Marnie Goldenberg

Criminal trial for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was driving at speeds between 149 km/hr and 192 km/hr in a 60 km/hr zone on a major arterial roadway in Toronto when he failed to negotiate a bend, crossed into oncoming traffic, and struck and killed the victim.

The court rejected defence challenges to the credibility of Crown witnesses including the collision reconstructionist and vehicle examiner, found the accused's driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, and was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on all essential elements of the offence.

Finding of guilt entered.

The court sentenced Arthur Kotula for two counts of dangerous operation causing death and two counts of dangerous operation causing bodily harm, following a fatal multi-vehicle collision.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including Kotula’s lack of prior record, his immigration status, and the impact on the victims’ families.

The court imposed a global sentence of six and a half years, with ancillary orders including a DNA order, a 15-year driving prohibition, and a weapons prohibition.

The decision discusses the sentencing range for dangerous driving offences and the effect of recent legislative amendments.

This decision addresses multiple criminal charges against Yinuo Liu, including assault, forcible confinement, criminal harassment, possession of weapons for a dangerous purpose, and impersonation of a peace officer.

The case primarily hinges on the credibility and reliability of the complainant, Ms. Yu, whose testimony was found to be inconsistent, evasive, and motivated by animus and retribution.

The court carefully analyzed the evidence, including text messages, social media posts, and police testimony, and found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Liu intended to impersonate a police officer or that he assaulted, confined, or harassed Ms. Yu.

The court acquitted Mr. Liu on all counts, emphasizing the importance of the presumption of innocence and the high standard of proof required in criminal cases.

The court sentenced Josue Varela Granado for a series of offences including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, impaired driving, and related offences.

The court found the circumstances to be at the most serious end of the spectrum for true crime firearm possession, emphasizing the aggravating factors of impairment, public possession, and resistance to arrest.

The total sentence imposed was seven years and 15 days, with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, forfeiture, and a driving prohibition.

The court considered mitigating factors such as youth, rehabilitative potential, family support, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, but prioritized deterrence and denunciation.

This is a sentencing decision for Jayson Jeyakanthan and Janson Jeyakanthan, who were found guilty of multiple firearm-related offences.

Jayson was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a loaded firearm, and careless storage of two firearms, while Janson was convicted of joint possession, carrying a concealed weapon as a party, careless storage of two firearms, and two counts of breach of recognizance.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles due to the public danger posed by the firearms.

Aggravating factors for Jayson included his criminal record, displaying a firearm in a crowded public place, and the impact on the victim.

For Janson, aggravating factors included being on bail and breaching its terms.

The court found minimal mitigating factors.

Jayson received a global sentence of six years, and Janson received a global sentence of three years, with specific allocations for each offence.

The decision also addressed pre-trial custody credits (Summers, Duncan, Downes), granting some enhanced credits for harsh detention conditions but limiting others due to the offenders' conduct, particularly egregious bail breaches.

Ancillary orders included DNA, lifetime weapons prohibitions, and forfeiture.

Mario Mendonca was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg.

The defence filed a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and dismissed all Charter arguments, finding no breaches.

The evidence, including blood alcohol readings, was admitted.

Mendonca was found guilty on both charges.

The accused brothers were involved in an altercation at a McDonald's where one displayed a firearm.

They fled and were subsequently arrested by police near an alleyway where two loaded handguns were found under a parked van.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging breaches of their rights under ss. 7, 9, and 10, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of the firearms.

The court found a breach of s. 9 for failing to bring the accused before a justice within 24 hours, and a breach of one accused's s. 10(b) rights due to delays in contacting his counsel of choice.

However, applying the Grant test, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) and refused a stay of proceedings.

On the merits, one accused was acquitted of assault due to self-defence, and the other was acquitted of pointing a firearm.

Both were found guilty of careless storage and possession of the firearms based on circumstantial evidence, with one also convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.

The defendant, Carlos Galeano, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) by police during a traffic stop and subsequent vehicle search under the Cannabis Control Act (CCA), and delayed access to counsel.

The court found that while the initial traffic stop and grounds for a CCA search were valid, the search itself was conducted in an unreasonable and overbroad manner, exceeding the statutory authority.

Furthermore, police failed to facilitate access to counsel at the scene and during a lengthy delay at the police station.

Consequently, the court found breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter and ordered the exclusion of all seized evidence and statements under s. 24(2).

The offender, a professional truck driver, pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing death after his tractor-trailer struck and killed a pedestrian on the highway.

Although not at fault for the collision, the offender failed to stop, continued his route, and later attempted to conceal his dashcam memory card from police.

The court weighed the offender's guilty plea, remorse, and pro-social background against the aggravating factors of his professional driver status and attempts to avoid detection.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 months in custody, a $1,000 fine, and a 17-month driving prohibition.

The applicant, J.L., sought leave to introduce electronic records and cross-examine the complainant, B.M., regarding their contents, as well as to testify about them, pursuant to section 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The records included Facebook messages from November 2015 suggesting prior sexual activity, messages from April 2016 discussing sleeping arrangements and having a flirtatious tone before the alleged assault, and messages from April 2016 (the day after the alleged assault) and later, which discussed the sexual encounter and the complainant's departure.

The Crown and complainant's counsel objected to admissibility.

The court found the November 2015 messages relevant as a specific instance of sexual activity and potentially contradictory to the complainant's police statement.

The April 2016 pre-assault messages were found relevant for impeachment value and to provide context for the complainant's decision to come to the applicant's residence.

