Carolyne G. Kerr

The Crown brought an application seeking reconsideration of the admissibility of evidence of prior discreditable conduct statements made by the accused to police in 2013.

The Crown argued that the accused's re-election to a judge-alone trial constituted a material change in circumstances justifying reconsideration.

The court found that while the evidence had some probative value, its prejudicial effect, particularly the danger of moral prejudice and undermining trial fairness, significantly outweighed its probative value, even in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application was denied.

Elias Osman was convicted by a jury of impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death after a crash killed his friend.

The court considered aggravating factors, including high blood alcohol content and high speed, and mitigating factors, such as the offender's youth, lack of prior record, community support, genuine remorse, and significant personal injuries from the crash.

The judge found that the victim's act of grabbing the steering wheel was an intervening act, but Osman's impairment and negligence were still significant contributing causes of death.

The primary sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation were balanced with rehabilitation and parity.

A sentence of 5 years in penitentiary was imposed concurrently for both counts, along with a 7-year driving prohibition and a no-contact order.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control, over 80 care or control, and possession of crack cocaine following a police investigation that began when officers observed him and a woman in a truck in a laneway.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: an unjustified flashlight search violating section 8; an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds violating section 8; and multiple violations of the right to counsel under section 10(b), including delayed notification of rights, questioning after invocation of counsel, and failure to re-advise on a new charge.

The court excluded all evidence and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to one year in custody.

She appealed both conviction and sentence.

The appellant claimed that additional paycheques she received were payments for files she had brought to the lawyer's practice, allegedly pursuant to an agreement for 10% of earnings.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence as internally inconsistent, unsupported, and unreliable, while accepting the lawyer's evidence as credible and supported by bank records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the W. (D.) test, no misapprehension of evidence, and no basis for interfering with the sentence imposed.

The defendant was charged with "Over 80" and "Impaired Driving" offences allegedly committed on September 17, 2016.

The defendant applied to exclude breath test results and observations made following his detention by police.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the arrest for impaired driving and the demand for breath samples were based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The court rejected the credibility of the police officer's testimony, finding it exaggerated and misleading.

The court determined that the arrest and detention violated sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court further found that the defendant was unlawfully handcuffed for approximately one hour and that the detention was unnecessarily prolonged due to police negligence.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded all breath test results and video recordings as evidence.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of charges for delay.

The charges comprised two separate series: firearms and drug offences laid on January 21 and 26, 2015, and conspiracy charges laid on November 19, 2015.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 237, which introduced presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court found that the Crown's decision to consolidate the separate charges and defendants into a single proceeding, combined with inadequate disclosure management and lack of urgency, resulted in unreasonable delay for the initial charges.

The court stayed 32 charges related to the firearms and drug offences but dismissed the application regarding the conspiracy charge, which fell just below the presumptive ceiling.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of assault against her minor daughter.

The assaults occurred over a two-year period from May 2014 to February 2016, involving repeated beatings with household objects including a toilet plunger handle, rolling pin, and broom handle.

The final assault in March 2016 resulted in visible bruising and abrasions.

The court imposed a sentence of 135 days imprisonment (90 days on count 1, 45 days consecutive on count 2) followed by 18 months probation, a weapons prohibition under Section 110, and a DNA order.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives while considering the accused's remorse, guilty plea, lack of prior record, and the risk of deportation as a permanent resident.

D.M. was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault, being a party to sexual assault, sexual interference, and inciting sexual touching involving J.B., his stepson.

The offences involved D.M. forcing J.B. to have sexual intercourse with his biological mother (M.M.), D.M.'s wife.

The court applied the Kienapple principle, convicting D.M. on the charge of being a party to sexual assault under s. 272 of the Criminal Code, and conditionally staying other counts.

Considering aggravating factors such as the egregious breach of trust, the two incidents, the forced incestuous acts, and D.M.'s lack of insight and amenability to treatment, the court imposed a sentence of eight years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with various ancillary orders including a DNA order, SOIRA registration for life, firearms prohibition, and a s. 161 prohibition order.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of children's clothing taken from unlocked lockers at a recreational centre in March and April 2015.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for an 18-month conditional sentence followed by three years of probation.

The court accepted the joint submission, noting that while the offences appeared to be simple theft, the circumstances revealed concerning underlying issues.

The accused has a documented history of pedophilia, paraphilias, and sexual interest in young girls' underwear.

A psychiatric assessment recommended anti-libidinal medication, sexual offender treatment programming, and strict conditions regarding contact with minors.

The conditional sentence includes house arrest with limited exceptions, prohibition on contact with children under 12, and mandatory medical treatment for libido reduction.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown withdrew the over-80 charge and did not introduce breath test results.

The defence initially pursued a Charter application but abandoned it after evidence was heard.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's poor driving was caused by alcohol impairment rather than a medical condition or language barrier.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on the totality of evidence, including aggressive driving patterns, inconsistent defence testimony, and the accused's behaviour following police intervention.

The applicants were charged with dangerous driving on April 14, 2013, and brought a motion to stay the proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The information was sworn on May 9, 2013, with the first trial date set for May 30, 2014 (over one year later).

An adjournment was granted on April 11, 2014, because a Crown witness needed to be in England.

The second trial date was set for November 28, 2014.

However, on the trial date, the Crown advised that it would not be calling the witness whose unavailability had prompted the adjournment.

The court found that the delay exceeded the Morin guidelines of 8-10 months for provincial courts and that the adjournment was unnecessary.

The charges were stayed.

In a sentencing proceeding following a guilty plea to importing heroin, the Crown sought to qualify an RCMP officer as an expert on heroin trafficking, consumption, and user behaviour to support an aggravating inference that the drugs were imported for trafficking rather than personal use.

The defence challenged several areas of the proposed expert evidence, arguing the officer lacked qualifications in pharmacology, toxicology, and behavioural science.

Applying the framework for admissibility of expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and R. v. Abbey, the court carefully delineated the permissible scope of the officer’s expertise.

The officer was qualified to testify regarding observable effects of heroin use, typical methods and rates of consumption, habits of users, drug pricing, packaging, purity, and trafficking practices based on extensive police experience.

However, the court excluded opinions requiring medical, pharmacological, or toxicological expertise, including assertions about physiological consequences of prolonged heroin consumption.

The ruling permitted limited expert evidence but restricted the officer from offering medical or scientific conclusions outside his demonstrated expertise.