Carolyne G. Kerr

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, citing a delay of over 20 months.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional complexity of the case, which involved a large-scale drug investigation with multiple co-accused, wiretaps, and voluminous disclosure.

The court adopted a conservative approach, attributing three months of delay to the COVID-19 backlog as a discrete exceptional event, bringing the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found the case was particularly complex, justifying the overall delay.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied.

The accused, a gymnastics coach, was charged with sexual interference and luring in relation to a young female athlete he coached.

The Crown alleged the accused repeatedly touched the complainant's buttocks during training and later sent her pictures of his genitals via Snapchat.

The trial judge applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the competing testimonies.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and noted the absence of corroborating evidence, including the missing Snapchat photos.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding both the actus reus and mens rea of the offences.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The Crown brought an application seeking reconsideration of the admissibility of evidence of prior discreditable conduct statements made by the accused to police in 2013.

The Crown argued that the accused's re-election to a judge-alone trial constituted a material change in circumstances justifying reconsideration.

The court found that while the evidence had some probative value, its prejudicial effect, particularly the danger of moral prejudice and undermining trial fairness, significantly outweighed its probative value, even in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application was denied.

The offender was convicted of two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after accelerating to 117 km/h in a 70 km/h zone and colliding with a left-turning vehicle.

The collision caused catastrophic, permanent traumatic brain injuries to a teenage passenger and serious injuries to the driver.

The Crown sought three years' imprisonment, while the defence sought six months.

The court weighed the profound impact on the victims against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, and the fact that the victim driver's unsafe left turn contributed to the collision.

The offender was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment and a three-year driving prohibition.

The accused, charged with sexual interference and luring, brought a pretrial motion alleging his s. 7 and s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated during a 2013 police interview regarding a separate incident.

The Crown brought a cross-motion seeking to admit the 2013 statement as voluntary and as prior discreditable conduct.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the accused was not psychologically detained during the interview.

However, the court ruled that the probative value of the statement as prior discreditable conduct was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, as it would invite propensity reasoning.

The Crown's application to adduce the evidence was denied.

The accused was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a serious intersection collision.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d).

The court found that police violated his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) rights by psychologically detaining him at the scene without providing rights to counsel, and violated his s. 8 rights by seizing his vehicle's airbag control module without a warrant and failing to file a report to a justice.

The court excluded the module data under s. 24(2).

However, relying on dashcam video from another vehicle, the court found the accused's driving—accelerating to nearly 50 km/h over the speed limit and passing a stopped vehicle in an intersection—constituted a marked departure from the standard of care and was a significant contributing cause of the collision.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused, charged with sexual offences against a child, brought a pre-trial application to determine whether a letter written by the complainant and retrieved from the trash by her mother constituted a 'record' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The letter was provided to the police and subsequently given to the defence as part of Crown disclosure.

The court held that the admissibility regime under s. 278.92 only applies to records in the accused's possession or control obtained outside of Crown disclosure or a successful Mills application.

Consequently, the letter did not qualify as a 'record' under this regime, and its admissibility would be governed by common law rules of evidence.

Elias Osman was convicted by a jury of impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death after a crash killed his friend.

The court considered aggravating factors, including high blood alcohol content and high speed, and mitigating factors, such as the offender's youth, lack of prior record, community support, genuine remorse, and significant personal injuries from the crash.

The judge found that the victim's act of grabbing the steering wheel was an intervening act, but Osman's impairment and negligence were still significant contributing causes of death.

The primary sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation were balanced with rehabilitation and parity.

A sentence of 5 years in penitentiary was imposed concurrently for both counts, along with a 7-year driving prohibition and a no-contact order.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control, over 80 care or control, and possession of crack cocaine following a police investigation that began when officers observed him and a woman in a truck in a laneway.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: an unjustified flashlight search violating section 8; an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds violating section 8; and multiple violations of the right to counsel under section 10(b), including delayed notification of rights, questioning after invocation of counsel, and failure to re-advise on a new charge.

The court excluded all evidence and acquitted the accused on all charges.

Summary conviction appeal from a sexual assault conviction arising from an employer's staff party.

The appellant argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence concerning the complainant’s intoxication, dancing, evolving account of the assault, scene location, and surrounding circumstances, and also reversed the burden of proof by faulting the defence for calling only certain witnesses.

The appeal court held that the reasons focused on credibility without adequately addressing reliability, contained several non-peripheral misapprehensions of evidence, and improperly commented on witness-calling choices in a manner inconsistent with the Crown’s burden.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered before a differently constituted summary conviction court.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to one year in custody.

She appealed both conviction and sentence.

The appellant claimed that additional paycheques she received were payments for files she had brought to the lawyer's practice, allegedly pursuant to an agreement for 10% of earnings.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence as internally inconsistent, unsupported, and unreliable, while accepting the lawyer's evidence as credible and supported by bank records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the W. (D.) test, no misapprehension of evidence, and no basis for interfering with the sentence imposed.

