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

The applicant sought to quash a warrant issued under s. 23(10) of the Food and Drugs Act authorizing Health Canada inspectors to enter a dwelling house and seize non-compliant health products, and to obtain the return of the seized goods.

The applicant argued the Superior Court had jurisdiction because the warrant was issued under Criminal Code provisions.

The court rejected this argument, finding the warrant derived from the FDA, not the Criminal Code, and that the inspectors constituted a federal board or tribunal under the Federal Courts Act.

The court held that the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction to review the seizure and declined to hear the application.

The applicant sought severance from her co-accused on the basis that a joint trial would result in significant prejudice and an unfair trial.

The applicant faces a charge of first degree murder while her co-accused faces second degree murder, despite the Crown alleging the same conduct of planning and deliberation against both.

The applicant argued that the differential charges would improperly lead the jury to conclude she is more culpable.

The Crown opposed severance, arguing that any prejudice would be eliminated through proper jury instructions.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding that the presumption of joint trial applies with particular force where co-accused are blaming each other, that the evidence is the same against both, and that jury instructions would adequately protect against any risk of prejudicial reasoning.

The applicant, a permanent resident from Barbados, sought leave to extend the time to file an appeal of a sentence imposed on July 7, 2021, for breaking and entering offences.

The applicant's motivation was to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order to the Immigration Appeal Division, as sentences of six months or more eliminate this right.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal, failed to adequately explain the delay, and that the appeal had been rendered moot by the applicant's subsequent conviction and nine-month sentence imposed on February 19, 2025.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to file a Notice of Application to challenge the Crown's decision to withdraw charges against a third party.

The applicant had been informed of the Crown's intention to withdraw on December 13, 2024, with the withdrawal occurring on January 22, 2025.

The applicant did not file his application until April 8, 2025, well beyond the 30-day deadline.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the required period and failed to provide a credible explanation for the delay.

Additionally, the court found no merit to the applicant's allegations of abuse of process by the Crown.

The application was dismissed.

The decision concerns the bail application of Matias Domingo Sanchez Nanuclef, who faces extradition to the United States for his alleged involvement in a $15 million jewellery store burglary in San Diego.

The court reviews the factual background, the legal onus for bail in extradition cases, and the proposed plan of release.

The application is denied on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, with the court finding that the applicant is not ordinarily resident in Canada, poses a flight risk, and that detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant, Fouad Barkouk, appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from his conduct as a driving instructor.

The appeal was allowed due to a material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, specifically regarding whether the appellant admitted to touching the complainant’s leg.

The court found that this error was significant in the trial judge’s reasoning and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The appellant, Zaheer Ahmad, appealed his convictions for failing to comply with a court order, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly apply the test for circumstantial evidence as set out in R. v. Villaroman.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the evidence and the trial judge’s reasoning, finding that the judge was entitled to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was the author of the emails in question.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court sentenced Arthur Kotula for two counts of dangerous operation causing death and two counts of dangerous operation causing bodily harm, following a fatal multi-vehicle collision.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including Kotula’s lack of prior record, his immigration status, and the impact on the victims’ families.

The court imposed a global sentence of six and a half years, with ancillary orders including a DNA order, a 15-year driving prohibition, and a weapons prohibition.

The decision discusses the sentencing range for dangerous driving offences and the effect of recent legislative amendments.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed the Crown's appeal from an absolute discharge imposed on Jennel Christie for assault causing bodily harm.

The Court found the sentence demonstrably unfit, given the seriousness of the offence, the lack of consideration for public interest, and errors in the sentencing judge’s reasoning regarding employment and immigration consequences.

The Court substituted a nine-month conditional sentence with strict conditions, followed by one year of probation.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after the trial judge found multiple Charter breaches, including a pat down search by a male officer that involved touching under the respondent’s breast area.

The Superior Court found that the search was brief, professional, and not unreasonable in the circumstances, and that there was no breach of sections 7, 8, or 12 of the Charter.

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The court summarily dismissed George Georgiou’s application to stay or terminate the execution of a U.S. Final Forfeiture Order (FFO) against funds held in Ontario, finding the application manifestly frivolous.

The court held that it had no jurisdiction to strike down U.S. orders, and that all appeals and challenges to the conviction and forfeiture order had been exhausted in both the U.S. and Canada.

The court also rejected allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and denied a request for further disclosure, finding no evidentiary basis for such claims.

The applicant, Brandon Caleb, sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that the delay in bringing his case to trial violated his right under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reviewed the procedural history, including the complexity of the Project Venom prosecution, the joining and severing of accused, and the Crown’s management of the case.

Applying the framework from R. v. Jordan, the court found that although the presumptive ceiling for delay was exceeded, the case was sufficiently complex and the Crown had a concrete plan to minimize delay.

Exceptional circumstances justified the delay, and the application was dismissed.