The April 2016 post-assault messages were deemed relevant as a potential prior inconsistent statement regarding the complainant's departure.

The court applied the factors under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the records were not being adduced for prohibited inferences, had probative value, were necessary for full answer and defence, and would not prejudice the administration of justice or have a chilling effect.

All three sets of communications were admitted as evidence, and the applicant was permitted to cross-examine the complainant and testify regarding them.

The accused, Theofanes Kalamaras, applied to reopen his trial after being found guilty of "over 80" but prior to sentencing.

The application sought to introduce fresh evidence from the accused and his wife regarding the police officer's initial interaction and alleged coercion, which the defence argued would support previously dismissed Charter applications (ss. 7, 8, 10(a)).

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence, finding a significant lack of due diligence in not presenting the evidence at trial.

Crucially, the court determined that even if the new evidence were admitted and believed, it would not reasonably have affected the trial's outcome, as other evidence overwhelmingly supported the officer's reasonable suspicion and the alleged Charter breaches were minor and did not impact the investigation's course.

The application to reopen the trial was dismissed.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a motion to exclude breathalyzer test results, arguing that his Charter right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated by police following his arrest.

The court found no breach of either the informational or implementational components of the right to counsel.

The accused was convicted after conceding the facts regarding care and control.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by drug following observations of erratic driving, two motor vehicle accidents, and physical indicia of impairment.

The trial judge found Charter breaches regarding the suspension of the right to counsel at the roadside and the failure to obtain an informed and unequivocal waiver of counsel at the police station.

Evidence obtained following these breaches was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the trial judge found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on admissible evidence including civilian witness testimony of erratic driving, police observations of physical impairment indicators, and expert evidence regarding the effects of drugs on driving ability.

Elias Osman was convicted by a jury of impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death after a crash killed his friend.

The court considered aggravating factors, including high blood alcohol content and high speed, and mitigating factors, such as the offender's youth, lack of prior record, community support, genuine remorse, and significant personal injuries from the crash.

The judge found that the victim's act of grabbing the steering wheel was an intervening act, but Osman's impairment and negligence were still significant contributing causes of death.

The primary sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation were balanced with rehabilitation and parity.

A sentence of 5 years in penitentiary was imposed concurrently for both counts, along with a 7-year driving prohibition and a no-contact order.

The defendant was charged with three counts of dangerous driving and three counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident arising from a motor vehicle collision between a tractor trailer and a group of motorcyclists on Highway 401.

The court ruled on the admissibility of the defendant's statements given at the accident scene as a pre-trial motion.

The defendant argued that his statements were statutorily compelled under section 199 of the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible in criminal proceedings.

The Crown argued that the defendant was merely a witness to the accident, not involved in it, and that his statements were motivated by self-interest rather than statutory compulsion.

The court found that the defendant was "directly or indirectly involved" in the accident, honestly and reasonably believed he was required to report it, was not motivated by self-interest, and reported the accident within the "forthwith" requirement.

Accordingly, the defendant's statements were excluded from evidence as statutorily compelled statements protected by the Charter.

Nedeljko Mikasinovic was convicted by a jury of assault causing bodily harm, an included offence of aggravated assault.

The sentencing judge rejected the defense's claim of self-defense, finding the assault unprovoked, gratuitous, and disproportionate, resulting in severe and permanent brain injury to the victim.

Despite mitigating factors such as the offender's efforts to rehabilitate and positive character references, the judge found the offender lacked genuine remorse and had a history of violent offenses.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 2.5 years, while the defense sought a suspended or intermittent sentence.

The court imposed a 14-month reformatory sentence, two years probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by the accused, Eric Brown, concerning drug consumption and cell phone use prior to a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of Mr. Brown's Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and (b).

The court found that the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to the police's failure to caution Mr. Brown about the use of his statements and the full extent of his jeopardy, especially after the victim's death was known.

Furthermore, the court determined that Mr. Brown was detained when placed in the police vehicle and that the police breached his ss. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights by not promptly informing him of the reasons for his detention or his right to counsel, nor of the victim's death.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing conduct was serious, the impact on Mr. Brown's rights significant, and that admitting the statements would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, both the statements made to police and the recorded telephone conversation with his mother were excluded from evidence at trial.

The defendant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a motorcycle collision where he was speeding and weaving through traffic, striking a pedestrian on the sidewalk who sustained severe injuries.

The court considered general deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing factors, along with mitigating factors such as no alcohol involvement and a non-intentional act.

Despite the defendant's expression of sorrow, the court noted his continued denial of fault and intent to resume motorcycle riding.

The court sentenced the defendant to 12 months in custody, 2 years' probation, and a 5-year motorcycle driving prohibition, declining ancillary DNA and firearms orders.

The accused, charged with aggravated assault, brought a Corbett application to prohibit the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record.

The record consisted of youth and adult convictions that were over a decade old, including a suspended sentence for assault.

The court granted the application, finding that the probative value of the remote convictions was low and outweighed by the risk of the jury engaging in prohibited propensity reasoning, especially given the limited nature of the defence's attack on the Crown witnesses' credibility.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and criminal negligence causing bodily harm after his motorcycle collided with a left-turning vehicle and struck a pedestrian on the sidewalk.

Dash camera footage showed the accused speeding and weaving between vehicles, obscuring his view of the intersection.

The court found the accused's driving was a marked departure from the standard of care, resulting in a conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

However, the court acquitted the accused of criminal negligence, finding his actions did not amount to wanton or reckless disregard.