The defendant was charged with "Over 80" and "Impaired Driving" offences allegedly committed on September 17, 2016.

The defendant applied to exclude breath test results and observations made following his detention by police.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the arrest for impaired driving and the demand for breath samples were based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The court rejected the credibility of the police officer's testimony, finding it exaggerated and misleading.

The court determined that the arrest and detention violated sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court further found that the defendant was unlawfully handcuffed for approximately one hour and that the detention was unnecessarily prolonged due to police negligence.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded all breath test results and video recordings as evidence.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of charges for delay.

The charges comprised two separate series: firearms and drug offences laid on January 21 and 26, 2015, and conspiracy charges laid on November 19, 2015.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 237, which introduced presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court found that the Crown's decision to consolidate the separate charges and defendants into a single proceeding, combined with inadequate disclosure management and lack of urgency, resulted in unreasonable delay for the initial charges.

The court stayed 32 charges related to the firearms and drug offences but dismissed the application regarding the conspiracy charge, which fell just below the presumptive ceiling.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of assault against her minor daughter.

The assaults occurred over a two-year period from May 2014 to February 2016, involving repeated beatings with household objects including a toilet plunger handle, rolling pin, and broom handle.

The final assault in March 2016 resulted in visible bruising and abrasions.

The court imposed a sentence of 135 days imprisonment (90 days on count 1, 45 days consecutive on count 2) followed by 18 months probation, a weapons prohibition under Section 110, and a DNA order.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives while considering the accused's remorse, guilty plea, lack of prior record, and the risk of deportation as a permanent resident.

D.M. was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault, being a party to sexual assault, sexual interference, and inciting sexual touching involving J.B., his stepson.

The offences involved D.M. forcing J.B. to have sexual intercourse with his biological mother (M.M.), D.M.'s wife.

The court applied the Kienapple principle, convicting D.M. on the charge of being a party to sexual assault under s. 272 of the Criminal Code, and conditionally staying other counts.

Considering aggravating factors such as the egregious breach of trust, the two incidents, the forced incestuous acts, and D.M.'s lack of insight and amenability to treatment, the court imposed a sentence of eight years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with various ancillary orders including a DNA order, SOIRA registration for life, firearms prohibition, and a s. 161 prohibition order.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of children's clothing taken from unlocked lockers at a recreational centre in March and April 2015.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for an 18-month conditional sentence followed by three years of probation.

The court accepted the joint submission, noting that while the offences appeared to be simple theft, the circumstances revealed concerning underlying issues.

The accused has a documented history of pedophilia, paraphilias, and sexual interest in young girls' underwear.

A psychiatric assessment recommended anti-libidinal medication, sexual offender treatment programming, and strict conditions regarding contact with minors.

The conditional sentence includes house arrest with limited exceptions, prohibition on contact with children under 12, and mandatory medical treatment for libido reduction.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown withdrew the over-80 charge and did not introduce breath test results.

The defence initially pursued a Charter application but abandoned it after evidence was heard.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's poor driving was caused by alcohol impairment rather than a medical condition or language barrier.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on the totality of evidence, including aggressive driving patterns, inconsistent defence testimony, and the accused's behaviour following police intervention.

The applicant sought relief from a forfeiture order relating to residential property forfeited as offence-related property and proceeds of crime following a relative’s conviction for conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The applicant claimed an interest in the property based on a $150,000 loan used toward its purchase and argued he held either an equitable mortgage or constructive trust interest.

The court found no intention by the parties to secure the loan against the property and therefore no equitable mortgage or resulting interest arose.

The court further held that a constructive trust based on unjust enrichment was unavailable because the applicant was merely an unsecured creditor and Parliament’s statutory forfeiture scheme constituted a juristic reason for the Crown’s enrichment.

Although the applicant appeared innocent of complicity or collusion in the offences, the absence of any legal or equitable interest in the property required dismissal of the application.

The applicant, a fugitive from the United States facing a sentence for tax evasion and an indictment for failing to surrender, applied for judicial interim release under the Extradition Act.

The court assessed the proposed release plan, which included sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found that the applicant failed to discharge his reverse onus on both the primary ground (flight risk) and the tertiary ground (public confidence in the administration of justice).

The application for judicial interim release was dismissed and the applicant's continued detention was ordered.

The accused applied for a second bail review after a prior review had been dismissed by another Superior Court judge.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the original justice of the peace’s decision or only the earlier review decision, concluding that under s. 520(8) of the Criminal Code and the authority of Saracino, the review was limited to assessing the earlier judge’s decision.

The applicant argued there had been a material change in circumstances and that the earlier judge misapplied the test from St‑Cloud in light of subsequent appellate authority.

The court found that the alleged new evidence, including statements by a co‑accused during sentencing, was not credible or capable of affecting the bail determination and therefore did not constitute a material change.

The court further held that the prior reviewing judge made no material error in principle and that detention on primary and secondary grounds remained justified.